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Abstract 
International Electricity Pricing and Regulation 
This thesis is a study of the international electricity industry and in particular its 
pricing and regulation. As an industry, electricity is characterised by its monopolistic 
tendencies and prominent government involvement. 
Chapter 1 discusses the economic regulation of firms with particular reference to 
utilities. In the first instance there is a brief discussion of the history of regulation 
with its beginnings rooted in the Victorian era. The Chapter covers the different 
forms of regulation up to the present day and also discusses the possibility of the 
introduction of competition hi fonner monopolistic markets. The regulatory problems 
of asymmetric infonnation, political interference, regulatory capture and possible 
future regulatory refonn in the UK are also covered here. 
In the final Chapter (2) there is an econometric analysis of international electricity 
prices which provides an explanation of the variance in electricity prices between 
countries. The model built for this exercise utilises price data from eleven countries 
for various customer types along with other quantitative data for these countries over 
a four year period. The 'model' concludes that national regulation effects overcame 
the international effects on electricity prices and that the price of oil had no significant 
effect on the price differences experienced between the countries compared in the 
model. 
---~- -CarlWilkes~--
December 1998 
Preface 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, price control is divided between that exercised directly by 
ministers (where an industry is owned by the state) or through an agreed pricing 
mechanism (economic regulation) which could include any aspect of the pricing 
mechanism's offered by economists since the days of the Victorian railways. 
However, price control is operated in all cases one way or another because of the 
natural monopoly that most electricity companies normally enjoy, particularly in their 
distributive capacity. Chapter 1loo~ at the development of regulation and the choices 
open to regulators. It also deals with the other important economic aspects regarding 
regulation. 
In Chapter 2 the effect of regulation on prices charged for electricity is examined in an 
international context. An econometric model is developed in order to analyse 
international electricity prices in relation to regulation and the other cost/price 
determinants. This model provides an explanation of the variance in electricity prices 
between various countries. 
Cl 
r. 
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Economic Regulation 
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Economic Regulation 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This Chapter delves in detail into the subject of economic regulation. To begin, this 
Chapter examines the history of economic regulation before looking at the economic 
fundamentals that face a would be architect of a regulatory regime. 
This Chapter then goes on to look at .the privatisation process in the UK since the 
early 1980's before moving on to discuss the possible economic arguments 
surrounding the introduction of competition as opposed to continuing to regulate a 
protected market. The different forms of competition that can be introduced are 
examined before this Chapter goes on to explain the different types of regulation that 
can be used should full competition prove impossible. . 
Finally, this Chapter considers some of the problems confronting regulators at the 
present moment, such as informational constraints, political interference and the case 
for regulatory reform in the United Kingdom. 
History of Regulation 
1 
It is often overlooked in the present day period of privatisation that Britain, before 
nationalisation, had more than 100 years of economic regulation of natural monopoly. 
This 100 year period can be divided into two distinct time periods - the first being the 
period distinguished by Parliamentary regulation accompanied by increasing 
interference by the courts and the second in which the Regulatory Commission 
became the main instrument (post 1870s) . 
. . 
The Original Regulator 
Towards the end of the 1870s railway regulation by Government was becoming 
increasingly legalistic and Parliament started to realise at this stage that somebody 
was needed to oversee the industry with a more permanent interest in railways than 
itself or the courts had. This realisation of its (the governments) shortcomings in 
controlling natural mon'bpoly spawned the era of the regulatory commissions. One of 
the first targets for their control was the railways who were the biggest and most 
hnportant commercial organisations of their day. As W.A. Robson (1960) in 
'Nationalised Industry and Public Ownership' (Ist edn. AlIen and Unwin) writes; 
"The Regulatory commission emerged in mid nineteenth century Britain as an 
instrument for regulating the railways in the public interest. It was Victorian capitalist 
democracy's notion 9fhow to reconcile the public interest in a monopolist service of 
primary importance with the profit making incentive of joint stock enterprise. The 
idea quickly spread to the United States." 
1 
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However, the regulation of railways and other natural monopolies was allowed to 
develop in a random ad-hoc manner either leading to huge unjustifiable profits or 
alternatively poor development of services because of lack of resources for investment 
(because of inaccurate calculations by regulators on the profitability of companies). 
Indeed, the fmancial stringency was so tight, that in many cases, companies were 
technically non viable and this inevitably lead to poor, unreliable, low quality and 
unsafe services being offered to the public. 
Because the failings of these commissions was so considerable, it is very possible that 
the forms of regulation adopted in B~tain in the nineteenth century and first half of 
the twentieth century had consequences on economic efficiency which amounted to a 
substantial adverse effect on economic growth. 
The collapse of this regulatory regime therefore paved the way for society's next 
attempt at regulation; this bemg regulation of industry through nationalisation as 
Foster (1992) states "thus did nationalisation follow the collapse of one kind of 
regulation and another kind of regulation the collapse of nationalisation." 
Government Intervention in the Utility Industries in the 20th Century 
The reasons for government intervention in electricity (as well as other energy 
industries) are varied, overlapping and take a number of forms; the lEA (1992) gives 
the following reasons. These are; 
a. Interventions arising form sectoral policies other than energy policy, for example, 
environmental, fiscal and transport policy have a significant impact on the energy 
sector; 
--- -_ b._ Interventio~~which arise from the fact that the production and use of electricity 
( energy) have special characteristics - in particular in some circumstances they are _ 
perceived as more dangerous than most other economic activities (e.g. nuclear 
generation) and are therefore SUbjected to special safety regulation; 
c. Interventions which may affect the economy as a whole - e.g. commercial law or 
general taxation; 
d. Interventions for rea§ons of energy policy, particularly the need to maintain energy 
security. 
e. Interventions specific to the energy sector but arising for other policy requirements, 
for example the bans on trade in energy which have been enforced against countries 
which have repressive regimes or are failing to comply with intemationallaw. 
f. The link between electricity production and foreign and defence policy Le. the 
nuclear generation programme in most countries has military significance. 
2 
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g. To ensure indigenous resources are used where available and to control factors 
such as environmental effects of electricity production. 
h. The importance of social and regional impact of developments in the electricity 
industry. 
L The need for secure and competitively priced electricity in order to promote an 
efficient and effective economy (including antitrust policy). 
Government involvement will of co~se be affected by the type of ownership 
pertaining to the utility industries in each individual country. Government 
involvement in the 1990's can be classified according to the lEA in three general 
ways relating to ownership. These are; 
3-
1. Countries where the electricity industry are mainly in the private sector and subject 
to specific regulatory controls i.e. Germany, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. 
2. An Electricity industry characterised by either joint ownership by the public and 
private sectors or arrangements for joint decision making which enable the 
government to direct general strategies or a combination of the two i.e. Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Netherlands and Sweden. 
3. Countries where the electricity industry is dominated by major state owned 
industries Le. France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
State intervention in the utilities industries is an international characteristic which is 
set to stay into the foreseeable future. Governments will be responsible for the type of 
regulations applied to their utility industries. 
I-~--------'-----
Nationalisation 
Although the concept of nationalisation is widely believed to be a Socialist policy it is 
a matter of fact that during the inter war period many Liberals and Conservatives 
aligned themselves with the policy. The main objectives of public ownership in this 
era were social (due to the effects of recession) but the electorate at the time were- also 
interested in the econOIftic issues. For instance, it was agreed that in return for 
monopoly power no one should be refused service (therefore the obligation to provide 
universal service was part of the legal requirements of the new nationalised 
industries). This had considerable relevance at the time as for example a quarter of 
the population had no electricity in 1936 and the Chairman of the Central Electricity 
Board made reference to this situation" .. the very fact that yesterday something which 
was regarded as a marvel of science is today looked upon as a common place and 
indispensable service, throws upon us the responsibility not only of developing it to 
the fullest degree, but of developing it also at such a reasonable cost that the fullest 
possible use can be made of it" (Sir Archibald Page, CEB Chairman, Proceedings of 
the National Electrical Convention, 1935, p.20). A comprehensive account of this 
3 
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period can be found in Hannah (1979) "Electricity before Nationalisation". The main 
economic reasoning was related to economies of scale and rationalisation. Indeed, it 
is generally agreed that in the electricity industry economies of scale were substantial 
and realised; however, for the railways, although economies of scale existed, these 
were never realised in any significant way. Because of the existing regulatory and 
legislative requirements, nationalisation seemed the only way to bring about the 
necessary reorganisation required in industries to achieve the required economies of 
scale; this being an objective which could not be achieved by existing private firms 
(e.g. Foster (1992) notes that before privatisation there were 369 municipal and 200 
private electricity undertakings and 300 generating power stations operated by 130 
separate generating authorities). . 
The main economies of scale to be found in electricity through nationalisation were 
the economic and technical advantages that effective co-ordination could bring and 
this co-ordination had eluded'the Electricity Commissioners before nationalisation 
because they had not attempted to create an integrated market in electricity·. As Foster 
(1992) states "because different areas had different peaks and troughs in demand for 
electricity, there were still substantial gains to be made by connecting generators and 
distributors by a grid network. Public ownership seemed the only way of managing 
such a system - the computers and computer based mathematics did not exist which 
would have made it possible for there to be a truly commercial electricity market 
buying and selling through the grid". 
The beginning of the end for nationalised industries started with the theoretical attack 
of neo-classical economists in America on their regulated monopolies (ironically 
most of which were and still are privately owned). There theories on the performance 
of monopolies began to receive acceptance in Britain especially with the Conservative 
Party (see Foster 1992). 
~~~- Foster notesthdt this theoretical attack centred around the concept that the managers 
of monopoly firms would not always act in the public interest because of the 
interference of politicians (as well as civil servants) in these undertakings .. Therefore, 
the setting of meaningful objectives and measures of performance was almost 
impossible and therefore, consequently, it was difficult to ensure any level of 
efficiency in these organisations. Indeed, at about the same time there was also plenty 
of evidence from researchers that publicly owned utilities were not as efficient as they 
could be (see for instance Pryke 1971, 1981 and 1987). Although it could be argued 
that this research on comparative efficiency was flawed, as it was not comparing like 
with like, (i.e. public undertakings with private companies whose objectives were in 
many cases different) the work ofKay (1987) and Bishop and Kay (1988) as well as 
Ashworth and Forsyth (1984) throws some light on this area Overall, because of the 
lack of incentives to manage effectively, combined with poor ministerial judgement 
regarding nationalised companies, (which destroyed any attempt to improve 
performance with the aim of improving economic efficiency, both within the context 
of the efficient operation of these industries and in relation to their outputs feeding 
into other industrie~) even modest levels of efficiency were never achieved. This 
failure of the "nationalised" regulatory regime was in line with the failure of the 
regulatory regime that had gone before it (this being through Parliament and 
4 
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Commission) in the sense that both failed to deliver meaningful and continual gains 
in economic efficiency and both were blamed for contributing to Britain's economic 
decline. 
5 
The main political motivation for the Conservative Party to adopt the markedly more 
right wing policies in the mid to late 1970's was probably due to the Conservatives 
industrial relations fiasco due to the public sector mineworkers (and their union the 
National Union of Mineworkers) in 1974. Before this period the Conservatives 
policies and objectives were in some respects indistinguishable from those of Labour. 
Swann 1988 comments "It could indeed be argued that the Heath government was not 
merely back on the consensus path, but had strayed into the kind of interventionist 
territory which was more likely to be occupied by the Labour Party". After the 1974 
General Election defeat, one of the major economic influences on the Conservative 
Party was the Austrian school of Economics (the leading proponent of this school 
being the philosopher and economist Friedrick von Hayek), see D., Swann 1988 "The 
Retreat of the State" Ch. 7. Another significant influence was that of the American 
economist Milton Friedman. 
• I 
Underlying Theories of Regulation - Three Issues of Contention 
These can be considered to be; 
1. Public Choice and Public Interest Theories 
2. Property Rights 
3. Regulatory Distortions 
----We will consider each in turn; -
1. Public Choice and Public Interest Theories 
The thinking behind public choice relates mainly to Public Choice Theory and this is 
based on the idea of rent seeking behaviour first suggested by Tullock (1967) where 
rent is the abnormal or monopoly profit associated with setting price above average 
cost and marginal cost. <> Politicians often grant favours to companies in the form of 
economic regulations. The motives for this action are mezzanine, however, it may be 
that the firms concerned have used a great deal of effort in their attempt to make a 
case for regulation and these exertions may be sufficient to put forward a strong 
logical argument for the introduction of economic regulations such as limiting entry 
to the incumbents industry. Although this rent seeking behaviour by the incumbent 
may be enough on its own to ensure regulation occurs, there are very often other 
incentives for politi~ians to act in way which is not to the nation's economic benefit. 
These incentives may range from the securing of significant electoral support from the 
pressure groups concerned, the reinforcement of political ideals and perhaps the 
delivering of manifesto content and the expansion of their own departments duties 
5 
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(therefore its size and budget), thus appearing to be seen to be doing something about 
a problem that the firm originally brought to the public's attention as part of their rent 
seeking action. These incumbents, being organised, have an advantage over 
disorganised groups such as consumers (see Moe 1980 and NolI 1983 for evidenc.e of . 
this). The most extreme form of this advantage is where only one interest is 
effectively organised and this usually results in Stigler's simple "capture" where the 
one organised group will tend to be a monopoly or cartel (Stigler 1971). This 
monopoly or cartel will adopt efficient monopoly pricing (e.g. perfect discrimination, 
optimal two part tariffs and Ramsey rules) only if regulatory conditions force them to 
do so. 
The foregoing, therefore, suggests that the incumbents will waste resources in order to 
push there case for regulation, as regulation will, in most cases, be of benefit to them. 
However, once the incumbent has spent these resources they are lost to the economy 
because (according to Weyman Jones, T. 1994) the "prospective monopoly rents 
including the present value of the future rents will have been dissipated in the attempt 
to capture them. The dead-weight welfare loss to the economy is then the sum H + T 
due to both price inefficiency and wasteful rent seeking behaviour, where": 
T= [L\p]q; H = [L\pL\q]/2 
''where T is the resource transfer which is equal to the price change multiplied by the 
new lower quantity sold", 
"where H is the dead-weight welfare loss which is equal to half the product of the 
price change and the quantity change". 
Buchanan-Tullock and Harberger costs of resource allocation distortion can be 
described as follows (according to Weyman Jones, T. 1998). 
1----------- ! ... 
(These measures are illustrated in the following diagram.) 
. pnce 
" 
B 
E demand curve 
quantity demanded 
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"The measures are interpreted as follows. Suppose that the fIrm is pricing at Po and 
selling Qo. This is not Pareto optimal i.e. not an efficient allocation of resources. The 
efficient allocation is that given by marginal cost pricing, P = MC and Ql." 
"At Po, 
Consumer surplus = A 
Producer surplus = B+F 
Total cost = C" 
"AtP = MC, 
Consumer surplus = A+B+D 
Producer surplus = F+G ( would be = 0 if MC curve was horizontal). 
Total cost = C+E" 
/:!,. W = /:!,.Consumer surplUs + /:!,.(total revenue - total cost) 
"Harberger cost is the dead-weight welfare loss /:!,. W, from non-marginal cost pricing. 
/:!,. W = [A+B+D - A] ........ consumer surplus change 
+ [(F+G+C+E)-(B+F+C)] ........ total revenue change 
- (C+E-C)] ........ total cost change 
= D+G = Y2 (P-MC)/:!"Q 
7 
= ~ /:!,.P /:!"Q where /:!,.P is the difference between price and marginal cost needed 
to establish efficiency in the allocation of resources". 
''Now suppose we ask how the monopoly arose in the first place. The industry was 
pricing above marginal cost, and the monopolist earned B+F in profIts. It could be 
argued that it would pay a fIrm to invest up to B+F in securing a monopoly position. 
Suppose it has done this. These resources have been spent in order to earn future 
profits ofB+F. The sum B+F is the Tullock cost of monopoly. It is the amount (e.g. 
I----bribe or corrupt payment) spent in securing or maintaining the monopoly_ if this is the 
way that the monopoly position actually did arise. If the monopoly is removed, then 
these costs are not recovered, even though the Harberger cost is recovered." 
"If this monopoly arose without prior investment, then only the Harberger costs are 
counted, but if the monopolist had to buy the franchise or otherwise incur costs of 
establishing the position, then the Tullock cost is counted as well. The Tullock cost is 
B+F = approximately Qo/:!,.P." (G. Tu110ck 1967: 'The welfare costs of tariffs, 
monopoly and theft' Western Economic Journal, 5, June, pp 224-32). 
"T + H are sometimes referred to as the Tullock and Harberger costs of monopoly 
after the economist associated with their analysis. The immediate policy implication 
is that the monopoly conferred by entry limiting regulation is a much more costly 
result than traditional economics recognises" 
Public Choice theory also suggests that once regulations are established they will be 
almost impossible t~'remove and there will be a lack of interest in deregulation (see 
McCormick, Shughart and Tollison 1984). This disinterest arises because Tu110ck 
costs, once spent are sunk although the Harberger costs can be recovered if a 
7 
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monopoly is deregulated. Therefore, pressure groups opposed to rent seeking 
producers will have little to gain from removing old regulations and Will concentrate 
instead on stopping new regulations. As a result of this, it is likely that old 
regulations will still operate long after they produced the rents that were the original 
objectives of introducing regulation. This conclusion can only be changed when the 
regulated firms have to spend to maintain their regulatory privileges and it follows 
that deregulation is most likely in those industries where the incumbent finds it most 
expensive to maintain these old regulations. 
All of this dissatisfaction with nationalised industries in general was a major factor in 
the undermining of the prevalent political conventions and the Keynesian economic 
philosophy which had dominated UK. thinking since the 1930's. This disappointment 
with the performance of nationalised industries opened the gates to an alternative 
economic ideology i.e. that of monetarism as propounded by the Austrian School of 
Economists. ~. 
This alternative economic policy preferred the deregulation of nationalised 
monopolies by removing these state industries away from government ownership and 
control through the process of privatisation (although a new system of regulation was 
also installed at the same time). 
In the USA, the Government was also in the process of deregulating monopoly, 
although in this case the emphasis was more on introducing competition rather than 
replacing an existing regulatory regime with another form of it. 
Public Interest Theories assume that governments seek to maximise economic wealth. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) state "the usual approach is to assume that the objectives 
of government departments are dermed by some form of social welfare function .... it 
is assumed that government departments seek to maximise a partial equilibrium 
8 
I-~~-measure of economic efficiency .... in reality,therearetwo publi~ int~rest reasons __ 
why governments might want to attach differential weights to consumers' and 
producers' surpluses in their objectives ... the first of these is distributional objectives" 
e.g. does the government want to favour one part of society more than another -
Shareholders, Taxpayers, Customers etc. "The second reason why a government 
would not be indifferent to transfer payments to the firm is the cost of raising public 
funds" i.e. which makes giving subsidies economically inefficient and leads to 
distortions in economic decision making in other parts of the economy. "Given a 
welfare maximising government and assuming .... that the monitoring of management 
is equally effective under both types of ownership, that public ownership has 
advantages over the private alternative ..... it provides government with the policy 
instruments to correct any deviations between social and private returns that arise 
from failures in goods and factor markets. The market failure argument can also be 
applied to the market for corporate control: government monitoring does not 
encounter the public good problems associated with dispersed shareholdings and 
avoids the transaction costs of share purchases". 
". 
The public interest theories of regulation take it as given that the purpose of regulation 
is the enhancement of economic welfare through improved efficiency in resource 
8 
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allocation and that the appointed legal agencies pursue their economic maximisation 
objectives. However, there is another second alternative strand of thought which 
challenges these assumptions. This alternative philosophy is called the economic 
theory of regulation which is concerned with the determinants of supply and demand 
for regulatory activities. The main economic thinkers behind this theory were Stigler, 
Posner and Peltzman. The theory has looked closely at the income distribution 
consequences of regulatory processes and the incentives faced by the regulators 
themselves. The theories are intended to be non nonnative and seek to explain how 
particular fonns of regulation emerge and change by assessing the gains and losses 
caused by alternative arrangements for the various stakeholders involved i.e. 
consumers, producers, suppliers and trade unions. 
As Vickers and Yarrow (1988) point out "there is particular reason to be concerned 
about the potential influence of producer groups on regulations dealing with new entry 
into the industry. The effects"on consumers of entry restrictions are less visible than 
the effects of price fixing and there is a public interest argument in favour of control 
of entry that could be used in self serving ways by producer groups. Simply stated, it 
is that natural monopoly implies that efficiency is improved by having the goods or 
services in question supplied by a single fInn, and that entry prohibition is necessary 
to guarantee this outcome. A theoretical perspective on the possibility of collusion 
between regulator and the fInn is provided by work on hierarchies i.e. principal -
agent relationships consisting of several levels" (e.g. see Caillaud, B., R Guesnerie, 
P. Rey and J. Tirole 1985). 
If the members of the regulatory agency have interests that do not coincide with the 
public interest we could for example say that the government might wish to limit the 
amount of control that the regulator has over the fInn. Whether this is in the public 
interest is another matter and the control voters exert over politicians and to what 
extent voters get what they want is examined later. For instance, it can be argued'that 
t----the long tenn development of many nationalised industries in Britain did suffer from 
governmental interventions. 
2. Property Rights 
It is not unusual at the time of privatisation for there to be a debate about property 
rights. These usually centre around who actually owns the assets of the state owned 
fInn. If the State decides to sell its stake in the company to private shareholders or to 
the company's existing managers and employees, the State is giving up the continual 
income that would have been generated in future years for a sum payable in the 
present. However, it should be remembered that the market price of an asset is simply 
based on the present value of the income stream to which it gives the owner. 
Therefore, so long as the asset is sold at its fair market price no-one should be worse 
off. However, there is evidence to suggest that the electricity utilities were sold at 
below their market price and this underlies the assertion that shareholders enjoyed a 
fInancial gain at the expense of taxpayers who did not invest in privatisation issues. 
'. -
There is also the worry that the distribution of property rights at the time of 
privatisation will lead to the extinction of the fInn in the future as the main claimants 
9 
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on property rights are the firms shareholders, managers, employees, customers and 
creditors. Shareholders can come to expect very generous returns on their 
investments, especially in the early years after privatisation, when competition has not 
yet been fully established; similarly, remuneration packages for managers and workers 
can also have this effect, as can customer expectations of the levels of service that can 
be provided for the price they are paying partly due to increased media attention on 
the industry. 
3. Regulatory Distortions 
The main regulatory distortion here is the one identified where rate of return 
regulation is used (Le. the work undertaken by Averch and Iohnson). The crux of this 
work is embodied in what is commonly called the A-I effect (see Kahn (1971». The 
A-I model examines a monopoly firm that produces output using the usual production 
methods which utilise two resoUrces Le. capital and labour. The firm is assumed to 
seek to maximise an objective, usually profits. A regulator imposes constraints on the 
firm's behaviour. It is usually assumed that the firm is constrained to earn some "fair" 
rate of return on its capital stock that is greater than its cost of capital, but less than the 
. super normal levels that a monopoly could enjoy. The objective of the regulator is to 
keep the actual rates of return no higher than the allowed rate of return and the main 
result here is that the regulated firm will operate at greater than minimum cost. In 
particular, the regulated firm exhibits a pattern of capital labour ratios that is higher 
than a cost minimising producer would use Le. there will be evidence of over 
investing in equipment, as the allowed rate of return encourages this "gold plating" in 
order to increase the capital base for regulatory purposes Le. determining the firms 
income. 
Other kinds of regulation such as Price Cap may also produce their own kind of 
I---~ distortions.-UI1der'Price Cap Regulation' the temptation for the company is to UIlder .. 
invest in items which the regulator may not be monitoring in order to cut costs and 
increase profit, as the effect of price cap is to cut controllable costs but not profits. A 
example of where this happened was in the case of British Telecom (BT) who 
gradually ran down their call box services after privatisation as their cost cutting 
became over zealous. As the regulator at the time of privatisation, OFTEL had not 
stipulated certain quality standards in terms of customer services, the firm (BT), was 
tempted to make easy cost cuts by providing poorer service to its customers. . 
Subsequent regulation has ensured that these customer service standards have been 
built in to the performance yardstick measurements used by the regulator and indeed 
in subsequent privatisation's these quality measures have been part of the regulatory 
control regime from the outset. 
Reasoning for Privatisation 
Putting aside any analysis of the possible benefits of improved efficiency and lower 
prices, made possible by the private ownership of utilities, and the effect this may 
10 
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have on the economy as a whole for one moment, we will consider some of the other 
economic arguments put forward as the reasons for privatisation. 
Many analysts of the privatisation process have noted that the process was used with 
increasing enthusiasm because of the effect that this had on reducing nationalised 
industries cash requirements. Privatisation was the easiest way of cutting public 
expenditure in order to reduce the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement and control 
the money supply. The popu1ar economic argument that privatisation may lead these 
industries to be more efficient was not the major driver of the reasoning here for 
privatisation, especially as these arguments had yet to be proved beyond all 
reasonable doubt (and wou1d take time to prove). Thus it cou1d be said that at the 
time, the strength of the pure economic arguments for privatisation, on their own, 
were not enough to persuade the government to action the privatisation process. 
However, privatisation's ability to cut the PSBR was a very attractive motivating 
factor, especially to the Treasury. At the time the Conservative Government had up to 
then been thwarted in its attempts to cut public expenditure (because of rising social 
security costs due to unemployment). For instance from 1978/9 public expenditure 
rose from 40.5% of GDP to 43.5% in 1982/3. 
This reasoning can be undermined by the fact that shifting profitable state owned 
firms into the public sector means there will be a temporary flow of funds into 
government coffers (Le. from the privatisation sale) but these funds must be offset 
against the funds which wou1d have come to the government as a resu1t of these 
nationalised company's profitable operations. If the government sold the assets it 
held in nationalised industries at the correct market price, then no one wou1d be worse 
off (e.g. taxpayers or the new shareholders) as the market price of an asset, as stated 
earlier, is simply the present value of the income stream which is received by the 
holder. However, there is evidence to suggest that most UK privatisation's have been 
I----under priced (i.-e.-witness the share price increases on flotation day). Thert~ may also 
be reason to believe that the government wanted to price these assets attractively in 
order to encourage wider share ownership, something they considered as an important 
policy objective which they were prepared to encourage (at the taxpayers expense). 
Another argument is whether the prospect of privatisation is the only way to improve 
management in nationalised industry and therefore whether this process has added to 
the valuation of the industry's worth. 
A useful theoretical analysis of the factors that affect the public sector deficit are 
given by C.A.E. Goodhart ("Money, Information and Uncertainty" 1975, Macmillan 
Press, Ch.8 p.154). Goodhart uses the following to explain the public sector deficit: 
Where 
PSD = OMO + NMD - MAT + ECF + ~H 
"PSD is the Public Sector Deficit after taking account of various 
fmancial transfers". 
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"OMO represents the outcome of the authorities' operations in 
marketable debt". 
. 
''NMD is the outcome of transactions in non marketable debt". 
"MAT shows the required use offunds to pay offmaturing debt". 
"ECF gives the total finance obtained from, or required for, 
accommodating external currency flows". 
"AH represents the public sector's monetary liabilities, 
(high powered money)." 
As Vickers and Yarrow (1988) have noted "the proceeds from the sale of state assets 
directly reduces the PSBR because they are treated as negative public expenditure. 
Unlike the sale of gilt's (Le. Government Bonds) sales of shares in privatised 
companies (Le. Government Equities) are deemed technically not to be borrowings, 
although in reality there is little difference between the two methods of Government 
fmance. Privatisation therefore accorded well with the objective of reducing the 
PSBR so as to meet the targets the Government has set itself as part of its medium 
term financial strategy for anti inflationary monetary control". 
There is also the worry that the flotation of large public utilities on the stock market 
can lead to fund deprivation for other private sector companies who wish to raise 
funds for often riskier but more important ventures in terms of national presence in 
these m~ket sectors (Le. investors will be tempted to switch funds away from risky 
ventures such as the new "cutting edge of technology" firms to the relatively safer 
pastures of the utilities). This does not mean that these fIrms will not be able to find 
___ -=fin= an<;ipg on the market, only that as funds become scarcer because they are attracted 
~o lower risk investments-the remaining.investmentftIDds Will demand relativelf 
higher interest rates than they would have been if alternative investments in state 
enterprises had not been made available. 
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In a speech given in July 1981 by Sir Geoffrey Howe (then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer) the Governments feelings about nationalised industry were expressed 
vividly and critically. Foster 1992 states .... "he noted that private industry had 
responded to the recession by reducing its overall fmancial defIcit whilst the 
nationalised industries had increased theirs, even though some of their prices had risen 
more than twice as much as the RPI. He blamed their immunity from market forces 
and effective government control". 
In addition, there were other pressing reasons why privatisation had become popular. 
One of the most signifIcant reasons for the increasing popularity of privatisation in 
Britain was the increase in international trade between all countries. Some 
economists believe that Britain had allowed monopolies and cartels to develop within 
its business community to a greater extent than found in most other modem 
economies through such devices as barriers, quotas and transport costs (for instance 
12 
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see Hannah, 1. (1983) "The Rise of the Corporate Economy"). In Britain, exports 
have remained constant as a proportion of GDP throughout this century whilst 
imports, at the same time, increased to 25%. Those who produce traded goods in 
Britain, faced with increased overseas competition, became increasingly critical of 
state organisations, especially when these producers increased their costs when 
international trading conditions did not allow electricity consumers to pass on these 
costs to their customers. Privatisation and the introduction of competition was seen as . 
a remedy for this situation. 
An Alternative Political Explanation for Privatisation 
There are many reasons why the privatisation process has been particularly successful 
for the Conservatives and this has led many observers to conclude that perhaps the 
denationalisation process had· more to do with achieving political objectives than 
economic ones. For instance, privatisation has increased the number of people who 
own shares and there was evidence at the time indicating that share owning 
individuals were more likely to vote for the Conservative Party than any other 
political party, as were managers in the private sector compared to their public sector 
counterparts. Trade unionists are more likely to vote Labour and they are more 
numerous in the state industries. Civil servants are more likely to vote for Labour and 
the argument here therefore is that a reduction in the number of state fmns will 
inexorably lead to a reduction in civil servants. 
The aforementioned also has some synergy with the governments other policy 
objectives such as the reduction of trade union power and the extension of home . 
ownership through the sale of council houses to their tenants. 
I----Competition and Regulation _ 
Most economists are in agreement that where competition can be introduced it should 
be, as it is a far more effective spur to efficiency and deterrent to customer 
exploitation than regulation. Open access to a market is the best regulator because it 
draws competitors into the market place to challenge incumbents and remove super 
level monopoly profits (as well as ensuring that competing firms are more responsive 
to their customers needs). 
" 
Foster (1992) notes that competition is also more likely to provide the best mechanism 
for revealing how much customers are really prepared to pay for a service (Le. at 
different price versus quality thresholds). The pressure of competition ensures that 
firms almost always reveal more details about their true costs than can ever be realised 
even by the most sophisticated regulatory revelation mechanisms (see Vickers and 
Yarrow 1988). In addition, firms in the competitive environment have a greater 
incentive to keep their costs to a minimum, to constantly innovate and improve their 
products and methods of operation, otherwise rivals will gain a competitive advantage 
over them. Competition should also ensure that anti competitive practices do not 
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materialise. However, some would argue that in order to be effective, competition 
needs regulating. 
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Regulation on the other hand is riddled through with difficulties such as its ability to 
transport itself from economics to politics as well as being plain ineffective in some 
cases; suffering from its ability to be captured by the entities it is regulating to the 
more mundane explanations for ineffectiveness such as the possible incompetence of 
its staff and lack of necessary resources or its costs outweighing any benefits it may 
deliver. The success of the rent seeking activities of those regulated also need to be 
considered. R.G. NolI for example in his paper 'Economic Perspectives on the 
Politics of Regulation' 1989 comments on the effects rent seeking can have on the 
fairness of the regulatory process; ... "Regulation ... becomes a forum among them (Le. 
organis~d interest groups) for creating and dividing rents .... regulated businesses and 
their employees are likely participants in the formation and execution of regulatory 
policy and especially in decisions that directly and immediately affect them. All else 
equal, this implies an outcome that first creates monopoly rents, and then engages in 
rent sharing between management and labour of the benefits thereby attained. 
Although this is most easily detected in economic regulation where a disorganised 
group may face monopoly prices, similar outcomes can also arise in environmental, 
health and safety regulation in which standards can be written so as to reduce 
competition" . 
We will now consider the options policy makers have in respect of deciding upon 
whether competition or regulation will be the most effective and practicable (in terms 
of economic efficiency) for the control of companies and the reasons for these 
choices. The political reasons for perhaps not choosing the optimal arrangement will 
also be discussed. 
t----Competition ahdRegulation - Why Both? 
Where natural monopoly does not exist and effective competition can be introduced, 
the need for economic regulation (in the sense of price control) is not great and indeed 
its costs will probably outweigh any benefits it could bring. It should also be 
remembered that regulation suffers from a number of failings and so the possibility 
that this might occur should also be borne in mind. Foster (1992) amongst others has 
noted that where natural monopoly does exist, regulation is necessary to prevent 
consumers from being @xploited. The overall objectives of economic regulation 
therefore, are the promotion of competition and the control of monopoly and cartels 
thus leading to greater economic efficiency. Even when their is no natural monopoly, 
the regulator, in the interests of promoting competition and economic efficiency, may 
need intervene to stop cartels and other anti competitive practices. The regulator must 
also keep an eye open to prevent or mitigate practices like predation, trademark and 
patent abuse and unfair or unequal access by which dominant firms use their market 
power to penalise rival firms and this type of regulation is usually a government or 
high court duty whi'ch relates to all markets. This is the only type of economic 
regulation needed for those industries where competition is present or can be made to 
be present. However, arrangements of another kind are required where monitoring of 
14 
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competition is difficult because of geographical differences (e.g. overhead or 
Underground electricity networks, dictated by the land). When these circumstances 
arise, specialist regulators are required, as they will be better aquainted with the detail 
of the industry they oversee and therefore more able to ensure proper control than the 
general competition authorities could. 
In the future, the need for specialist regulation may even spread to markets which are 
at present totally competitive. The globalisation of many companies combined with 
the fact that the constantly improving information and management systems that 
organisations have, enables the effective management oflarger structures. Therefore, 
it could be argued that this might resUlt in national economies losing international 
competitiveness in many industries, if they insist on more than one domestic firm 
providing for their home market. In order to allow one fIrm to supply the home 
market and therefore be a virtual monopoly where competition from overseas is weak, 
there needs to be a regulatory· regime in place to ensure the dominant firm does not 
exploit its domestic customers or suppliers. 
Choos'ing to Regulate or Introduce Competition 
When deciding to regulate, policy makers fIrst need to consider the other options 
available to them besides regulation for the reasons given earlier. However, as 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) have pointed out, regulation and competition sometimes 
need to go hand in hand i.e. "an incumbent firm with market power usually has at its 
disposal a variety of instruments of strategic entry deterrence, and that incentives for 
predatory behaviour are likely to exist. Unless this sort of conduct (and threat of it) 
are checked by suitable policy measures, market "liberalisation" in the legal sense can 
be quite ineffective. It can be argued that the sanctions of ordinary competition policy 
are sufficient to strike down anti competitive behaviour of this kind but we disagree 
I---~for several reasons. -First, competition policy in the U .K. (and elsewhere) evolved at a _ 
time when dominant utility companies were in public ownership. The competition 
problems that may arise in these industries were therefore not envisaged when policy 
was made, and so there is little reason why it should be expected to cope with them. 
Secondly, it can be argued that U.K. competition policy has weaknesses generally (see 
for example Sharpe 1985). Certainly it has usually been less vigorous than U.S. 
antitrust policy. Thirdly, where the danger of particular anti competitive practices can 
be foreseen, it makes sense to legislate against them in advance, and to give the 
specialist regulatory agency the duty of monitoring and enforcing the policy. This 
also reduces uncertainty. Finally, the agency has greater knowledge and expertise 
regarding industry conditions than a generalist competition authority can have." 
The most obvious option to regulation, besides of course the choice of no regulation, 
is the introduction of competition and this can be effected in a number of ways. This 
extension of competition raises a number of important issues relating to competition 
policy, for instance: (a) will the introduction of competition have a negative effect on 
the economies of scate of the industry (i.e. is it natural monopoly?) as introducing 
competition often means breaking up a monopoly; (b) the question of unnatural 
monopoly i.e. how to prevent it from occurring; ( c) if it is economically efficient and 
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practically feasible to break up the monopoly, what kind of competition can be 
introduced? (d) if the monopoly cannot be broken up, is competition still possible? 
( e) should regulation be necessary - what kind of regulation should be utilised? 
Natural Monopoly 
Just because monopolies can be broken up into smaller units it does not follow that 
the resulting organisations will produce greater efficiency or that consumers will 
enjoy greater benefits (e.g. lower prices). 
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The basic definition of a natural monopoly (see Kahn 1971) is where a finn emerges 
as a single seller in a market because of cost or technological advantages contributing 
to lower average costs of production. Competition among finns in such an industry 
eventually results in one largefinn supplying the entire market demand at lower cost 
than two or more smaller firms: A natural monopoly can produce the entire quantity 
demanded by buyers at any price at lower average cost than would be possible for 
each firm in the industry if more than one finn existed. There is no real doubt that 
some public utilities such as electricity distribution are "natural monopolies". The 
questions that then needs to be asked is what makes them natural monopolies and are 
they characterised by long run decreasing cost tendencies; or as Kahn (1971) puts it 
"an inherent tendency to decreasing unit costs over the entire extent of the 
market.. ... the principle source of this tendency is the necessity of making a large 
investment merely in order to be in a position to serve customers on demand .... these 
tendencies are related to the fact that fixed or capacity costs bulk unusually large 
among total costs in most public utility industries. And it is these fixed costs that 
might be.wastefully duplicated if two companies tried to serve the same 
markets ..... and even when unit costs are increasing .... monopoly is still present 
because one company can serve any given number of subscribers .... at a lower cost 
,~---than two".- _r. _ 
Therefore, if natural monopoly is diagnosed it may be unwise to break up the 
monopoly in order to create competition as this will result in a less economically 
efficient outcome (in terms of higher costs to the industry, higher prices to customers 
and inefficient resource allocation for the economy as a whole) than retaining the 
monopoly would have been. The next question is whether to regulate the monopoly 
or not. However, should an unnatural monopoly be identified (i.e. where there is 
evidence to suggest that efficiency gains would result from one or more competitors 
entering the market place) the introduction of regulation may be a less attractive 
option compared to the various ways competition could be introduced. We will 
consider the various methods available to introduce competition later. 
Unnatural monopolies can be identified by the fact that any increase in their size, 
brought about by organic growth, acquisition or merger, does not exhibit the declining 
unit costs which are the hallmarks of a natural monopoly. 
16 
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Promoting Competition - Contestable Markets 
The topic of deregulation has coincided with the theory of possible equilibrium 
outcomes in certain types of markets otherwise known as "perfectly contestable 
markets. E.E. Bailey in "Contestable Markets and the Theory ofIndustry Structure" 
Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) suggests that a "perfectly contestable market 
(pCM) is defmed as one in which entry and exit are easy and costless, which mayor 
may not be characterised by economies of scale or scope but which has no entry 
barriers. Potential entrants are assumed to face the same set of productive techniques 
and market demands as those available to incumbent firms and there are no legal 
restrictions on market entry or exit and no special costs must be borne by an entrant 
that do not fall on incumbents as well. Thus, potential entrants are undeterred by 
prospects of retaliatory price cuts by incumbents and instead are only discouraged 
when the existing market prices leave them no room for profitable entry". 
"Consequently, a contestable market need not be populated by a great many firms; 
indeed, contestable markets may contain only a single monopoly enterprise or they 
may be comprised of duopolistic or oligopolistic firms. Willig (1979) proved that the 
absence. of entry barriers can lead to the· socially right amount of entry Le. that for a 
feasible industry. configuration to be sustainable it must minimise total industry cost 
for the production of the aggregate industry output". 
The theory of perfectly contestable markets leads us to investigate the conditions 
under which markets will be perfectly contestable i.e. where second best welfare 
maximising prices are chosen voluntarily by the incumbent firm(s) (in order to deter 
new firms from entering the market place) and the socially "right" number of firms 
exist in each market. In particular three conditions have been identified by the above 
authors Le. Bailey, Baumol, panzar and Willig and these conditions are: 
I----a.-Free entry to.the industry in the sense that potential entrants and the incumbents do 
not face different entry costs and there are no legal barriers to entry such as licenses or-
patent protection. 
b. Costless exit from the industry - Le. any firm in the market place can leave without 
additional costs to itself. Thus any fixed costs incurred should not be sunk or 
irreversible Le. it can move the capital it has invested intact into another market or 
dispose of the assets in an efficient second hand market, which means that the amount 
paid for the assets does dlot exceed the economic depreciation on its capital. 
A good example here is the difference in exit costs for potential entrants to electricity 
distribution as compared to operating a fleet of aircraft. As the costs to the economy 
and to the potential entrant of laying a new electricity distribution network to every 
potential customers home would be prohibitively high this market is unlikely to be 
very contestable. On the other hand, an entrant into the airline industry will find that 
the sunk costs here are much lower because the majority of the capital costs (Le. the 
aircraft) are easily liquidated or transferable to another market Le. aircraft can be 
moved to different locations cheaply in order to compete in other markets whereas 
distribution wiring, once installed, is difficult and costly to move. 
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c. The new entrant is able to offer supply, or sign a supply contract with the 
incumbent's customers before the incumbent can change its current price structure. 
The threat of this possible invasion into the incumbents market place should, 
according to PCM theory, be enough to make the incumbent price at average cost 
permanently rather than only temporarily. 
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Therefore, if conditions for contestability are satisfied, PCM theory suggests that 
regulation has nothing to offer even if the industry is a natural monopoly or naturally 
uncompetitive. Summarising the views expressed in Baumol (1984) and Elizabeth 
Bailey's DECD report (OECD 1985) we get the following conclusions: 
a. Contestable market theory should be used as a broad framework to analyse the 
consequences of deregulation. 
b. Governments should strive to promote policies that promote contests for markets. 
c. Impediments to entry and exit may be the primary source of interference with 
market efficiency (in the sense of promoting cost minimising structures). 
d. Regulatory policies tend to support cross subsidisation, encourage a high price and 
high service product, draw artificial boundaries that interfere with the scope of a firm's 
operations and fail to provide for firms to act efficiently. 
e. If the industries display the properties of contestability, deregulation should lead to 
a dramatic lessening of cross subsidies and the creation of a larger selection of 
products at different prices while providing enormous pressure to improve 
productiyity . 
----Natural Monopoly - Should it be Regulated? _. 
One argument often made in the light of past regulatory failures and the evidence 
relating to the cost of regulating monopoly profit is that it might be more efficient to 
allow a monopoly to set its own prices if that avoided the costs involved in regulating 
monopoly profits. The cost of regulation is not insignificant, particularly in the USA, 
where the nature of their regulatory process has made regulation very costly. There is 
a possibility that regulation costs may rise in Britain if disputes get out of hand and 
the system declines into constant court actions. There is a substantial economic 
argument against the regulation of monopoly profits where there is free entry, 
effective fair trading arrangements and the possibility of product innovations and real 
competition. Higher returns to the incumbent will signal to potential competitors that 
there might be an incentive to overcome the barriers to natural monopoly (i.e. the 
absorbitant returns made by the monopoly may mean it is economically viable to 
provide an alternative e.g. own generation for electricity, gas cylinders for gas supply, 
road transport as an alternative to rail). 
"". 
The economic justification for imposing some kind of regulatory regime on monopoly 
companies lies in the fact that all the evidence shows that where regulation has not 
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been applied to natural monopolies, there is a tendency for the incumbent to set prices 
higher than necessary whilst restricting output, thus enabling itself to earn super 
normal profits or be less efficient than need be. Therefore, in order to promote lower 
prices and more goods, the monopolist should be forced (through regulation) to set 
prices equal to short run marginal costs and increase production until price equals 
long run marginal cost. 
However, the potential regulator must exercise caution when introducing regulation. 
Braeutigam (1989) states "When should a natural monopoly be regulated at all? In 
assessing the effects of regulation and later in comparing various options for public 
utility pricing, we need to employ a Clear measure of the economic benefits to 
consumers and producers. While such measures do exist, they are often difficult to 
apply given the kinds of market data that are usually available. The work of Wi1lig 
(1976) has suggested that the well-known measure of consumer and producer surplus 
is an adequate approximation-in most circumstances". 
Therefore, we can conclude that where natural monopoly exists it is prudent to 
enforce some kind of regulation. We will discuss what type of regulation may be the 
most economically efficient and what makes it so later. On the other hand, where 
unnatural monopoly exists, the policy decision will more probably be directed 
towards what kind of competition can be introduced (although the introduction of 
competition does not rule out regulation altogether i.e. the regulation of multiproduct 
firms in different markets some of which are fully competitive). 
We will now turn our attention to the different types of competition that can be 
introduced where 100% natural monopoly does not exist. We will then look at the 
different ,types of regulatory regimes that can be used to control natural and unnatural 
monopolies (in cases where competition is not deemed appropriate). 
f--------- - ------- ~. 
Introducing Competition 
As already stated, competition is preferable in most cases to regulation. However, 
there are situations where competition can be unproductive ( Le. where natural 
monopoly exists) and there are different ways to bring about competition, some of 
which may be more efficient than others, depending on the circumstances. 
The arguments for pref~rring competition to promote efficiency are numerous. The 
forces that competition lets loose provide not only that firms reveal more facts about 
their costs than can be extracted by law or regulation, it also ensures that they reduce 
their costs to a minimum, otherwise they will lose their efficiency edge to a rival firm. 
In many cases, competition will ensure that the players in the market concerned will 
find it difficult to engage in anti-competitive practices. Competition also makes it 
more likely that the company will concentrate on innovating its products, processes 
and services. This will not only make it more unlikely that the company will be 
surpassed by its rlvaIs, it will also mean that the consumer enjoys greater utility as 
these improvements will feed through to them in the form of, for example, lower 
prices, more diversity and higher quality/technically advanced goods. 
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We will now discuss the different forms that competition can take and how the 
regulator may go about introducing it where monopoly exists. 
The Main Ways to Introduce Competition 
The main methods are as follows; 
1. Ensuring Free Entry 
2. Intermodal Competition 
3. Restructuring (Break Up) and use of Yardsticks 
4. Interconnection 
5. Franchise for the Market - Demsetz Competition 
We will now discuss each type in turn. 
1. Free Entry 
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There are many economists who are of the opinion that natural monopoly can be kept 
efficient simply by having the threat of a new company entering the market at the first 
sign of the incumbent operating below the most efficient level (thus offering the 
prospect ~at there is enough slack in the market for the new entrant to exploit the 
inefficiency of the incumbent and enter the market place and gain market share). 
However, at the same time as acknowledging this fact we must ask ourselves whether 
----free entry is always desirable.-------------------------- --------------- ----- ------ ----
Is Free Entry Always Desirable? 
As Kahn states in the Economics of Regulation Vol II 1971 "All economic regulation 
involves a limitation or suppression of competition, whether by control of entry or of 
price rivalry or both ...... and in principle all such regulation has the avowed purpose, 
among others, of assuring a satisfactory quality of service". Adam Smith heralded the 
deregulation of his times by calling for the abolition of all legal monopolies in 
restraint of trade, whether granted or imposed by the Crown, by Parliament or the 
merchants of a borough. In recent years economists like William Baumol have 
reached a similar conclusion. The main' weapon of free entry is that the incumbent 
(monopolist) will know that if they become demonstrably inefficient or set prices,too 
high, another firm can enter and compete away market share and profits. However, 
Foster (1992) puts three main arguments against free entry, these being: 
" -
(a) Competition can be introduced too quickly - Where an industry is suffering from 
organisational shortcomings because of its past ownership and under investment, it 
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will probably be in no position to react quickly enough to changes in its business 
environment so that it will ultimately fail, whilst being unable to grasp the scale and 
extent of the economies available to it that a competent management and organisation 
would have been able to deliver; New entrants could, therefore, become the 
monopolist incumbents in a relatively short space of time. Allowing too many 
competitors into the market could also allow the experienced and relatively bigger 
incumbent to control the market, using its fmancial strength and comparatively 
superior economies of scale to capture the most profitable parts of the market whilst 
ensuring its rivals scrap over what is left, thus preventing these rivals from ever being 
able to grow big enough to mount a serious threat to its dominance. This is most 
likely when the initial entry investment is substantial and not readily saleable and 
therefore this was the reasoning used to justify Mercury Telecommunications being 
allowed as the only competitor to British Telecom initially. The experience in Britain 
to date, as regards the introduction of competition, is that competition is allowed to 
grow periodically. Announcements to this effect are usually made in advance by the 
relevant regulator in order to avoid shareholder hostility and possible early 
competitors from being disadvantaged. 
Another issue here is asset specificity. This issue usually occurs when some kind of 
interconnection occurs e.g. where Mercury for example uses the British Telecom 
network to route its own calls (interconnection is discussed later). D.M. Kreps (1990) 
states .... " a transaction has high levels of asset specificity if as the trade develops one 
side or the other or both becomes more tied to and in the 'power' of the other side. A 
simple example is a company that makes glass bottles locating a plant adjacent to a 
bottler" (with the intention of winning business through the efficiency gains made 
possible by locating next to one another). In this example 'asset specificity' is at work 
on both sides of the transaction. "There will also be cases in which asset specificity 
binds only or mainly on one side". An example of this is where one side in order to 
get the result they require must use more inputs than the other party in the transaction 
r----and therefore relatively more resources will be expended in the form of traIlS action 
costs to prevent this party from being exploited. "The second quality of a transaction 
.... .is the extent of uncertainty in the transaction .... and this goes hand in hand with 
bounded rationality. Indeed, uncertainty is the major complexity that gives rise to 
bounded rationality. Finally, there is the frequency of the transaction. This aspect of 
the transaction does not bear on the absolute magnitude of its costs, as with the 
previous two aspects, but rather on the relative costs of various means for dealing with 
the transaction". This usually means that transaction costs are relatively cheaper when 
they occur frequently as efficient governance structures can be constructed compared 
to when transactions are undertaken infrequently. 
(b) Free entry can lead to wasteful and destructive competition because of the 
excessive investment of capital for the size of the market (thus causing duplications of 
assets). For competition to be of any use, market entry and exit must be as near 
costless as possible (Le. capital costs are fixed but not sunk) as substantial sunk costs 
make the prospect of destructive competition more likely. In a two company situation 
(one being the incumbent, the other, the new entrant) the likely outcome where sunk 
costs are involved is that the two companies will try to compete with each other in a 
price war to try and dislodge one another from the market place. Prices may go down 
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to short run marginal costs (i.e. only variable costs are covered) or even lower. This 
contest will last until one party decides it can no longer take the drain on its cash 
resources and withdraws (or is made to withdraw by its backers) or goes bankrupt or 
the two parties agree to come to some agreement which may not be in the interests .of 
the consumer. In any case, whoever wins or remains will be a lot worse off than if the 
contest hadn't occurred and may no longer be in a position to invest the sums required 
to maintain the efficiency and quality standards it had before the new entrants arrival. 
The winner may also be tempted to regain the losses it sustained in the battle by 
charging higher prices to its customers (if they cannot go elsewhere) and even if the 
two players survive, the probable anti competitive arrangement will almost certainly 
lead to higher prices for customers, as the two incumbents seek ways to recover their 
losses. In the event of one party losing, there is also the loss to society of the capital 
invested in the sunk investment (unless of course the winner can do something with 
this equipment). It would seem logical that the risks of entry may be so high that it 
would be very foolish for any. possible competitor to try and enter the market place 
(let alone the considerable "cost of capital" that may be incurred because of the level 
of risk). Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) put this perceived foolishness down to lack of 
information and insufficient analysis of the facts or the deliberate misleading of 
shareholders by the instigators of these projects. 
However, this possible risk, relating to new entrants failing needs careful political and 
economic judgement from the regulator if he is to see the introduction of competition 
succeed. Certainly he needs to ensure certain standards are maintained and that the 
new entrant at least succeeds long enough to promote real competition, but not at the 
cost of prices (and average costs) being higher and quality lower than they would have 
been had the monopoly remained intact. 
( c) There are certain circumstances in which a natural monopoly may not be able to 
retain its maximum efficiency (the very factor that makes it a natural monopoly) if 
I~---new entrants are allowed to enter the market. To remain viable, a natural .. monopoly __ 
must be exhibit unit costs that fall as its output increases. A natural monopoly that 
does not exhibit these characteristics displays marginal costs rising over the whole of 
its output. There are many reasons why this might occur; Oliver Williamson (1983) 
puts the blame at the feet of factors he calls 'control loss diseconomies' (Le. 
management competence is shown to be insufficient in its strategy,tactics and its 
ability to control the organisation. 
In addition, the entry ota new participant can lead to an economic domino effect. For 
instance, the new entrant enters one part of the natural monopoly's market by 
lowering prices for one product or one geographical area. As a result of this· 
competition, the monopoly fIrms average unit costs increase as the same fixed costs 
must be recovered from a lower level of sales. This leads to possibilities for other 
competitors to enter other parts of the monopolists market and reduce prices there, 
leading to even lower sales and increasing average costs. These invasions will mean 
that over time, the monopoly will be gradually dismantled. This will be economically 
ineffIcient if, eventUally, average costs are higher than when just the one fIrm served 
the market (which of course means higher prices for customers). Therefore, the 
economic argument should be for the monopoly to be protected from free entry. 
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However, the attack on the monopoly (Le. domino invasion) cannot happen if, 
according to Foster (1992) a "natural monopoly has declining average costs and the 
freedom to discriminate in its pricing" ... since the monopoly ... "can protect itself by 
lowering its prices sufficiently in that part of its market where it meets competition". 
As it is not economically efficient to prevent price discrimination what stops 
incumbent monopolies from doing this? Foster notes the case of British Telecom in 
the 1980's, where political forces kept prices (and hence profits) in the long distance 
and international call sector artificially high whilst local calls were kept low Oocal 
calls being subsidised by the more profitable long distance calls). Free entry means 
that a competitor could cream off the high profit market by offering lower prices than 
BT's whilst leaving the unprofitable local market to BT. IfBT had pricing freedom it 
would have rebalanced its charges to prevent Domino invasion. However, BT was 
restricted from discriminating in this way, by the regulator and politicians who feared 
the political backlash from residential customers, whose local call charges would have 
risen suddenly. Because of its social obligations, BT is vulnerable to domino 
invasion, which could lead to economic inefficiency in the market. 
In this situation the regulator has to decide whether to opt for allowing cross 
subsidisation or the promotion of competition. However, it should be remembered, as 
Foster (1992) notes, that ever since the 1840's politicians have interfered with 
regulation on purely political groundspy insisting on imposing social obligations on 
regulators and these strictures make it very difficult for regulators to formulate 
regimes that ensure maximum economic efficiency. It is difficult to see how a 
regulator can move away from this position, as it is unlikely that politicians would 
even allow a long transitional period to ensure that cross subsidisation was eliminated. 
The technical innovation in many industries has meant that a large number of barriers 
to entry have been overcome but the issue of free entry is important in this context. 
For instance, in telecommunications, copper wire is being challenged by mobile 
r-----phone networks; microwave transmission and fibre optics and in electricity, wind 
generation and gas fired generation stations are challenging coal and oil. Foster notes 
"to leave such developments in the hands of a monopolist would ensure that the rate 
of innovation would be slow" (thus reducing consumers opportunities to benefit from 
the cost reductions and the new services that these cutting edge technologies make 
possible). 
Overall, it could be said that although a case can be argued for restricting entry in 
order not to jeopardise economic efficiency, an example where this argument would 
be deemed relevant are only normally to be found in the text books. Restricting 
freedom of entry, even when used as a method to ensure long term competition, 
should, as a rule, only be used sparingly. Where restrictions on entry do exist, this is 
usually due to political intolerance towards efficient pricing systems and where 
restrictions do not exist, politically determined pricing systems will eventually be 
eliminated and this may lead to further interference from politicians (and customer 
complaints) as demonstrated after the privatisation of British Gas and British 
Telecom. If the regulator feels it is his duty to prevent moves towards inefficient 
pricing he may opt for alternative methods beside entry restriction to achieve this. 
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Barriers to Free Entry 
Although the introduction of competition, in theory, is the perfect solution where 
_ markets are contestable, it is probable that new entrants will face a number of barriers 
that will restrict their entry. Apart from the obvious defence of incumbents such as 
predatory pricing, excess capacity and the blocking of access to the networks there 
are other problems to be overcome. The existence of brand names is one problem and 
coupled with the incumbents probable superior financial strength, this will certainly 
mean that the new entrant will be faced with intense promotion of the incumbents 
products through advertising. Thus by advertising (so long as this is successful) the 
incumbent will raise the entry price to the industry i.e. the new entrant will not only 
have to make large investments in production and labour but also in marketing and 
sales, a task made even more expensive where the incumbent has established brand 
name goods. In addition, legal barriers to competition may exist such as Patents. 
2. Intermodal Competition 
This usually cannot be introduced by the regulator as it often exists already e.g. Gas 
versus Electricity for domestic heating. Braeutigam (1989) comments "competition 
can be introduced ....... through Chamberlinian monopolistic competition (see 
Chamberlain 1962). For example, in the transportation sector of the economy 
monopolistic competition among various modes of transport is often referred to as 
'intermodal competition'. This term is employed to describe the rivalry between 
railroads, motor carriers, pipelines and water carriers all of whom compete for freight 
traffic. If intermodal competition is strong enough, it might be cited as a basis for 
deregula~ion even if one or more of the modes of transport appears to have the 
structure of a natural monopoly. Consider a simple example of freight transportation 
between two points. Suppose that a railroad and a competitive motor carrier industry 
can provide the-required point to point service, and suppose the railroad has the cost __ _ 
structure of a natural monopoly. If the intermodal competition between the railroad 
and the motor carriers is strong enough to prevent the railroad from earning super-
- -
normal profits, then the unregulated market outcome may be very nearly second best 
in the absence of regulation". 
A good real life example of intermodal competition is the deregulation of the motor 
carrier industry in the USA since 1980. This deregulation has led to declining rates 
for motor carriers and this has added further to the intermodal competition faced by 
the railways. In the UK, the planned synchronisation of the Gas and Electricity 
market liberalisation timetables (Le. 1998) is an example of the regulators need to 
ensure a level playing field, wherever possible, for intermodal competition. 
3. Restructuring 
Although breaking up a monopoly may not lead to increases in efficiency (although 
this is a point of some contention) restructuring the industry usually means breaking 
the large monopoly into a number of smaller entities. These smaller natural 
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monopolies will have less scope to cross subsidise or undertake predation than its 
larger predecessor. 
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In the case of regulated oligopolists, it has been argued that the break up of two 
existing fIrms into say fIve or more separate companies, would reduce their ability to 
control their market place and thus lead to lower prices for customers. This scenario 
has been backed up by Game Theory simulations which suggest lower prices are 
achieved when there are five or more competitive firms in a market as opposed to two. 
However, when considering breaking up companies the regulator must bear in mind 
what the 'minimum efficient scale' of operation is. The regulators decision regarding 
the two firms referred to earlier would have to be tempered by the consideration that if 
they were broken into five separate companies, would they still be big enough to 
retain their minimum efficient scale of operation and would this affect their chances of 
competing successfully on the international stage. 
Break up can also have another spin off advantage for the regulator. The advantage 
for the regulator is the fact that each of the new companies he has created will be 
reporting data about their performance (which is comparable, as each of the new 
companies will be serving roughly the same type of markets with the same product). 
The regulator can use this information to make comparisons about the relative 
performance of each firm. Littlechild (1986) has suggested that it may be possible to 
build this 'yardstick' into the price formula by requiring that the costs which a firm is 
able to recover are based not on its own costs but on those of an average or above 
average firm and therefore this data would be of particular use to the regulator, 
especially when revising the price formula Complications in making comparisons 
Will arise however if all the units compared and measured as a result of the break up 
are not identical. For instance, within electricity board areas or British Telecom 
districts the grouping of customers are not identical e.g. in terms of numbers serVed, 
geographical and demographic spread, consumption per head, income levels, growth 
I----rates, industrial-mix, investment patterns, temperature and climate. TIlese differellces . 
will have a signifIcant effect on unit costs and other measures of efficiency. 
The devising of efficiency indicators is extremely difficult especially across a number 
of companies serving different market areas (Le. geographic). It is very common to 
fmd many business operations and public bodies who have not developed sufficient 
indicators to track even their own performance over time. Schleifer (1985) and 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) deal with the issues of performance measurement and the 
use of yardsticks. Schleifer (1985) examines a model of yardstick competition. 
Vickers and Yarrow state "in the basic version of the model there are n identical risk 
neutral firms operating in a certain environment. Each faces dem~d curve Q(P) in its 
market (the n markets are separate). A firm spending z on cost reducing effort 
achieves unit cost level c(z), with c(o) = Co ." 
."The lump sum transfer to the firm (if any) is denoted by T. Profit is therefore given 
by Schleifer as;" 
1X'=[ P - c(z)]Q(P)-z+T 
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"If the social welfare objective is the sum of consumer and producer surplus (and so 
this is not affected by considerations of distribution or the cost of raising public funds) 
then the optimum subject to the non negative profit constraint has," 
p* = c(z*), 
-c'(z*)Q(P*) = 1 
Z*=T* 
"In sum, price equals unit (and hence marginal)cost, efforts to reduce unit costs occur 
up to the point where their marginal cost (=1) equals marginal benefit (= -c'Q, Le. 
degree of cost reduction times volume of output) and the cost of effort is reimbursed 
by the lump sum transfer." 
"However, this first best outcome cannot be achieved if the regulator does not know 
the function c(z), which describes the scope for cost reduction. Schleifer supposes 
that each firm is run by managers who like profits ;r .but dislike effort z. In particular 
it is supposed that their preference ordering is lexicographic with profits preferred 
over leisure; This is the minimal extent to which some weight can be given to leisure 
in manager's preferences. The key to efficiency is to break the dependence of the 
price for firm i upon its cost level". "Let. ... 
C, =2>jl(n-l) 
j"" 
and 
" ... be the average cos~ and effort levels of firms other than i. These provide 
yardsticks against which to compare i's performance. Schleifer 1985 shows that the 
following regulatory mechanism f~r all firms i induces first best behaviour:" 
p, = Cl 
and 
7; = Zi 
"The profit of firm i is then 
- --Kt =[C,-C(Z,)]Q(C,)-Z, +Z, 
and the first order condition is therefore" 
00, 
-C' (z,)Q(cl)-I=O 
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"There is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which all firms choose ci = c* in which 
case P* = c* and T* = z* and Shleifer shows that there exists no asymmetric Nash 
equilibrium. Therefore the equilibrium that sustains the first best outcome is unique. 
This result in fact holds with pricing rules considerably more general than ;; =CI . A 
related result holds even when lump sum transfers are impossible. Yardstick 
competition can then induce the second best outcome, Le. the social optimum subject 
toT=O." 
"The main shortcoming of the version of this model is that it assumes that firms 
operate in the same environments with exactly the same constraints. However, in real 
life this is unrealistic as companies do not operate in exactly the same environments 
especially where they are regionally based. Shleifer used regression analysis based on 
observable characteristics to screen out at least part of the heterogeneity between 
firms that occurs in practice.'~·: 
Reduced form regulation works well if it takes into account all the variations between 
firms and is truly accurate. Where it fails to capture the full extent of the differences, 
reduced form regulation does not provide perfect incentives and it causes undesirable 
noise to brought into the analysis. Using reduced form regulation also has the 
disadvantage of encouraging endless arguments about the appropriate way to conduct 
the regression analysis (e.g. which variables to include). 
lfthe regulated firms concerned collude in order to frustrate competition via 
regulation i.e. if firms deliberately used less than maximum effort (to an equal extent) 
inefficiency would persist. 
The use of econometric studies can also be used for making comparisons although it is 
unlikely that a regulator would rely on them entirely for setting and revising a price 
I----(or rate ofretuiil) formulae, as the results of such studies are qualified-because of 
doubts over the quality of the data. The UK. Audit Commission uses such studies for 
comparing the performance of local authorities and, although it is not their regulator, 
the commission is effective because its uses the media to distribute and therefore force 
its recommendations. 
In theory it may also be possible to enforce the establishment of a system of 
accounting which would ensure that comparisons would be a lot easier and more 
accurate for the regulator. Something along these lines has been attempted in the 
USA, in which particular items are, or should be, recorded in the same way, although 
even this system is not accurate enough to be used for detailed statistical analysis. 
4. Interconnection 
Where there is a s~.tainable natural network type monopoly, interconnection is one of 
the best ways to introduce competition. Thus interconnection usually entails other 
companies being able to use the monopolists distribution network for a charge usually 
known as the "Use of System Charge". One of the earliest (in modem times) and 
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most successful examples of interconnection was the use of British Telecom's 
telecommunications network by Mercury. 
28 
Ioskow and Schmalensee (1983) have commented on the problems and advantages 
that have been highlighted in the United States from the issue of interconnection. The 
difficulties in the USA stem primarily from the contractual nature of the relationships 
between the players in the market place there, as opposed to the command type 
system operating in the UK between the National Grid, the respective generators and 
the regional distribution companies. 
One of the economic advantages of using interconnection, according to Foster (1992) 
is that the system can be operated with greater technical efficiency (particularly true 
for electricity systems). It also enables other firms other than the monopolist to 
deliver products to users and this usually results in lower prices and greater product 
innovation than would have resulted had interconnection not occurred. The regulator, 
however, must be wary of the problems that can be created by interconnection. The 
possible loss of quality is one such problem (Le. the operators disturb the technical 
integrity of the monopolists service by using poor equipment or offering poor 
standard goods and services). Another problem is that the contractual disputes 
between the parties reach such a point that the costs involved in challenging legal 
rulings outweighs any economic advantages that were originally obtained. The 
provision of adequate capacity (at all times) for possible parties wishing to use the 
system is another problem. 
One of the main regulatory offences that can come from interconnection is inefficient 
interconnection. This offence arises when one party to the interconnection agreement 
has and ~es his superior knowledge and bargaining power to gain advantage in the 
use of the system. The knowledge needed to understand these contracts is likely to 
necessitate stringent regulation to prevent offences such as this occurring. 
I------------!' .. _____ _ 
Prices charged for use of system should encourage economic efficiency. Long run 
marginal cost, including whatever profit rate is required to maintain the network, is an 
accepted basis for price setting. However, although LRMC may be easy to estimate 
when there is one operator using the system under easily forecastable future demands, 
the position is made more complicated when there are a number of third parties 
wishing to use the system, all with their own ideas on how demand can be stimulated. 
In "Toward Competition in Local Telephony" (W. Baumol and G.Sidak, MIT Press 
and the American Enterprise Institute, 1994) the authors argue that regulators should 
tear up their traditional rules and use marginal pricing (although the issue here is how 
to redefme the marginal cost to the network owner of providing access). This consists 
of more than just the cost of the use of the system as the network is nearly always in 
the market for the final product and will therefore lose revenues to any newcomer. 
The prices that regulators usually let the network owner charge for fmal products also 
makes a contribution to the networks fixed costs. When the network owner loses 
market share to the iiew entrants, the network owner also loses this contribution, 
which can be called the opportunity cost (which should be included in the access price 
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to the system). This approach has been named "Efficient Component Pricing" (ECP) 
and enables the regulator to achieve four important economic aims. First, it enables 
the correct price signals to be sent to possible new entrants about whether it will be 
viable for them to enter the market Second, it ensures the network costs are properly 
covered. Third, it means that utilities should worry less about entrants 'cream 
skimming' customers located in the lucrative bits of the network (e.g. city centres) 
and the effect this has on the network owner being able to meets its obligations to 
customers in the less lucrative areas of the network. Fourth, it should mean that there 
is no need to separate the network from the supply of fmal products, as the right 
access prices should mean that incumbents have no incentive to keep rivals out. 
ECP has already been used in practice by the American railways and California's 
telephone regulators'. 
One criticism is that because ECP requires new entrants to reimburse utilities for lost 
revenues it will only encourage monopoly. Baumol and Sidak argue that this is not 
the case as the final product price should mimic the outcome in a contestable market 
where there is no barriers to entry. ECP will not ensure against high prices because 
the regulator is slack, but no other regime will either. 
Defining the opportunity cost is another problem. If the market has a fixed number of 
customers, with the result that all of the new entrant's sales are from the incumbent 
utility, it is fairly easy. But if the entrant's product differs from, or is cheaper than the 
incumbents, the market will expand. Working out what the monopolist has foregone 
is then much trickier. As with most other forms of regulatory mechanism's the 
regulator. is not perfectly informed. 
c------5. -Franchise for the Market (Demsetz Competition)_ 
Franchising is an alternative to taxing monopoly rent (and this will be looked at in 
more detail in our section on types of regulation). This could be said to be 
competition for the market rather than competition within the market. Demsetz 
(1968) ("Why regulate utilities" Journal of Law and Economics) po'inted out that in 
many cases where there is a risk of losing economies of scale, it is not always sensible 
to have competition within the market. In theory, franchising is an efficient way of 
taxing the profits of an)t monopoly enterprise, since it allows prices to remain at levels 
determined by supply and demand and therefore to be efficient, potential franchisee's 
have to compete at certain predetermined time intervals, thus reducing long term 
profitability to competitive levels. The franchising scenario is therefore a means of 
regulating prices and as such this method of introducing competition can be said to be 
a way of regulating prices, as the process has to be repeated (and supervised) at 
predetermined intervals. 
For franchising to work effectively in these circumstances, two conditions need to be 
satisfied. First, inputs must be available to all firms in an open market (at competitive 
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prices). Second, the cost of collusion among bidding rivals must be prohibitively 
high, so that competitive bidding is in fact the outcome of the franchise procedure. 
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The companies may own the means of deliyering the service or product if they win 
the bid or they could merely provide the expertise and personnel to. operate equipment 
or facilities owned by a third party (e.g. the government) and this would necessarily 
be the case in network industries such as Gas and Electricity. 
Demsetz competition, in theory, leads to average cost pricing since all excess profits 
are bId away. Ifbidding competition is fierce enough, the price awarded to the 
winning firm woUld only be sufficient for it to break even (including normal profit). 
One problem arising from this method of organising competition is the risk that the 
winning franchisee will also provide the lowest quality service. Here the regulator 
must, as part of the franchising system, devise quality standards that stipulate quality 
levels that have to be adhered to. Setting the quality standards required, and indeed 
determining them in the first place is very difficult. Future changes in the market 
place, which are not foreseeable at the time the contract was written, but which may 
necessitate re negotiation in the original contract at a later stage, add further 
complications and costs. Re-negotiation of the franchising contract, enforcing 
compliance or re-opening the bidding process are all options open to the regulator 
when changes in the market place occur, but none of these options is without fmancial 
consequences. 
The problem of the winners curse also needs to be considered i.e. will the winning bid 
be so low that the winning company will be forced out of business or forced to cut 
back on quality in order to survive. 
Another problem to be encountered with franchising is that the firm with the existing 
t----franchise possesses an advantage over other bidders because they have sup~rior . 
information as to what the true costs of the operation really are. In addition, if the 
franchised business has substantial assets, the valuation, replacement or transfer of 
these assets from a losing to a winning franchisee poses considerable 
accounting/financial problems. Williamson (1976) also suggests that franchising has 
a tendency to degenerate into rate of return. regulation. 
Finally, this kind of competition can also face problems when the enterprise 
concerned provides mote than one service to the customers it serves. As Braeutigam 
(1989) states ... " in the single product case the winner might be chosen on the basis of 
the tariff that the franchisee would charge to customers .... however this selection 
criterion does not naturally generalise to the case of multiple products .... this may lead 
to a number of different bids which are undominated. Demsetz competition offers no 
obvious basis for choice among a number ofundominated prices, even though some 
of these may be quite inefficient relative to others". 
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Types of Regulation 
Although the regulator can introduce competition he may be faced with a situation 
where competition can only be introduced slowly, or because of reasons of natural 
monopoly the introduction of competition would be counter productive i.e. the 
incumbent in the market place, if left unregulated, would exploit its customers even 
though competition might exist (e.g. there may be a tendency for two big players in 
the market to collude) or finally, competition cannot be introduced, because of 
political reasons. In these situations, the need for regulation (usually of an economic 
kind) is obvious. The choice of regulatory regime the regulator decides upon will 
usually be influenced by the numerous economic theories that make up the bulk of the 
work on regulation theory. 
This section now looks at the main regulatory theories (and mechanisms) that can be 
used by the regulator to induce the firms he regulates to produce and price their 
outputs (Le. goods and services) in the most efficient and equitable manner. In this 
section we will also examine some regulatory theories which have been used in 
practice (Le. Rate of Return and PrIce Cap). 
Before going on to discuss the different types of regulatory regimes we will briefly 
discuSs the concept of "First and Second" best pricing (see Train 1991) as this will be 
illuminating to the discussions on regimes. First best prices occur where a firm 
selling products such as electricity sell this product at marginal cost. However, firm's 
have to sell the products at above marginal cost in most circumstances, as marginal 
cost is below the firms average cost. If a firm sells goods at marginal cost, the firm 
would lose money on each unit sold. In theory, companies could be subsidised for 
this loss and therefore continue to achieve first best prices by selling to customers at 
marginal' cost. In the absence of subsidy, prices have to be raised to average cost 
where the firm is allowed to cover its costs but earn only zero economic profits. This 
I----is the-"second best" outcome as the consumer surplus is high~r h~re t!J.an under any 
other scenario apart from the first best outcome. Subsidies are usually undesirable, as 
the money needed to fund these subsidies usually has to be raised through taxes, 
which of course have to be raised somehow and of course will distort incomes or 
prices elsewhere in the economy. Theoretically, in a multi product situation, there is 
room for some price differentials, which will allow the firm or regulator to charge first 
best prices to consumers for some of the firms products (at prices unsustainable in a 
single product situation). Finally, effective mechanisms to ensure truth telling about a 
firms costs are an essential part of regulatory regimes, otherwise it will be impossible 
for the regulator to know what is marginal cost and where. first/second best prices are 
being achieved. It is generally agreed that pure "competition" is the best truth 
revealing mechanism and therefore, where firms produce in a truly competitive 
market place, it can be said that the majority of their products will be sold at second 
best prices. 
We will now discuss the types of regulatory schemes and mechanisms open to the 
regulator. The regtilatory options are as follows: 
1. Rate of Return 
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2. Price Cap regimes 
3. Surplus Subsidy Schemes 
4. Return on Sales, Output or Cost regimes 
5. Sliding Scale {Profit Sharing) arrangements 
Some of the mechanisms that enhance optimality are: 
1. Ramsey Prices (in addition using the V-F mechanism to induce Ramsey prices) 
2. Time of Use Prices 
3. Multipart Tariffs 
4. Self Selecting Tariffs 
Regulatory Options 
1. Rate of Return Regulation 
In the United States the most prevalent form of economic regulation is the Rate of 
Return regulation employed to regulate most of the country's utilities. The "test of 
fairness" here is that the firms revenue should yield no more than a fair return on its 
capital. The tradition of putting a control on a monopoly's returns goes back a long 
way in the United States and, as in Britain, maximum rates of return were often 
written into statutes and charters, the figure of 10% often being used as the acceptable 
rate of return. 
----The judgement· of what constitutes a fair rate of return was somethittg much argued 
about. In the United States, Foster (1992) notes that the Supreme Court discussed this 
issue in great detail in Smyth vs. Ames (1898), a case which influenced US regulatory 
policy for half a century. Unfortunately, this case led the US regulatory authorities 
into many future difficulties, as the court, in its conclusion to this case, made an 
incoherent list of inconcise statements and observations on how capital value should 
be ascertained and what items should be allowed in the valuation. This judgement, 
therefore, had the effect that many lawyers and their advisers were kept in lucrative 
employment arguing oxer how the total present value of a monopoly firm should be 
calculated, whenever a regulatory dispute flared up. Inevitably, these arguments were 
usually won by the company rather than the regulator, as the company usually had 
better information and the benefit of practical experience at its disposal and the courts 
were usually reluctant to rule against firms where the matters in dispute were of a 
technical/commercial/economics nature. The effect of the Smyth vs. Ames case 
affected American regulatory policy unti11944 when the Supreme court in Federal 
Power Commission vs. Hope Natural Gas reversed the earlier decision in the "Ames" 
case. However, the""decision in the Hope Natural Gas case did not do anything to 
remove the uncertainty surrounding rate of return regulation in the United States, as it 
did nothing to address the problems surrounding the issues relating to the calculation 
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of the rate base. The main arguments remained Le. cost of capital, the evaluation of 
the effect of risk and forecasting the future rate of inflation. 
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In the period between the Hope and Ames cases, the American regulatory system has 
fluctuated between three views of what constitutes a fair and reasonable rate of return. 
To sum this up we can paraphrase Foster (1992) ... "first was that the property right 
of the shareholder is defined by the market or net present value of the business, on 
which it then should earn a return not too different from that which could be earned as 
a return from a business of similar risk. The second view stresses the historic value of 
the actual investment, that is, the rate of return not should be based on whatever rises 
or falls have occurred to the value of the investment subsequently. The third of these 
views is of a managerial nature, in that it puts forward the idea that the organisation 
must have a sufficiently high return to raise whatever capital it needs to maintain its 
operations. These three views, unfortunately do not agree or compliment one another 
and therefore do not lead to the same result, thus leaving a great deal of scope for 
regulated firms to argue about the merits or otherwise of their particular 
circumstances. This situation favoured the regulated because, as they had more 
resources, it was in their favour to make the court hearing last as long as possible in 
order to wring out concessions from the regulator". 
More recently the discussion about rate of return regulation has centred around the 
incentive that it gives the regulated organisations management to behave in an optimal 
economic manner. As Averch, Johnson* and Wellisz** amongst others have pointed 
out, (* H. Averch and L.L. Johnson "Behaviour of the Firm under Regulatory 
Constraint" American Economic Review, December 1962; ** S.H. Wellisz 
"Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies: An Economic Analysis" Journal of 
Political;Economics February 1963) this combination of circumstances may induce 
companies to make investments where the social benefits fall short of their social 
costs, because as Kahn (1988) observes; 
t' 
-- -- .,- -~ --- --
1. Such investments will expand the rate base on which the companies are entitled to 
a rate of return in excess of the cost of capital. 
2. Where net revenues directly generated by such incremental investments fall short 
of yielding the allowed rate of return they can recoup the revenue deficiencies by. 
raising their rates in markets in which they have hitherto been prevented from pricing 
at profit maximising levels. These considerations could hiduce them (1) to adopt an . 
excessively capital intensive technology and ( 2) to take on additional business, if 
necessary, at unremunerative rates. 
The effect of the "A - J _WIt effect might be reflected in (as noted by Kahn and 
others); 
1. The resistance of many public utility companies to full peak - responsibility pricing, 
which would tend to hold down the expansion of demand at the peak and the 
consequent justification for capacity . 
.... 
2. A willingness to maintain a large amount of standby capacity, in excess of peak 
requirements. 
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3. Some considerable resistance by electric utility companies to the thorough ongoing 
regional planning of investment that represents the most highly integrated form of 
power pooling (which would reduce the need to invest in generating capacity). 
4. A resistance to the introduction of capital saving technology. 
5. A reluctance to lease facilities from others. 
6. A tendency for public utility companies to adhere to excessively high (because 
excessively costly) standards of reliability and uninterruptibility of service, with 
correspondingly high and costly specifIcations for the equipment they employ. 
7. An incentive to bargain less hard than they otherwise would in purchasing 
equipment from outside suppliers. 
8. A tendency to reach out for additional business, inside or outside the sphere of 
their franchised public utility operations, if need be at rates below incremental costs in 
order that the company can increase its rate base. 
Foster (1992) notes that utility rate case hearings are therefore dominated by such 
factors as whether the utility has overstated replacement costs (i.e. why were they 
higher than original cost?) the appropriate depreciation rates and appropriate cost 
interpretation when assets are acquired from another firm. In fact these proceedings 
can be so exhaustive that it has been claimed that the regulatory initiatives of the 
1930's in the United States were necessarily so meticulous and docunlented that they 
formed the foundations of the modem accountancy profession (see McCraw, T.K.(ed.) 
(1981) "Regulation in Perspective" and "Prophets of Regulation" (1984) both Harvard 
University Press). 
----In recent years;the most difficult problem for rate of return regulators has been how 
to deal with multi product firms where certain goods (i.e. electricity units on one 
tariff) are priced at competitive levels and others are priced either well above or below 
a reasonable level. In addition, there will be a tendency to over capitalise the core 
monopoly. The argument then follows that the natural monopoly will have higher 
capital to labour ratios than normal fIrms (Le. gold plating) or at the very least the 
accusation is that they have not maximised their capital/labour input ratios. However, 
some writers believe there is no real evidence to suggest over investment due to rate 
of return regulation (e.g. Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. (1985) "PrivatIsation and the 
Natural Monopolies" Public Policy Centre). Also, under rate of return regulation the 
firm will be induced to move as much cost as possible into its regulated business in 
order to justify increases to its regulated prices (thereby meeting the rate of return 
proscribed). In response, regulators have to devise various constraints relating to cost 
apportionment in order to stop obvious exploitation, although these rules have tended 
to create their own conundrums. For instance, where a fIrm has set up separate 
companies to supply its monopoly part with inputs, it wilI"be tempted to over charge 
for these goods. "-
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The one thing that is certain is that the interpretation of accounting rules and the 
inconsistency of approach and application has led, in the United States, to endless 
court cases between the regulated and the regulators. To this extent, the whole U.S. 
experience can be rightly described as a descent into legalism. 
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Foster (1992) notes that the result of a century ofU.S. style rate of return regulation 
has been the fonnulation of the classical regulation concept, which depends on 
calculating the cost of providing the output and then allowing a justifiable return, so 
that a price for the output can be arrived at. The investigation and calculations 
~volved to arrive at this juncture have proved to be the biggest stumbling block for 
rate of return practitioners. Regulatory commissions have understood the concept of a 
reasonable rate of return with price~ quality and entry being the main factors for their 
attention. The decision in the Hope Natural Gas case led to the courts allowing 
regulatory commissions a great deal of room to exercise their judgement as to what 
constituted anti competitive monopolistic behaviour. Therefore, provided that a 
commission goes through a full set of hearings during which evidence is produced and 
tested and its own fmdings can be regarded as consistent with its responsibilities and 
recent case history, its decisions are unlikely to be challenged successfully in the 
courts. However, reaching this point, where all the provisos are in place, can be 
difficult, time consuming and expensive. This use of discretion has enabled 
regulatory agencies, where they have chosen, to take action to blunt any of the rate of 
return regimes tendencies to allow distortions that Averch and Johnson and others said 
would follow from this type of regulation. More recently, this discretion has allowed 
some regulators to follow their beliefs e.g. that the industries they regulate should 
reflect marginal cost. Where marginal costs are falling below average costs, which is 
a defming characteristic of strong monopoly, this forces those regulators to allow 
price discrimination, so long as the relevant legal statues enable such discrimination. 
With weak monopolies, on the other hand i.e. where marginal costs are above average 
I----costs,- efficient pricing ceilings will be needed to limit the return to what is deemed 
acceptable. However, this is just one standpoint amongst many, some regulators use 
their discretion to regulate in a more traditional classical mould, while others 
concentrate on the political and social aspects of regulation. 
Rate of Return Regulation in Operation 
According to Train 1992 "under Rate of Return (ROR) regulation the finn is allowed 
to earn a 'fair' return on its investment in capital, but it is not allowed to earn profits in 
excess of this fair rate of return. The finn can freely choose its levels of inputs, its 
output levels, and its price as long as the chosen levels do not result in profits in 
excess of the fair return. The rate of return on capital is defmed as"; 
"Revenues minus costs for non capital inputs, divided by the level of capital 
investment. " 
ie ROR = (PQ - wL)/K. where P = price 
Q = quantity 
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w=wagerate 
L = non capital input 
K=capital 
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"This rate must be no greater than the fair rate of return, called f, that the regulator has 
previously announced. Therefore, the firm can choose any K,L,Q, and P as long as " 
f ~ (PQ - wL)1K 
"The economic profits or what economists call the excess profits are the difference 
between the firm's revenues and its costs for all inputs including capital;" 
tr = PQ - wL - rK where r = cost of capital 
"The maximum return the regulated firm is allowed to earn can be expressed in terms 
of economic profit i.e." 
f-r~ «(PQ-wL)IK)-r; 
f -r ~ (PQ - wL - rK)IK; 
f - r ~ trlK; 
tr~ (f -r)K. 
____ tt,,_ 
"Therefore, the maximum economic profit the firm is allowed to earn is (f - r)K." 
"If, for example, the fair rate of return is 1 0% and the cost of capital is 8% the firm is 
allowed to earn no more than 2% of its invested capital." 
"e.g. If £100m is invested, it will be allowed to earn no more than £2m in profits" 
(Train 1991). 
Cl 
The apparent unfairness of the rate of return regulation when used for different types 
of business, is displayed by the example given in Kahn 1988 where a typical utility is 
compared with a typical bus company; this is shown below: 
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TYPICAL TYPICAL BUS 
UTILITY COMPANY 
.' . $ $ 
Annual Income 10,000,000 10,000,000 
Net Investment 25,000,000 4,000,000 
Operating expenses 8,500,000 9,760,000 
Return (6% of investment) 1,500,000 240,000 
2. Price Cap Regulation 
Price Cap regulation could be considered as one of the great innovations of the 
regulatory world over the last" 1 0 years. Where the regulator uses Price Cap 
. . 
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regulation, the price cap imposed restricts the permitted change in the average charge 
for a bundle of services to movements in a general price index (typically the Retail 
Price Index). In their simplest form, price caps are expressed in terms of an RPI-X 
constraint on charges, where the X factor reflects expected efficiency gains and 
investment requirements. A cost pass-through factor may also be added to allow 
significant cost items, which are outside the control of management, to be passed 
through directly to consumers in fmal prices. During the privatisation period of 
electricity in the UK, the price cap took the form of a revenue yield control. This is 
considered to be a forward looking approach which controls increases in the average 
revenue per unit of output, for example the average price per kilowatt hour of 
electricity distributed. Such an approach usually requires forecasts to be made of the 
volume of expected future sales and increases in inflation. This means that a 
correction factor is required to adjust tariffs in subsequent years for any forecasting 
errors. 
- __ t!'fo~ ______ _ 
Worked Example of Revenue Yield Price Control 
A good example of how Price Cap control works in practice is given by the Centre for 
the Study of Regulated Industry's Electricity charges review for 1993/4 Chapter 2. 
This is as follows; 
Assumptions: 
1. Three component formula which includes; 
- average revenue per unit for Service A 
- average revenue per unit for Service B 
- average revenue per unit for Service C 
2. Mix of units be~een services A, B, and C remains constant; 
3. Change in RPI from Year 1 to Year 2 = 3% 
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4. X=O% 
Table: Revenue Yield Control (CRI) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Regulated Price Quantity Total Revenue Price Quantity Total Revenue Increase in 
Activity Year I Year I Revenue Yield Year 2 Year 2 Revenue Yield Revenue 
Year I per Year 2 per Yield 
(2x3) Unit (6X7) Unit per 
Year I Year 2 Unit 
(4/3) (8/1) Year 1·2 
«9/S}1)x100 
Service A 10.00 25,000 250,000 10.0,0 10.75 25,000 268,750 10.75 7.50 
ServiceD 20.00 15.000 300,000 20.00 20.35 15,000 305,250 20.35 1.75 
ServiceC 30.00 10,000 300,000 30.00 30.15 10,000 301~00 30.15 .sO 
Total 50,000 850,000 17.00 50,000 875,000 17.51 3.00% 
Average 
Allowable increase, RPI-X == 3% 
Actual Increase, per Column 10 == 3% 
The CRI example states ... "the table above shows the increase in the average revenue 
yield per unit (Le. revenue divided by the number of units sold) for three services, A, 
B and C from year 1 to year 2. In this example the increase is constrained to an RPI-
X limit of3%. For simplicity, a constant mix of units between the three service 
categories is assumed in addition to no forecasting errors in order to avoid the 
complic~tion of a correction factor. The revenue yield per unit in Year 1 is shown in 
column 4. For the services individually, the revenue yield per unit is simply the price 
or tariff for that service. The average revenue yield for all units (Le. Services A, B 
I----and C combined) in year 1 is £17.00. In Year 2, increases in the prices f()r services A,_ 
Band C are 7.5%. 1.75% and 0.5% respectively. These price increases result in an 
average revenue yield for all units in Year 2 of £17.51 (column 9).' The individual 
increases in average revenue per unit are 7.5% for Service A, 1.75% for Service Band 
0.5% for Service C, which result in an increase in the average revenue yield per unit 
for all units of3%. This is equal to the RPI-X constraint of3%". 
"The price control is intended to reflect certain aspects of a competitive market, 
principally giving a business an incentive to operate efficiently and ensuring over time 
that its customers obtain the benefits of greater efficiencies. If for a period of time 
(say five years) the average level of prices charged to customers is capped, thus 
limiting the company's revenue during that time, there is a greater incentive for the 
business to make efficiency gains and reduce costs than if those profits are removed 
by regulation as they occur. Indeed, the control may be set such that efficiency gains 
are required of the business to maintain its profitability. To ensure that the benefits of 
efficiency gains are passed onto customers over time, periodic reviews of the price 
cap are undertaken"· This exercise in a sense emulates the workings of a competitive 
market where company's, in order to maintain profitability, have to make efficiency 
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gains similar to their competitors, or if their gains outstrip everyone else, they can 
expect to see this advantage competed away over time". 
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"Difficulties arise with an RPI-X control however when a company is able to obtain 
higher rates of return than anticipated, not because of efficiency savings but because 
of shortcoming's in the regulator's estimates of returns achievable under the price cap 
set, either as a result of estimation problems, unforeseen events or errors of . 
judgement" . 
"However, it is important, that the period between price cap reviews is sufficient to 
enable the business to enjoy the benefits that its increased efficiency savings make 
possible". 
It can be seen therefore, that from a possible range of prices, the firm will choose the 
most profitable price combination, as it is allowed to retain all the profit it makes. 
Although their is a ceiling capping prices, the overall surplus should at least stay at 
the same level as before. However, the more efficient output mix should ensure that 
consumer surplus increases. 
The regulator will usually specify that a review of the price will be conducted 
periodically (Acton, J. and I. Vogelsang in their introduction to the 'Symposium on 
Price Cap Regulation', Rand Journal of Economics, 1989, Vo1.20, No.3, pp.369-372, 
make this an important aspect of price cap regulation). 
Finally,to paraphrase Train (1991) "when the price cap is altered in view of the firm's 
profits rather than just on exogenous factors, the situation and the reaction of the firm 
and its subsequent behaviour will be far more complex. For instance, in these 
circumstances the finn may be induced to use strategic behaviour e.g. the firm may be 
induced to waste so as to convince the regulator to allow a higher price cap. There are 
I----a number of possible scenarios which can be imagined, where the firm will be indu~ed . 
to waste. For instance, where a company is currently regulated under a rate of return 
regime and is aware that a price cap may be used instead, the finn may be induced to 
waste under the ROR regulation, as the ftnn is allowed to recover its costs under this 
regime, and at the same time this will help the finn obtain a higher cap when price cap 
regulation is imposed. When the price cap is introduced, the ftnn's proftts will 
increase as their will be less incentive to waste and the firms output will be priced 
artificially high (as the price cap will be set higher than is necessary). Another 
problem occurs if the regulator when undertaking his periodical review (say every 3 
years) pays more attention to the latest years profit forecast rather than the first two 
years. Here, there is a danger (if the firm knows which year the regulator is more 
interested in) that the firm will waste in the third year if it believes that subsequently 
the more leniently reset price cap will enable them to make more profit in the 
following three years, to offset the loss in real terms due to the wastage incurred in the 
year before the review". 
There is also a danger that if the review is conducted in the same manner and with the 
same frequency as under Rate of Return Regulation, these two forms of regulation 
risk becoming almost identical and therefore the inefficiencies experienced under Rate 
39 
Economic Regulation 40 
of Return regulation will not be eliminated by the introduction of a Price Cap regime. 
The longer the period between reviews the more likely the firm will cost minimise and 
not indulge in strategic behaviour to waste resources. There is, however, a question of 
trust here i.e. does the firm trust the regulator to stick to the review periods and the 
formula he has promised at the outset (e.g. the second electricity distribution re-
review of 1995 is relevant here) because if it does not, it will almost certainly engage 
in strategic behaviour. 
Price Cap - Resetting the Value of X 
At the time of privatisation, the initial level of X is set by the government as part of 
the privatisation process. The regulator, usually after an agreed period, has to reset X. 
According to Beesley and Littlechild ("The Regulation of Privatised Monopolies in 
the United Kingdom", M.E. Beesley and S.C. Littlechild, Rand Journal of Economics 
Vo1.20, No.3, Autumn 1989) this difference between the initial setting of X compared 
to the resetting process has three important implications. They argue "fIrst, the initial 
level of X is set as part ofa whole package of measures, whose parameters affect the 
costs, revenues, and risks of the regulated company. Some of these parameters pertain 
to the design of price control itself, including the duration of the price constraint, its 
scope in terms of goods and services included, what costs (if any) are allowed to be 
passed through into prices, and whether the constraint is calculated on the basis of 
historical or expected performance. All these parameters are embodied in license 
conditions. Other parameters pertain to the wider regulatory framework, including 
what other non commercial obligations or constraints are put on the company, what 
steps are.taken to encourage or restrict competition, what policies are adopted towards 
suppliers and so on. Both sets of parameters are fIxed by the government, more or 
less simultaneously, in full acknowledgement of the interactions and trade offs 
I----between them~ • They are gradually firmed up and made more precise in the run up to 
privatisation, culminating in the determination of certain key parameters, including X, 
prior to the publication of the prospectus a few weeks before privatisation. (The 
striking.price of the shares is determined later in this last period and will be heavily 
influenced by the anticipated changes in the stock market level to the flotation date.)" 
"In contrast, the resetting of X takes place in a context where these parameters have 
already been determined. Admittedly, they could be changed, and in practice some 
have been, but to make <substantial and unexpected changes would have potentially 
adverse affects on the company's cost of capital and hence on prices to customers. 
Moreover, insofar as any proposed changes pertain to the company's license, if the 
company does not agree to the changes, the regulator may not wish to run the risk of 
an unsuccessful appeal to the MMC. There are thus fewer degrees of freedom in 
resetting X." 
"Second, the initial level of X is set by the government as owner of the company, 
whereas X is reset by a regulator who does not own the shares. The government as 
owner can choose, if it wishes, to take lower proceeds in return for, say lower prices to 
customers. The regulator does not have that extra degree of freedom: any shift in 
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favour of one interest group (such as customers) will be at the expense of another 
group (such as shareholders). The regulator is constrained by the expectations of 
shareholders and customers, which were established at privatisation, and his discretion 
is limited to whatever range is deemed acceptable (or can be so presented)". -
"The third difference between setting and resetting X, which reinforces the previous 
two, relates to the effect on the company's share price. In both cases the level of X 
will influence the share price via its effect on expected net revenue streams, so the 
stock market in fact decides the yield to shareholders. At the time that X is initially 
set, however, this effect has to be conjectured. It is not known with any certainty how 
potential investors will evaluate the company put before them. Nor is there any 
market valuation of the previous or alternative arrangements with which to compare 
it. After privatisation, however, the views of investors are clearly reflected in the 
company's traded share price, with its accompanying dividend yield, price earnings 
ratio, relative risk factor p, etc. A change in the stock market's evaluation of the 
company, following any action-by the regulator, in particular his revision of X can be 
immediately observed in the change in the share price. If the market regards the 
regulator's decision as favourable to the company (i.e. more favourable than expected) 
its share price is marked up and its cost of capital falls; the opposite happens if the 
decision is regarded unfavourably. The regulator cannot ignore this consideration in 
his decisions, and it reinforces the greater constraints on resetting X than on setting it 
• 'ti' 11 " 1Il1ay. 
Price Cap and Rate of Return Regulation both have some common features with one 
another i.e. they both accept the need to secure an adequate return for the company's 
shareholders in order to induce them to continue to finance the business, without 
conceding unnecessarily high prices at the expense of customers. However there are 
some differences which Beesley and Littlechild believe give Price Cap a number of 
advantages over Rate of Return regulation (ROR) in respect of encouraging and 
f----promoting efficiency. -These are as follows: -
a. Price Cap regulation uses exogenously determined risk periods between appraisals 
of prices, whereas for ROR this period is determined endogenously. 
b. Price Cap regulation is more forWard looking than rate of ROR as ROR tends to 
be based on historic costs and demands, with future changes being catered for by 
forecast inflation adjustments and extrapolation of historic trends. Price caps on the 
other hand, embody forecasts of what productivity improvements can be achieved and 
what future demands will be and is set on the basis of predicted future cash flows. 
3. When resetting X there are more degrees of freedom for the regulator than exist 
under ROR regulation i.e. in the resetting ofX. ROR regulation does allow some 
room for manoeuvre (e.g. on the basis of asset valuation, the definition of the rate 
base, treatment of work in progress etc.) but it would seem difficult to change these 
decisions repeatedly. In resetting X (taking into account the initial value which would 
have considered faCtors such as coverage, duration and form of the price constraints -
the extent of non commercial obligations - the restrictions on competition and the 
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permissible rate of adjustment from inherited pricing policies) the regulator, although 
constrained by his degrees of freedom, can modify any aspect of this framework. 
4. In setting X, the U.K. regulator has more discretion and less need to reveal the 
basis of his decisions than his U.S. counterpart. However, this is perhaps more to do 
with the different legal procedures and what is expected of public authorities in the 
two countries. The basis for legal challenge in the U.K. is reduced compared to that in 
the U.S. This has led to calls from the Chairmen of regulated companies for the 
setting up of a Regulatory Commission in order to avoid the cult of the personality 
developing and to ensure that regulatory decisions are more consistent, transparent 
and predictable, a topic which has been fashionable recently in the UK. It may also 
mean of course that challenging a regulators decision is made more straight forward. 
The overall effect of these four differences is that there is greater scope for bargaining 
in Price Cap regulation than in ROR of return regulation. The level of X can reflect 
negotiations with the company -and could be said to be one of several bargaining chips 
in a political process. 
However, it could also be said that the UK system of regulation straddles the fence 
between ROR and PC regulation. This position is discussed in Helm (1994). The 
main argument here is that the fixed periods that are the hallmark of the PC system 
only run their course because the regulator foregoes the opportunity to intervene, 
although in practice intervention has occurred. The types of intervention (sometimes 
called regulatory chiselling) are listed by Helm as: 
a Interim Price Reductions - These fall mainly into two categories~ either voluntary 
(under threat ofMMC referral) or through the 'interim determination mechanism' 
which is used to provide 'within review period' flexibility. 
I----b;- Quality of service enhancements without compensating price increases - again by 
voluntary and compulsory means. These increases in quality cost the utilitY~ thus 
reducing their returns. 
c. Increased investment without compensating price increases - these can be made 
part of the utilities Licence conditions (i.e. the British Gas transportation and storage 
price cap is in effect conditional on the delivery of appropriate systems to ensure the 
operation of a competitive market in gas supply). Another variant is energy efficiency 
investments to meet environmental targets. 
d. Market Share Reduction - enforced access to the incumbents markets by 
competitors can reduce revenues. Very often the agreed introduction of competition is 
undertaken at a more rapid pace than the Utility had originally agreed with the 
regulator. 
3. Surplus Subsidy Schemes 
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Most regulatory mechanisms only enable the second best consumer surplus outcome 
to be achieved. However, if the regulator has the ability to subsidise the firm, 
theoretically the ftrst best outcome is possible. The main drawback to these schemes 
in practice are the stringent informational requirements to enable the regulator to 
allocate subsidies fairly and efficiently. The work ofLoeb and Magat 1979, 
Sappington and Sibley 1988, and Finsinger and Vogelsang 1985 is relevant here. 
Each of these economists has produced variations on the 'subsidy' mechanism that 
tries to overcome the inherent informational constraints of operating subsidy 
mechanisms in the real world. 
4. Return on Sales, Output or Cost 
Even if we do not entirely believe that the Averch-Johnson model is 100% correct in 
its prediction of how a firm operating under rate of return regulation will behave (i.e. 
the ftrm will not be induced to use the optimal mix of inputs and outputs) we can use 
the model to try to identify other mechanisms that do induce optimality. The 
alternative mechanisms we will now discuss are; ° 
a. Return on Output Regulation (ROO) 
b. Return on Sales Regulation (ROS) 
c. Return on Cost Regulation (ROC) 
a. Return on Output Regulation 
Here the ftrm is allowed to earn a stipulated amount of proftt on each unit of output it 
sells. The ftrm chooses its inputs, output level and price as long as its proftts do not 
I----exceed the allowed amount per unit of output, this being the "fair" return per unit 
decided upon by the regulator (usually stated in terms of say £'s of proftt per unit of 
output e.g. for every penny ofproftt made on one Kilowatt hour of electricity sold, the 
company could retain one ftfth of a penny. 
Train 1991 shows the proftt constraint to be expressed as 
"Where k is the allowed proftt per unit of output 
and Q is the quantity of output." 
For the proftt constraint, "the maximum allowed proftt, atany input combination is k 
times the maximum output that can be produced with the inputs. The constraint 
surface therefore takes the same shape as the production function, rescaled by k" . 
"Because proftt per unit is constant on the constraint curve, absolute proftts increase 
as output increases,jo. To paraphrase Train we can say that the ftrm therefore chooses 
the greatest output that its constraints allow it. If the ftrm attempts to go beyond this 
point (i.e. exiting its constraint curve) the ftrm would be allowed to earn more proftts 
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but would not be able to. Because of these characteristics, firms regulated by Return 
on Output display the following results; 
a. They utilise the most efficient input combination for its level of production. 
h. They produce greater output than ifthere were no regulation in place. 
c. If the regulator reduces profit, the regulated firm increases its sales. 
d. The firm does not waste as it produces as much sales as efficiently as possible. 
(allocative efficiency). 
The ability of Rate of Output regulation to move the firm close to the optimum input 
and output levels compares well with the situation under ROR regulation. With Rate 
of Return Regulation, the firm cannot be motivated to enter the inelastic area of 
demand. In addition, Rate of Return cajoles the firm to operate with an inefficient 
input mix. 
However, Train notes a problem with Return on Output regulation arises if the firm 
can influence its demand curve e.g. through advertising. If the company uses demand 
stimulating devices, Return on Output regulation establishes an incentive to indulge in 
these demand stimulating activities. On the other hand, if the firm has the ability to 
reduce its demand, Return on Output regulation gives it a motive not to do so even if 
production cutbacks are necessary e.g. conservation reasons. Under Return on Output 
regulation, the firm has no incentive to introduce measures that would motivate its 
consumers to lower their requirements, even if these reductions were efficient for the 
Economy as a whole. 
I----b.-Retum on Sales Regulation 
Train 1991 states that the "revenues generated by a firm are called its turnover or 
volume of sales. If sales are easier to observe than its quantity of output, the 
regulator will want to use sales as the basis for determining allowed profit. Return on 
Sales (ROS) regulation means the firm can choose its outputs and inputs under the 
constraint so long as its profits do not exceed a portion of its revenues". 
;r:5: kPQ o "Where k is the allowed proportion of revenues that can 
be retained as profit". 
"If marginal revenue is positive over the relevant output levels, then allowed profit 
grows with the amount of output, because revenues increase. Consequently, the 
analysis ofROS regulation, when marginal revenue is positive, is nearly the same as 
that for Return on Output Regulation. The conclusions are identical i.e. if marginal 
revenue is positive over the relevant output range, ROS regulation induces the firm to 
increase output, not' waste and to choose the efficient input mix for its level of output" . 
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"Furthermore, output increases as the allowed proportion of revenues that can be 
. retained as profit decreases. Therefore, it follows that the firm can be enticed by 
lowering the allowed proportion toward (but not to) zero, to produce arbitrarily close 
to the second best output level, using cost-minimising inputs". 
"Should marginal revenue be negative, then allowable profit drops when output rises, 
because revenue decreases. Therefore, 'Return on Sales' regulation is different from 
Return on Output regulation, if the optimal output level is in the inelastic portion of 
demand, because under Return on Output regulation, the firm will not reach into the 
inelastic area (where marginal revenue is negative), because doing this would decrease 
its allowed profit". 
The difference between this form of regulation as compared to 'RetUrn on Output' 
regulation, is shown in the table below after the section on 'Return on Cost' 
Regulation. .. 
c. Return on Cost Regulation 
The profit the firm is allowed to retain can be based on the costs of the firm. Return 
on Cost regulation imposes a restriction on the firm as follows: Train shows the 
constraint as; 
tr<5. k(wL + rK) "where k is the proportion of costs the firm is authorised 
to keep as profit" 
"This type of regulation is like allowing the firm to mark up price over average costs 
by the proportion k:" 
-trS'k(wL+rK)-
PQ - (wL + rK) S k(wL + rK) 
PQ S (1 +k) (wL + rK) 
PS (1 +k)AC where AC is average cost 
"If marginal revenue is .consistently positive, the implications of this form of 
regulation are very different than if the optimal output falls in the inelastic portion of 
demand". Therefore, (according to Train 1991) the following can be said to be true 
for Return on Cost Regulation. 
a. "An organisation operating under Return on Cost Regulation and facing positive 
marginal revenue produces on the expansion path, using the most efficient input 
allocation for its level of output". 
b. "Under Return on Cost Regulation, if the firm is facing positive marginal revenue, 
it will produce more output than the unregulated firm" . 
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c. "The finn facing positive marginal revenue does not waste inputs under Return on 
Cost regulation". 
d. "If the allowed amount 'k' costs to be retained as profit is lowered toward (but not 
to) zero, then any finn will increase output, by using inputs efficiently under Return 
on Cost regulation (when experiencing positive marginal revenue)". 
To paraphrase Train 1991, it should be noted that the firm· does not increase its costs 
through wasting inputs even when it is allowed to increase its profits by engaging in 
waste. However, this is dependant on marginal revenue being positive. If the finn 
purchases non-productive inputs (i.e. waste), then its allowed profit increases but its 
real profit decreases (because costs increase but revenues do not). Alternatively, if the 
firm uses the same amount of money to purchase inputs and uses them productively, 
allowed profit rises by the same amount, but feasible profit either rises or drops by 
less (because revenues increase, at least partially offsetting the cost of the extra 
inputs). 
Return on Cost regulation enables the firm to increase costs, but as long as marginal 
revenue is positive, the firm earns greater profit by increasing output as much as 
possible along with costs. 
Train goes on to state "if marginal revenue becomes negative within the relevant 
range of output, then the cost based incentive does not translate into a quantity based 
incentive. If marginal revenue is negative, the firm loses revenue by selling extra 
output. As a result, the firm is able to earn greater profits by selling less even without 
reducing.inputs -.its allowed profit does not change and its profit increases. On the 
other hand, the firm can increase its allowed profit by purchasing inputs (whether 
productive or not) and yet its feasible profit decreases less when inputs are purchased 
I---~without expanding output than when using the inputs to produce more." - ----
"The firm will only increase output beyond its unregulated level to the point that 
marginal revenue is zero. If allowed profit exceeds feasible profit at this point, the 
firm purchases wasteful inputs thus increasing allowed profit while decreasing 
feasible profit as little as possible. If the firm used these additional inputs to produce 
extra output, its real profit would decline even more. However, if the firm purchases 
additional capital but does not produce greater output, its profits would decline by less 
(Le. by not selling more. output, the firm's revenues do not shrink at the same rate)." 
"Summing up, if optimal output is in the inelastic portion of demand, then RaC 
regulation can be used to motivate the firm to expand output and use cost-efficient 
inputs only to where marginal revenue is zero. Any attempt to force the firm to 
expand output further (Le. by reducing the allowed profits) simply motivates the finn 
to waste". 
A numerical analysIs giving a comparison of outcomes from similar inputs for ROS, 
ROO and RaC schemes is now given. 
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Table of Comparisons between Return on Output, Sales and Cost Types of 
Regulation Under Given Assumptions 
Return On Output 
Scenario Demand Price Sales MC FC TC APkWh TP RP 
1 200 10 2000 8 200 1800 1 200 200 
2 300 9.5 2850 6 200 2000 1 850 300 
3 100 20 2000 8 200 1000 1 1000 100 
4 300 10 3000 8 200 26.00 1 400 300 
Where: 
Scenario 1 = Control scenario 
Scenario 2 = Increased demand due to price decrease, driven by achievable 
reductions in MC i.e. 8 down to 6. 
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Scenario 3 = Reduced demand caused by increase price where costs remain the 
same. 
Scenario 4 = Increased demand due to increased penetration of electrical goods 
_ in_h_o~~~~lds - price and costs_!~main unchanged. _____ _ 
And where MC = Marginal Cost, FC = Fixed Cost, TC = Total Cost (MC + FC), AP 
kWh = Allowed Profit Per kWh, TP = Total Profit, RP = Retained Profit. All figures 
given in pence except demand which is given in kWh. 
RP is calculated as Ip per kWh sold under any scenario unless TP is less than this 
figure. 
Conclusion under ROO° - Profit can only increase if prices are reduced or demand 
increases. Increasing price reduces profit. 
Return On Sales 
Scenario Demand Price Sales MC FC TC A %R TP RP 
1 200 .. _ 10 2000 8 200 1800 10% 200 200 
2 300 9.5 2850 6 200 2000 10% . 850 285 
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3 100 20 2000 8 200 1000 10% 1000 200 
4 300 10 3000 ·8 200 2600 10% 400 300 
Scenarios as before except where A%R = Allowed % of sales to be retained. 
RP is calculated as 10% of Sales under any scenario unless TP is less than this figure. 
Conclusion under ROS - Profit can o.nly increase if prices are reduced or demand 
increases. Increasing price reduces profit. Natural increases in demand result in 
higher profits than where increases in demand are induced by price cuts. Under 
Scenario 3 retained profits are higher than under ROO as RP is a function of £ 
turnover rather than just k Wh ,sales. 
Return on Cost 
Scenario Demand Price Sales MC FC TC %C TP RP 
1 200 10 2000 8 200 1800 11.1% 200 200 
2· 300 9.5 2850 6 200 2000 11.1% 850 222 
3 100 20 2000 8 200 1000 11.1% 1000 111 
4 300 10 3000 8 200 2600 11.1% 400 289 
Scenarios as before except where %C = Allowed % of Costs to be retained Le. for 
--- .. Scenario 1 to achieve 200 TP, %C is set at 11.1 %. RP is calculated as lJ.l % ofTC 
under any scenario unless TP is less than this figure. 
Conclusion under ROC - Profit is less under Scenario's 2&4 than under either ROO 
. or ROS, however under Scenario 3, ROC results in a superior RP than ROD although 
these outcomes are produced under contrived cost levels. In real life, for instance, 
when facing Scenario 4, a company regulated under ROC would be motivated to 
increase costs, which would of course have an effect on demand. 
o 
Similarly, firms operating under ROO and ROS would be induced to stimulate 
demand through advertising. ROO participants would also be inclined to increase 
demand through price reductions, especially if the regulations stipulated that where 
RP was greater than TP the regulator would subsidise the difference. 
5. Sliding Scale Schemes 
Recent criticisms of the RPI-X price cap regime operating in the UK have surfaced 
because of the high level of profits made by the utility companies and this has led to a 
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search for alternative regulatory regimes. One such alternative is the sliding scale 
arrangements used in the UK. and the US from the mid 1800's until the Second World 
War. Bums, Turvey and Weyman Jones (1995) point out, under 'Sliding Scale 
Regulation' (SCR), a strong incentive should still exist for the ftrm to maximise 
proftts even though these proftts will have to be shared with customers as well as its 
shareholders. Indeed, although the present price cap regime provides ample 
incentives to increase efficiency it could also be said to lead to instability for the 
company e.g. in that profits will be higher than the normal in good times (thus causing 
adverse publicity and political pressure) but lower when circumstances worsen (thus 
the financial viability of the company could be injeopardy). 
Therefore, it can be said that SCR is more flexible than price cap because there is· a 
mechanism for both customers and shareholders to share in the good times as well as 
the bad (the size of proftts and losses will be less under SCR than under Price Cap 
Regulation). Another advantage of SCR is that the regime avoids the drawbacks of 
using forecast or lagged RPI because it operates when all relevant information is 
known. 
Sliding Scale Options 
Bums, Turvey and Weyman Jones (1995) put forward three main forms of Sliding 
Scale Regulation (SCR). These are; 
1. Dividend Sliding Scale 
2. Price Related Profits Levy 
3. Rate ofRetum Sliding Scale 
Each of these are now described in turn 
1. Dividend Sliding Scale - Under this option, end of year dividend payments can 
only increase (decrease) beyond a certain level if prices throughout the year have been 
lower (higher) than a standard price. 
Bums, Turvey and Weyman Jones (1995) show the constraint to be 
Cl [ Actual yield - standard yield] 
must be less or equal to 
[(standard price - actual price)/standard price] multiplied by the proftt sharing 
parameter 
Therefore if the profit sharing parameter is 50%, this constraint simply says that if the 
firm keeps its prices 10% below the standard price, and if the standard dividend is 5%, 
then the firm is permitted to payout a dividend of 10%. Profit sharing only takes 
place after dividends exceed a stipulated level. 
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2. Price RelatedProfits Levy - This is similar to dividend sliding scale, except the 
firms profits, rather than dividends, is conditional on its pricing behaviour. As in the 
dividend sliding scale case, the firm can choose to pay the levy as a one off rebate at 
the end of the financial year or it could avoid paying the levy by lowering prices 
below the standard price throughout the year. 
3. Rate of Return Sliding Scale - Here deviations from a target rate of return can only 
be justified by prices which differ from the standard price. 
Much of the recent debate about Sliding ScalelProfit Sharing mechanisms has come 
from the UK. The SCR method of regulation has been suggested as a replacement 
for the existing RPI-X price capping arrangements which are currently used to 
regulate the utilities. Much of the debate has centred on the fact that SCR is a more 
equitable method of regulating public utilities as it enables excess surpluses (Le. 
returns above a 'normal' level) to be returned ,to customers more quickly than at 
present under PC arrangements. This is of course politically attractive, as price cuts 
or refunds are more immediate and the reporting of excess utility profits will be short-
lived and, where reported, they will be accompanied by good news for customers. 
However, critics.of SCR have pointed out that although surpluses may be given back 
to customers more quickly, this will reduce incentives on the company's concerned to 
be efficient as possible i.e. in the long term companies are incentivised more to be 
efficient under price cap arrangements than under SCR, as this type of regulation 
could be called price cap regulation with annual regulatory reviews. Therefore, 
customers will eventually be better off under a price cap regime (e.g. prices will be 
lower) than under SCR because of the better incentives that PC provides utility 
managers to increase efficiency. 
Much of the analysis of SCR schemes therefore has focused on the amount of risk to 
----be shared under.SCR arrangements (e.g. how much is to be shared with customers). 
For instance, Schmalensee (1989) numerically analysed how risks could be shared 
between a firm and its customers under incentive regulation arrangements (profit 
sharing) to optimise the effectiveness of the regime (which can be defmed as either 
direct customer benefits or overall aggregate economic efficiency) .. Haring and 
Rohlfs (1994) analysed the effect on incentives due to the length oftime between 
regulatory reviews. 
Cave (1995) analysed the experience of US telecoms regulation in terms of its use of' . 
PC and SCR (and hybrids) to see whether there was a clear winner. The evidence 
suggests to date that neither SCRor PC regimes can be assumed to be superior in 
terms of promoting economic efficiency. ' 
Mechanisms to Achieve Optimality 
There are a number"Of mechanisms that can be used by a Utility Regulator to induce 
economic optimality: Some of these are; 
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1. Ramsey Prices 
2. Time of Use Prices (TOUP) 
3. TOUP with Riordans Mechanism - (first best price mechanism) 
4. Multipart Tariffs - Acess / Usage Tariffs and Block Rate Tariffs-
5. Surplus Subsidy Mechanisms (mechanisms to induce first best prices) 
6. Pareto Dominating Block Rate Tariffs 
7. Self Selecting Tariffs 
8. Self Selecting Tariffs with Sibleys Mechanism. 
For our purposes we will look at 1,4, and 7 in more depth. 
Achieving OptimaIity - Ramsey Prices 
In the field of theoretical economics Ramsey Prices are regarded as an effective 
mechanism in reaching optimality (i.e. efficient resource allocation). The work of 
Frank Ramsey and in particular his 1927 contribution to the optimal theory of taxation 
("A contribution to the Theory of Taxation" Economic Journal, Vo1.37, No.1) has 
made a considerable impact on the world of regulatory economics. Ramsey 
developed a method for determining the tax rates for various goods that would 
provide the government with sufficient revenue while reducing consumer surplus as 
little as possible. Baumol and Bradford (1970) noted that optimal taxation rules are 
directly applicable for determining second best prices for multiproduct natural 
monopolies and it is usual therefore to refer to these second best prices as Ramsey 
prices. 
As Train(1991) puts it; 
"Of all possible price combinations for a multiproduct firm, Ramsey prices provide 
----the greatest total surplus while allowing the finn to break even. At the Ramsey price, 
profits are zero, and" 
1. "the output of each good is reduced by the same proportion relative to the outputs 
that would be produced when prices are at marginal cost; and" 
2. "the amount by which price exceeds marginal cost, expressed as a percentage of 
price, is greater for goods with less elastic demand". 
N.B. "Statement 'one' only "applies exactly only when demand is linear, otherwise 
output is reduced by approximately the same amount for each good" . 
The second statement, called the 'inverse elasticity rule', "applies with both linear and 
non-linear demand. The two statements are equivalent, but are simply described in 
different tenns. That is, if prices are raised inversely to elasticity, outputs will be 
reduced by the same proportion for all goods and vice versa" . 
--. 
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RAMSEY PRICE EXAMPLE 
Price Combinations that result in Zero Profit 
DEMAND DEMAND REVENUE REVENUE ' TOTAL PROFIT CONSUMER CONSUMER 
IN IN IN IN COST SURPLUS SURPLUS TOTAL 
MARKET 1 MARKET 1 MARKET 1 MARKET 2 19800+ IN IN CONSUMER 
Pl P2 Ql 02 P1Q1 P2Q2 2OQ1+2002 MARKET 1 MARKET 2 SURPLUS 
20.00 25.44 4,000 3,640 80,000 92,600 172,600 0 SO,Ooo 26,499 86,499 
21.00 23.98 3,867 4,005 81,200 96,040 In,24O 0 56,067 32,080 88,147 
22.00 22.88 3,733 4,280 82, 130 97,930 180,060 0 52,267 36,637 aa,904 
,.' 
23.00 22.00 3,600 4,500 82,800 99,000 181,800 0 48,600 40,500 89,100 
24.00 21.27 3,467 4,683 63,200 99,600 182,800 0 45,067 43,852 aa,919 
28.25 20.00 3,167 5,000 63,140 100,000 163,140 0 37,S05 50,000 87,605 
Extract from K.E. Train "Optimal Regulation" 1991 MIT Press 
Train notes there are many price combinations that will result in zero profit. The 
question for the regulator is which price combination produces the best economic 
surplus. Ramsey prices should produce the "best" price combination, this being the 
one that results in the smallest loss of consumer surplus. As all price combinations 
that result in zero profit provide the same producer's surplus; the price combination 
that reduces total surplus the least and also reduces consumer surplus the least is the 
best price combination. "Ramsey and others, have derived formulae for calculating 
the prices that result in the smallest surplus loss when prices must be raised above 
margiIlal c~sj in. order for theJ!rm 1() remain solvent" (Train 1991). __ 
1------'----
In the Ramsey Price Example above we have two goods in two markets. Demand in 
the two markets is, PI = 50 - .0075QI and P2 = 40 - .004Q2. The firm has incurred 
start up costs of £19,800 and marginal costs of £20 for each unit of either good 
produced. Its cost function is TC = £19,800 + 20Ql + 20Q2 as shown in the example 
table. 
"If the firm priced at mwginal cost it would sell 4000 units in market I and 5000 in 
market 2". As its revenues would only cover its variable costs it would incur a loss of 
£19,800". In a real1ife situation the firm would have to raise the price on one or 
either of the two goods to a price that would ensure that both variable and fixed costs 
were recovered. An infinite number of price combinations could be chosen by the 
firm to achieve this goal and some of these are shown in the table above. However, 
although the firm will find any combination that achieves its goal, consumers enjoy a 
greater surplus at certain price combinations and lower surplus at other price/demand 
levels (Le. consumers are better off where the surplus is calculated to be at its 
highest). To calculate which price mix results in greatest surplus we use the Ramsay 
method to obtain a measure of consumer surplus. 
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Ramsey Consumer Surplus in a Market 
A 
Po 
D 
Q 
Qo 
(Graph extracted from Train 1991) . 
For PI A = 50 and Po = 20. Qo = 4000 (50-20=30 therefore 30/4000 = .0075) 
For P2 A = 40 and Po = 25.44. Qo = 3640 (40-25.44 = 14.56 therefore 14.56/3640 = 
___ .004). ____ ~.-
"Consumer surplus in a market is the area under the demand curve and above price as 
shown above in the area covered by A, Po and E. For linear demand this area can be 
calculated fairly easily. It is the area of triangle whose width is the quantity sold (Qo) 
and whose height is the difference between the price and the y-intercept of the 
demand curve (A - Po). Because the area of a triangle is one half the width times the 
height, consumer surplus in this figure is (112) Qo(A-Po). Applying these ideas to the 
two markets in our example we fmd that consumer surplus is £86,499 when PI = 
<> 
20.00 and P2 = 25.44, which is one of the price combinations that result in zero profit. 
Consumer surplus for each other price combination, that provides zero profit, is given 
in the last column of the table above" (Train 1991). 
Example Proof: Where PI = 20 and P2 = 25.44 
PI surplus 112 x 4000(50-20) = £60,000 
P2 surplus 112 x 3640(40-25.44) = £26,499. Total Surplus £60,000+£26,499 = 
£86,499. 
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Consumer surplus is optimised when PI = 23 and P2 = 22 (Le. £89,100). These prices 
can be said to be second best prices because, of all the price combinations possible, 
they provide zero profit with the greatest consumer surplus Le. of all the possible 
ways of raising prices to allow the firm to break even, the price changes that keep the 
ratio of outputs unchanged (that is keeps this ratio at its first best level) are the 
changes that result in the least loss to consumers and hence are second best. This fact 
provides a mechanism for calculating second best prices. Train 1991 describes the 
procedure as follows; "first commence with marginal cost prices and determine the 
ratio of outputs at these prices. Raise prices a little in each market in such a way that 
this output ratio is unchanged, that is, that output in each market is reduced by the 
same proportion. With these slightly higher prices, the firm will have somewhat 
smaller losses. Raise prices again, still keeping the output ratio constant, and the firm 
will incur even smaller losses. Continue raising prices in this way until the firm 
breaks even and these are the second best prices". 
Using Ramsey pricing means that prices are raised on outputs with less elastic prices. 
As the "elasticity of demand is a measure of price responsiveness in a market it can be 
defmed as the percentage change iil output that results from a per cent change in 
price" Train 1991. The elasticity is calculated as: 
&=(AQIQ)/(M'I P) 
In the Ramsey Price example table shown earlier and according to Train, at the second 
best prices "the elasticity of demand in market one is -.85 (calculated as (1/-
.0075)(23/3,600» whilst the elasticity of demand in market two is -1.2 (calculated as 
(11-.004)(22/4,500»". Examination of the examples shows that "the price is higher in 
the market with lower elasticity Le. the price in market one is higher than in market 
two (23 to 22) and the elasticity of demand is lower (-.85 compared to -1.2, where 
'lower' means smaller in magnitude, representing less price response) ..... this 
-characteristic of:· second-best prices is often called the inverse elasticity rule". This is _ 
an important fact for a company to remember, as more funds can be obtained with less 
disruption in consumer's consumption patterns (Le. less reduction in output) by raising 
price in the market with inelastic demaridllian in the market with elastic demand. 
Train (1991) states that the general rule is, that where there are no cross-elasticity's, at 
the second best prices, we find the following; 
«PI-MCl)lPl) '&1 = «R2-MC2)1P2) '&2 where & is the elasticity of demand, 
the term PI - MCl is the amount by 
which price in market one exceeds 
marginal cost for that good. 
Dividing PI - MCl by PI gives the amount by which price exceeds marginal cost 
expressed as a proportion of price. The equation states that, at second best prices, if 
the percentage by which price exceeds marginal cost in each market is multiplied by 
the elasticity of demand in that market, the resulting product is the same for all 
markets. 
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In the example given in Train we arrive at the following; 
Market One - elasticity is .85, price 23 and MC = 20 
Price - MC = 3 therefore 3/23 = 13% of the price 
Therefore: -0.85 x 0.13 = -.11 
Using the same for Market 2 we also get a figure of -.11 
Ramsey Prices and the Issue of Equity 
ss 
Train 1991 states that "Ramsey prices are those that provide the greatest total 
consumer surplus while allowing the provider to break even .... the distribution of this 
surplus among consumers is not considered. If total surplus is as high as possible, 
then there is, theoretically at least, some way that this surplus can be redistributed 
such that all people are better off than at any other price combination" (and therefore, 
if this is the case, the issue of equity is resolved). However, this scenario is usually 
not possible and the regulator will need to consider the issues of fairness when 
redistributing the surplus. If Ramsey prices were to be introduced unfettered, it is 
more than likely in many instances that "lower income consumers would subsidise 
higher income households", as the inverse elasticity rule means that prices are 
increased proportionately more above marginal cost on goods with lower elasticities. 
As poor consumers often have less choice than richer consumers, this implies that the 
goods poorer consumers have to buy (Le. often all disposable income is spent on 
necessities such as food, housing, transport, clothing and energy) would be increased 
whilst gQods where higher incomes meant that more choice could be exercised, would 
be raised less. An example here could be transport systems where poor consumers are 
forced to use public transport whereas more aftluent consumers can choose to travel 
by car or taxi.-" .----
In energy, this could mean that necessary supply prices were increased where 
alternatives could not be found by consumers. Healthcare is another example where 
consumers would continue to spend on this service, even if prices were raised 
substantially. The Ramsey rule implies that prices be raised more on these goods than 
on goods with more elastic demands. The regulator has to consider whether this is 
equitable in the circumstances. Therefore, we can conclude that although Ramsey 
prices may achieve the greatest surplus, this does not mean they are the best if judged 
by other social criteria that the regulator might consider relevant. 
Achieving Optimality - Multipart Tariffs 
A tariff can be considered as a schedule of prices to a customer which contains a 
number of billing components. Multipart tariffs are sets of prices with several billing 
components and they can have important implications for customers and the utilities 
concerned. According th Train (1991) if the regulator can encourage the use of a 
specially designed multipart tariff it will be possible to ensure a monopolist operates 
ss 
Economic Regulation 56 
closer to the first best outcome than would have been attained with a single rate tariff. 
Under certain circumstances, it is even possible to achieve the first best outcome. 
There are two main types of multi part tariffs. 
a. Access/Usage Tariff - is made up of a fixed charge that does not relate to the level 
of consumption (called the standing charge or access charge) and a 'per-unit' price for 
consumption e.g. kWh (called the consumption component or usage fee). 
In the UK, electricity tariffs are designed with a standing charge and a consumption 
component Le. the quarterly standing 'fixed' charge is the access fee and the unit price 
per kWh consumption is the usage fee. The standing charge is the "access charge" 
because this payment buys access to the electricity distribution network. In a way, the . 
standing charge is payment for the right of the customer to connect his appliances to 
the electricity distribution network whilst the unit charge is for actual consumption of 
electricity delivered over the system. . 
b. Block Rates Tariffs - these are rates where the price for each unit of electricity 
changes when the consumption of electricity reaches certain predetermined levels. 
Many electricity tariffs are charged in this way. Block rate tariffs can be designed to 
have declining or inverted price levels Le. the price for additional units decrease or 
increase as consumption increases. 
As the customer is facing different price levels at different usage levels, a definition of 
average and marginal prices is necessary. The average price per unit of consumption 
(kWh) is the overall cost paid (standing charge plus unit charges) by the customer 
divided by the total consumption in the period. Marginal Cost per unit is the cost of 
units use~ over the period divided by the total number of units used kWh' 
Block rate tariffs and access! usage tariffs can be combined in one tariff package. For 
----example, the usage charge under an access!usagetariff can ~onsistofblo~k rates e.g. a 
electricity company may charge a fixed quarterly fee and then allow a certain number .. 
units to be charged at one rate and then steadily increase unit rates in stepped bands of 
consumption (Le; if it wished to deter high usage of the system). 
The difference between access!usage fee and block rate tariffs with two blocks is 
important; e.g. in the case of an electricity service, a person might choose to have the 
service (Le. subscribe for access) and yet not use any electricity because they only 
want to use the electricity company's power as fail-safe for their on site generation. 
They value this service and do not wish to be disconnected and be without power for a 
lengthy period in the event of a fault on their own system (and they also do not want 
to incur the high costs of reconnection). 
Achieving Optimality - Self Selecting Tariffs 
It is customary nowadays for utilities to offer their customers a choice of tariffs. 
Where customers have this choice, the tariffs are called "optional" or "self selecting". 
Self selecting tariffs are now common place, not only because they give customers a 
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choice, but also it is often easier to obtain regulatory clearance to offer a new tariff in 
addition to existing tariffs. Also, any conundrums relating to the increase in surplus 
to some customers, against the decrease to others, when deciding whether the new 
tariff provides any economic improvement, are made redundant. 
Train 1991 argues that "not all self selecting tariff offerings allow for Pareto 
dominance or even increase surplus. Indeed, if not appropriately designed, the 
introduction of a new self selecting tariff can reduce surplus. The successful design of 
a self selecting tariff requires information on the demand of customers (which the 
regulator generally does not possess)". To overcome this problem Sibley 
("Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Price Cap Regulation", (1989) Rand 
Journal of Economics, Vo1.20, NoJ) has proposed a regulatory mechanism that will 
induce a firm (under certain circumstances) to design and offer self selecting tariffs 
that increase surplUS. To be effective, however, Train outlines the following 
conditions which need to be ni~t to allow the mechanism to operate. effectively: 
a. "Demand for access to the service is assumed to be fixed independent of price". 
b. "All customers have the same demand or the firm knows the demand of each 
individual customer is able to offer a separate tariff to ea~h customer". 
"It was shown that in many circunistances surplus can be improved and Pareto 
dominance achieved through the judicious use of multipart tariffs and this can be 
extended to the case of self selecting tariffs which can be said to be the same as 
multipart tariffs without selection. Self selecting tariffs possess a unique feature that 
is important in itself and facilitates the analysis of surplus. Specifically, the 
introduction of a new self selecting tariff in addition to existing tariffs can only benefit 
customers" i.e. if customers are offered a new tariff without changing the original 
ones "then no customer is made worse offby this addition and some customers might 
be made better off'. However, although no customer losses out the firm might lose 
----some surplus (e:g.profits may decrease) .. To paraphrase Train (1991), ..... for instan<:e, 
where time of use (TOU) rates were offered only customers standing to gain from 
them would choose to switch to them. However, if these customers were non price 
responsive i.e. the new tariff did not induce a change in consumption behaviour, these 
customers would only be making savings because the company had priced the tariff in 
a way that meant that these customers did not have to do anything (other than to 
change tariff) to save money. Therefore, the company would lose revenue but its 
costs would stay the same (as off peak production compared to peak production would 
not have altered). However, if customers were price responsive and therefore a 
significant amount of consumption shifted into off peak periods (thus saving the 
company money) then the companY·would increase profits. 
It should be remembered however, that in the real world, where a new tariff is 
introduced and this leads to a loss for the company concerned, it might be necessary 
for the firm to change the original tariffs i.e. by raising the rates, which would of 
course mean that those customers not changing to the new tariff would be worse off. 
.. -
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Tariff Comparisons - Affect on Average Unit Price due to Load Factor Levels 
and Time Pattern Consumption 
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In the real world of tariffs, it is usual to find a number of tariff types on offer to 
customers. However nearly all tariffs will offer some discount for customers prepared 
to use electricity.in off peak periods e.g. at night when generation costs are lower 
(because only efficient baseload plant is required to meet demand) and this also gives 
customers an incentive to switch load from peak periods, thus lowering the demand on 
distribution systems, which of course will mean, that on average, system 
reinforcement costs will be lower than if all customers chose not to use any electricity 
in off peak periods. ~, 
For larger customers, most tariffs will have some maximum demand charging and 
peak rate charging, both elements designed to give customers incentives to use 
electricity outside the main peak times, which tend to be winter weekday aftemoons. 
Normally, in the UK., a system of self selecting tariffs operate, where a number of 
tariff choices are given, thus avoiding the need to force customers to use certain types 
of tariffs. Customers, should therefore, make cost comparisons, before choosing a 
tariff, based on the past and forecast future levels of electricity consumption and usage 
patterns. 
The tariff selections offered and the difference in price these different terms could 
have on a particular customer are explained and demonstrated below. 
1------ -- - -~.~~--__ 
-- -- --
Description of Price Regimes used to Create Different Price Combinations 
For the purpose of this explanation we are using 7 different price regimes, which are 
explained below. First, however, we will give an explanation of the components used 
in the price regimes. 
Components of the Price Regimes 
i. Fixed Rate 
Also called the Standing Charge. Often used for recouping fixed costs such as 
metering and connection costs. These costs are not volume related. 
ii. Availability Charge 
Used to reflect the costs incurred for making available a certain amount of network 
capacity for a customer whether it is used or not. Usually applied to larger industrial 
customers charging regimes. . 
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iii. Maximum Demand Charges 
Sometimes referred to as MD or 'Max Demand'. charges. These are used to recoup 
the costs of providing maximum capacity in periods of peak demand (Le. weekday 
afternoons in the winter months). Again, usually applied to larger industrial 
customers charging regimes for peak periods only or where used as an 'availability 
charge' this might be a monthly charge for all 12 months. 
iv. kWhRate 
Sometimes called the 'unit' cost. This element recovers the cost of electricity 
purchased and other volume related charges (e.g. transmission costs and working 
capital charges). . 
The 7 Price Regimes (a description of the regimes) 
a. Single Rate Tariff 
kWh rate 1 (P) 7.00 All days, all hours 
Fixed £30.00 The fIxed charge levied regardless of consumption 
(P) = pence sterling 
b. Two Rate Tariff 
-kWh rate 1 (P) 8.00 - All hours except those being used forrate 2_ 
kWh rate 2 (P)2.00 Night Rate operating from Midnight to 7 am 
Fixed £ 40.00 . 
·c. Simple Single Block Rate 
Fixed £ 30.00 C) 
kWh rate 1 (P) 10.00 fIrst 4000 units per annum 
kWh rate 2 (P) 7.00 >4000 All other units after fust 4000 k Wh 
d. Block Rate wit.~ additional Off Peak Night Rate 
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kWh rate 1 (P) 11.00 First 4000 units per annum other than those recorded on 
rate 3 
kWh rate 2 (P) 8.00 >4000 units other than those recorded on rate 3 
kWh rate 3 (P) 2.00 Night Rate operating from Midnight to 7 am 
Fixed £ 48.00 
e. 2 rate Night I Day Tariff with Maximum Demand 
kWhrate 1 p 5.00 Day time units 
kWhrate2 p 3.00 Night Rate operating from Midnight to 7 am 
MD rate 1 £1.50 Peak MD recorded in November and February 
MD rate 2 £2.50 Peak MD recorded in December and January 
MD rate 3 £6.00 Max Demand Availability Charge based on the 
highest recorded monthly demand reading in a rolling 12 month period. 
Fixed £200.00 
f. 4 Rate Time of Day and Seasonal Tariff 
kWh rate 1 p 13.00 
kWh rate 2 p 8.00 
________ kWh rate3p _ __ 5.00 
kWh rate 4 p 3.00 
MD rate 1 £ 1.50 Max Demand Availability Charge based on the 
highest recorded monthly demand reading in a rolling 12 month period. 
Fixed £250.00 
Rates 1 - 4 cover the following periods 
- December and January Weekdays 0700hours to Midnight 
- November and February Weekdays 0700hours to Midnight 
- All other periods other than those above and the night period 
Night = Midnight to 0700 hours 
g. 6 Rate Seasonal Tariff 
kWhrate.l (P)32.00 
kWhrate 2 (p) 16.00 
kWh rate 3 (P) 6.00 
kWh rate 4 (P) 5.00 
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kWh rate 5 (P) 5.50 
kWhrate 6 (P)2.50 
Md rate 1 (P) 0.90 (availability charge) 
Fixed £800.00 
Rates 1 - 6 cover the following periods 
December and January Weekdays 1600 - 2000 hours 
November and February Weekdays 1600 - 2000 hours 
- December and January Weekdays 0700-1600 then 2000 hours to Midnight 
- November and February Weekdays 0700- 1600 then 2000 hours to Midnight 
- All other periods other than those above and the night period 
- Night = Midnight to 0700 hours 
For the purposes of the comparisons given later the tariffregimes will be referred to 
by their tariff code i.e. 'Single Rate Tariff' = a, 'Two Rat£! Tariff = b, etc 
For example in the cost comparison tables below for a 'Single Rate Tariff' we will 
show: 
Tariff Code Charges Per Annum £ Pence per unit 
a. Charges £ 14030 Cost/unit: 7.02 
i.e. Tariff Code relates to the codes given above i.e. 'a' = the Single Rate Tariff and 
total charges were £14,030 per annum and the average pence per unit was 7.02, this 
figure being derived by using a consumption level of200,000 units (kWh) over the 
period of a calendar year. 
--~.~---
Specification of Consumption and Demand Levels Used to Achieve Load Factor 
Levels 
In order to obtain the 'Schedule of Price Regime Rates and Outturn Price and Average 
Pence per Unit to Consumer Outcomes' we need to construct some theoretical usage 
patterns to enable the calculation of average pence per unit costs to demonstrate the 
effect of varying load factors on unit price and price regime chosen. Load factor is 
calculated as: ~ 
Load Factor % = (Annual ConsumptionkWhl (peak MD x 8760 hours» x 100 
Load factor will be mainly affected in our examples by adjustment to Maximum 
Demand (MD). 
For the purpose of this analysis we will use 9 different load factor scenarios which 
will be applied to the 7 price regimes outlined above. For each scenario, we will 
consider two outturns, the first based on 24% of total usage being dependant on night 
use and the second with night usage at 50%. These 9 load factor scenarios are as 
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follows i.e. 5%, 15%,25%,35%,45%,55%,65%, 75%, & 85%. These are described 
in more detail below. 
1. 5% Load Factor . 
Customer Characteristics 
AnnualkWh: 200000 %kWhNight: 24 NOVMD: 30 
MD 450 % kWh Weekdays: 90 DECMD: 20 
Noy Feb%Units: 1.88 *%PT 5 lANMD: 20 
Dec lan%Units: 1.95 %LF: 5.07% FEBMD: 15 
* %PT = %Kwh usage at Peak Times = kWh used on Winter Weekday afternoons 
Tariff Code Charges £ ~. Pence per unit (24%Night) 50% Night 
a. Charges £ 14030 . Cost/unit: 7.02 nla 
b. Charges £ 13160 Cost/unit: ~.58 5.02 
c. Charges £ 14150 Cost/unit: 7.08 nla 
d. Charges £ 13288 Cost/unit: 6.64 5.08 
e. Charges £ 17693 Cost/unit: 8.85 8.33 
f. Charges £ 17681. Cost/unit: 8.84 8.27 
g. Charges £ 15269 Cost/unit: 7.63 6.85 
Please note that 'a' and 'c' will remain the same for all load factor and night usage 
combinations as these tariffs do not contain components that are sensitive to these 
, ____ -factors. How~v~r, ~Q'-aJ1~_ '~'_ c~ange_by Ilight ~g~ bl.!! IlC)t by' !~ttd_ ft\~to!, ~~e!.e~ ____ _ 
'e', 'f and 'g' change with both load factor and % night usage. 
'nJa' is denoted for options 'a' and 'c' because there will be no change from 24% to 
50% night usage for these tariff options, as they are single rate (all day) terms. 
2. 15% Load Factor 
Annual Kwhs : 200000 ~ kWh Night: 24 NOV MD : 30 
MD 150 %kWh Weekdays: 90 DECMD: 20 
Noy Feb%Units: 1.88 *%PT 5 lAN MD : 20 
Dec lan%Units: 1.95 %LF : 15.22% FEB MD : 15 
* %PT = %Kwh usage at Peak Times = kWh used on Winter Weekday afternoons 
Tariff Code 
a. 
b. 
c. 
Charges £ 
Charges £ 
Charg'es £ 
Charges £ 
Pence per unit (24%Night) 
14030 Cost/unit: 7.02 
13160 Cost/unit: 6.58 
14150 Cost/unit: 7.08 
50% Night 
nla 
5.02 
nla 
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d. Charges £ 13288 Cost/unit: 6.64 5.08 
e. Charges £ 12293 Cost/unit: 6.15 5.63 
f. Charges £ 12281 Cost/unit: 6.14 5.57 
g. Charges £ 12029 Cost/unit: 6.01 5.23 
3. 25% Load Factor 
Annual Kwhs : 200000 %KwhNight: 24 NOVMD: 30 
MD 90 %Kwh Weekdays: 90 DECMD: 20 
Nov Feb%Units: 1.88 ·%PT 5 JANMD: 20 
Dee Jan%Units: 1.95 %LF: 25.37% FEBMD: 15 
• %PT = %Kwh usage at Peak Times = kWh used on Winter Weekday afternoons 
Tariff Code Charges £ ..: ~ Pence per unit (24%Night) 50% Night 
a. Charges £ 14030 Cost/unit: 7.02 n1a 
b. Charges £ 13160 Cost/unit: 6.58 5.02 
e. Charges £ 14150 Cost/unit: 7.08 n1a 
d. Charges £ 13288 Cost/unit: 6.64 5.08 
e. Charges £ 11213 Cost/unit: 5.61 5.09 
f. Charges £ 11201 Cost/unit: 5.60 5.03 
g. Charges £ 11381 Cost/unit: 5.69 4.90 
4. 35% Load Factor 
Annual Kwhs:-- 200000-% kWh Night: -- 24. NOVMD: 30 
MD 65 % ke.h Weekdays: 90 DECMD: 20 
Nov Feb%Units: 1.88 ·%PT 5 JANMD: 20 
Dee Jan%Units: 1.95 %LF: 35.12% FEBMD: 15 
• %PT = %Kwh usage at Peak Times = kWh used on Winter Weekday afternoons 
Tariff Code Charges £ Pence per unit (24%Night) 50% Night 
a. Charges £ 14030 Cost/unit: 7.02 n1a 
b. Charges £ 13160 Cost/unit: 6.58 5.02 
., 
c. Charges £ 14150 Cost/unit: 7.08 n1a 
d. Charges £ 13288 Cost/unit: 6.64 5.08 
e. Charges £ 10763 Cost/unit: 5.38 4.86 
f. Charges £ 10751 Cost/unit: 5.38 4.81 
g. Char~es £ lll11 Cost/unit: 5.56 4.77 
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5. 45% Load Factor . 
Annual Kwhs : 200000 %kWhNight: 24 NOVMD: 30 
MD 50 %kWh Weekdays: 90 DECMD: 20 
Nay Feb%Units: 1.88 *%PT 5 .JANMD: 20 
Dec lan%Units: 1.95 %LF: 45.66% FEBMD: 15 
* o/oPT = %Kwh usage at Peak Times = kWh used on Winter Weekday afternoons 
Tariff Code Charges £ Pence per unit (24%Night) 50% Night 
a Charges £ 14030 Cost/unit: 7.02 nJa 
b. Charges £ 13160 Cost/unit: 6.58 5.02 
c. Charges £ 14150 Cost/unit: 7.08 nJa 
d. Charges £ 13288 Cost/unit: 6.64 5.08 
~. 
e. Charges £ 10493 Cost/unit: 5.25 4.73 
f. Charges £ 10481 Cost/unit: 5.24 4.67 
g. Charges £ 10949 Cost/unit: 5.47 4.69 
6. 55% Load Factor 
Annual Kwhs : 200000 % kW.h Night: 24 NOV MD : 30 
MD 41 %kWhWeekdays: 90 DECMD: 20 
Nay Feb%Units: 1.88 *%PT 5 JAN MD : 20 
Dec Jan%Units: 1.95 %LF : 55.69% FEB MD : 15 
* %PT = %Kwh usage at Peak Times = kWh used on Winter Weekday afternoons 
Tariff Code Charges £ Pence per unit (24%Night) 50% Night 
a Charges £ 14030 Cost/unit: 7.02 nJa 
.. 
b. Charges £ 13160 Cost/unit: 6.58 5.02 
c. Charges £ 14150 Cost/unit: 7.08 n1a 
d. Charges £ 13288 Cost/unit: 6.64 5.08 
e. Charges £ 10331 Cost/unit: 5.17 4.65 
f. Charges £ 10319 Cost/unit: 5.16 4.59 
g. Charges £0 10852 Cost/unit: 5.43 4.64 
7. 65% Load Factor 
Annual Kwhs : 200000 % kWh Night: 24 NOV MD : 30 
MD 35 % kWh Weekdays: 90 DEC MD : 20 
Nay Feb%Units: 1.88 *%PT 5 lAN MD : 20 
Dec Jan%Units: 1.95 %LF: 65.23% FEB MD : 15 
* %PT = %Kwh usage at Peak Times = kWh used on Winter Weekday afternoons 
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Tariff Code Charges £ Pence per unit (24%Night) 50% Night 
a. Charges £ 14030 Cost/unit: 7.02 nla 
b. Charges £ 13160 Cost/unit: 6.58 5.02 
c. Charges £ 14150 Cost/unit: 7.08 "nla 
d. Charges £ 13288 Cost/unit: 6.64 5.08 
e. Charges £ 10223 Cost/unit: 5.11 4.59 
f. Charges £ 10211 Cost/unit: 5.11 4.54 
g. Charges £ 10787 Cost/unit: 5.39 4.61 
8. 75% Load Factor 
Annual Kwhs : 200000 % kWh Night: 24 NOY MD; 30 
MD 30 % kWh Weekdays: 90 DEC MD : 20 
Nov Feb%Units: 1.88 *%PT 5 lAN MD : 20 
Dee lan%Units: 1.95 %LF: 76.10% FEB MD: 15 
* %PT = %Kwh usage at Peak Times = kWh used on Winter Weekday afternoons 
Tariff Code Charges £ Pence per unit (24%Night) 50% Night 
a. Charges £ 14030 Cost/unit: 7.02 nla 
b. Charges £ 13160 Cost/unit: 6.58 5.02 
c. Charges £ 14150 Cost/unit: 7.08 nla 
d. Charges £ 13288 Cost/unit: 6.64 5.08 
- -- --I' --- ----
. 
e. Charges £ 10133 Cost/unit: 5.07 4.55 
f. Charges £ 10121 Cost/unit: 5.06 4.49 
g. Charges £ 10733 Cost/unit: 5.37 4.58 
9. 85% Load Factor 
" Annual Kwhs : 200000 % kWh Night: 24 NOY MD : 30 
MD 27 % kWh Weekdays: 90 DEC MD : 20 
Nov Feb%Units: 1.88 *%PT 5 lAN MD : 20 
Dee lan%Units: 1.95 %LF : 84.56% FEB MD : 15 
* %PT = %Kwh usage at Peak Times = kWh used on Winter Weekday afternoons 
Tariff Code Charges £ Pence per unit (24%Night) 50% Night 
a. Charges £ 14030 Cost/unit: 7.02 nla 
-
b. Charges £ 13160 Cost/unit: 6.58 5.02 
c. Charges £ 14150 Cost/unit: 7.08 nla 
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d. Charges £ 13288 Cost/unit: 6.64 5.08 
e. Charges £ 10079 Cost/unit: 5.04 4.52 
f. Charges £ 10067 Cost/unit: 5.03 4.46 
g. Charges £ 10701 Cost/unit: 5.35 4.56 
Although the information for the comparisons is based around a contrived theoretical 
customer consumption pattern (in real life a customer choosing a tariff would make an 
effort to utilise the low cost periods of the tariff) it is useful to demonstrate how 
customers usage patterns and choice 'of tariff can affect final price paid. If customers 
fail to appreciate these differences, they will risk paying more for their energy than 
they need to (although most energy supply companies do offer advlce on tariff 
choice). 
For example, as demonstrated by the tables, tariff 'b' with 50% night consumption at 
low load factors is the cheapest choice, however at higher load factors, all the MD 
type tariffs are cheaper than 'b'. This is due to the fact that the main unit price for 
MD type tariffs is cheaper than the 2 rate 'day/night' type tariff and therefore, at high 
load factors, this unit cost advantage outweighs the cost of the additional MD related 
charges. 
Rationality of Customer Choice of Tariffs 
When considering the increase in surplus that different tariffs bring we usually assume 
that the customer chooses the tariff that will provide them with the lowest average 
price. However, empirical research shows that customers do not always choose this 
option (for example see Kling and van der Ploeg 1989 "Estimating Local Telephone 
I----Call Elasticities·with a Stochastic Model of Class_ of _~~rvic~ and!Jsag~Choice"­
MlT) Le. a significant number of customers chose tariffs that did not provide the 
lowest bill for their actual level of consumption. In Great Britain, where Time of Use 
terms have been offered by electricity companies, many customers have not switched 
to these tariffs, even where they would have made savings by choosing these new 
tariffs. 
If customers do not choose the cheapest tariff because they are miscalculating (or not 
calculating at all) then Qne of the biggest advantages of self selecting tariffs is lost; 
conversely, if they mistakenly choose the new tariff and they are worse off they have 
reduced their surplus. Pareto dominance relies on the belief that by making a new 
tariff option, in addition to the existing tariff choices, this will not adversely affect any 
customer. If customers make mistakes however, 'Pareto' dominance is severely 
weakened. 
However, customers may not be choosing the right tariff for other reasons. These 
reasons may include the issue of risk (Le. the customer does not know his exact future 
consumption pattern and so he may choose a single rate tariff over multi rate terms, as 
in all likelihood he may not use enough of the cheap rate to make it worth his while to 
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switch to the multi rate tariff). Another reason is the potential cost saving Le. if it is 
small it may not be worth searching for another tariff. This ties in with the effort of 
optimisation - the inconvenience of using extra effort to find a better tariff and 
continually check that it is more cost efficient to be on that tariff may be considered 
too much effort, and therefore, customers will not bother searching for alternative 
tariffs .. 
Asymmetric Information and Regulation 
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One of the main problems all regulators experience is the lack ofinformation 
available to them to help them regulate. After all, if the regulator had complete 
information about the firms costs and industry conditions he could simply design the 
most economically efficient plan and instruct the fIrm to follow it. However, the firm 
obviously knows more about itself and the industry than the regulator and may use 
this knowledge to gain an advantage over the regulator. Therefore, the regulator has 
to resort to using techniques which will help him reveal true costs and demands 
(including unobservable effort) and these are known commonly as "truth revealing 
mechanisms". Most of these models are rarely used in practice and therefore we will 
only refer to these briefly. 
Baron and Myerson (see Baron and Myerson 1982 "Regulating a Monopolist with 
Unknown Costs") devised a model that allowed the regulator to discover a company's 
true cost (Le. where the company knows their true costs but is not willing to disclose 
:them). 
An excellent in depth analysis of regulating with asymmetric information is given in 
Caillaud, Guesnerie, Rey and Tirole (1985) "The Normative Economics of 
Government Intervention in Production in the Light oflncentive Theory" 
Regulation and Politics 
The political causes of regulatory policy became an important issue in the 1970's with 
the publication ofStigler's highly influential paper (Stigler, G.J. (1971) "The Theory 
of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economic and Management Science, 2:3-
21) which led subsequently to his award of the Nobel Prize. This area of study was 
motivated by the problems associated with market failures, governments' attempts to 
rectify these failures through regulation and whether these attempts to overcome 
market failure were more efficient than doing nothing. Therefore, the market failure 
rationale has three separate components - fIrst a positive theory of conditions under 
which a market produces an inefficient outcome, second a normative theory that 
government ought to undertake actions to improve the efficiency of poorly performing 
markets and finally a positive theory that expects government to overcome signifIcant 
market failures through regulation. 
The introduction mid extension of regulation has been defended by its proponents on 
the basis of supposed market failures (for instance see Breyer, G.S. 1981). The three 
main types of market failures that have been used to justify regulation have been (1) 
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natural monopoly, (2) imperfect information and (3) the presence of external effects 
and public goods. Two other rationales have also been used, these being scarcity rent 
and destructive competition. 
An important concept here is that of the public interest theory that government should 
adopt regulatory strategies that cope with market failures. However, economic 
literature contains a number of alternatives for coping with market failure other than 
regulation such as competitive bidding for franchises as advocated by Demsetz or the 
use of taxes and subsidies. In addition, some market failures can be overcome simply 
by redefining property rights and creating markets in them (i.e. for instance, Spitzer, 
M.L., 1987). However, the positive theory of public interest regulation states that the 
regulatory policies which are adopted will be the most effective remedy for a market 
failure. 
Surprisingly, many people believe that regulation can make matters worse. Noll 
(1989) states "many scholars iri law, philosophy, political science, and psychology 
reject welfare economics as having interesting normative content and microeconomic 
theory as a relevant scientific approach to studying political behaviour". 
Noll and others have noted that the tenants of the economic theory of policy making, 
(which includes regulation), is also reliant on the concepts of cost of trading and the 
problems associated with asymmetric information and agent management. Regulators 
depend on a myriad of agency partners involving multiple principals and agents i.e. 
elected political officials act as agents for their constituents, regulatory agencies act as 
agents for these political officials etc. Elected politicians decisions are enforced 
through various means including legislation, enabling orders, appointing agency 
leaders and the control of finance. Governments normally delegate policy control, 
budgets and responsibility for formulating legislation to committees and full time 
officials. As the complexity of the agency relationships may cause 'inertia, the scope 
____ and interpretation of the instructions of elected Politicians depends heavily on 
(according to Noll1989) several important factors, these being; 
a. The extent to which principals and agents have conflicts of interest. 
b. The costs and accuracy of methods for principles to monitor the penormance of 
agents. 
c. The power of the pripciples' enforcement mechanisms for redirecting the incentives 
of the agent. 
Therefore, policy drift can occur i.e. what politicians promised the electorate would 
happen may not be achieved, either partly or in total. Drift can occur for instance 
where agents own policy preferences go unnoticed and unchecked because monitoring 
may be too expensive or the need for it had not been anticipated. 
Another set of problems we have not yet identified are those that the voter faces in 
checking and influencing the actions of its Politicians. Most members of the 
electorate are powerless as individuals, as a single vote is unimportant and cannot 
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convey the intensity of the individual voters wishes. In addition, voters cannot air 
their views on each issue; they therefore have to reject or accept the whole manifesto 
being offered. In addition, voters have to be prepared to make large efforts for few 
benefits in trying to undertake in-depth analysis of its politicians preferences and 
therefore it is not surprising that voters are poorly informed about policies and choose 
only to vote on a few major issues which affect them. A further difficulty stems from 
the problem of assigning responsibility for the performance of the public sector (see 
for instance Fiorina, M.P. (1981). Assigning responsibility for a change can be 
difficult as elected officials, the courts and the administration all play a role in shaping 
policy and ensuring its introduction. 
NolI (1989) and Moe (1980) have both commented on how organised pressure groups 
help counteract the problem of insignificant influence and informational complexity 
in electoral systems. To paraphrase their arguments, persons joining the group pay to 
monitor the performance of politicians and government departments and as the group 
represents a significant number of votes, they may be able to influence policy. Key 
politicians may also be given funding and therefore, these group members are more 
likely to have influence with politicians than unidentified voters. However, it must be 
remembered that the decentralised nature of Political Parties and the Civil Service 
found in most democracies acts as a antidote against the possible excessive influence 
which could be exercised by organised pressure groups. However, as pressure groups 
differ in their ability to organise and fund themselves, there is a key public interest 
implication for policy, in that the better organised pressure groups are likely to be 
successful promoters of their views' With policy makers because the time, effort and 
costs of attacking them will be too exhausting. In addition, unorganised voters will be 
unlikely to know of the policy decisions that are detrimental to them and from the 
pure perspective of economic policy, this favouring of the most organised group may 
mean that policy departs from the most efficient economic outcome. When a policy is 
reached where pressure groups have obtained what they wanted from policy makers, 
----the surplus gained, which is sometimes called monopoly rents, will be shared amongst 
the members of the pressure group. Pressure groups are also formed to capture rents 
because a market failure has fallen heavily on members of the group in the past and 
therefore this failure has provided the impetus to form the group to recapture the 
surplus belonging to the them. 
Indeed, over a period of time, the monopoly rents effectively stolen from 
unrepresented voters will eventually lead to these unrepresented voters taking an 
interest in regulation. Externally imposed reform will eventually arise because of the 
impact on unrepresented voters, who having paid the cost of this biased regulation, are 
forced to take effective political action. In addition, some represented groups who are 
party to rent sharing will perceive that their share of the rents from regulation have 
shrunken sufficiently to show that their net returns from the system as a whole are 
negative, which will lead to renewed efforts from them to capture new sources of rent 
or recapture old ones. 
The effects of rent snaring display themselves in higher charges than necessary to 
consumers, barriers to entry, lack of innovation and less than efficient production. An 
example of this is illustrated in the number of firms operating in transportation before 
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and after deregulation (see Bailey, E.E., Graham, D.R. and Kaplan D.P. (1985) 
"Deregulating the Airlines" Cambridge: MIT Press). 
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Therefore, the overall picture is one that suggests that organised interests do succeed 
usually at the cost of economic efficiency by capturing regulators until those who are 
made worse off organise themselves to do something about it. 
Avoiding Regulatory Capture 
As discussed above, we have seen that regulators can.be captured and induced to 
follow less than optimal economic policies, not only by the industry's they regulate 
but also by other interest groups and by the officials who have been appointed by 
politicians to administer them. Foster (1992) outlines a number of ways that 
regulatory capture can be avoided or at least checked and these are as follows: 
1. "Experience suggests that it requires an independent regulator who retains 
substantial discretion to interpret and decide regulatory offences". 
2. "The adoption of elaborate, court-like procedures, and a right of appeal to the 
courts on merits and the interpretation of the law, are likely to favour the regulated 
industry". 
3. "The adoption of procedures by a regulator which protect natural justice without 
leading to over elaborate and costly proceedings is likely to check regulatory capture. 
Such natural justice may be protected by a right of appeal to a court". 
4. "If there are to be appeals on merits and interpretation of the law they should be 
preferably to a similar regulatory body with similar discretion and procedures". 
1----5;-"The more firms within an industry a regulator regulates the less likely he is to be _ 
captured by any of them, except .where there is one dominant or they are able to make 
common cause against him becauSci ·their interests are complementary" . 
6. "The more influence on a regulator that is given to interested parties other than the 
regulated the more likely it is that he will strike a balance between those interests and 
those of the regulated industry, preventing or checking capture by any party". 
7. "As important as any other is the consideration that ministerial and other political 
influences must be constrained as far as possible to roles that do not allow them to 
have opportunities to impose uncompensated burdens on regulated industries with a 
significant effect on their efficiency". 
8. "The interest that most needs to be built up is that of the consumer. One needs an 
apparatus to reflect the consumer's economic interest intelligently, since consumers 
tend to be apathetic. But one should not make them dominant, as that could lead to 
regulatory failure". "-
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Another aspect of the situation to consider when looking at the extent to which 
regulation can induce economic efficiency and serve the public interest, is the . 
monopoly power the regulator has because he has no competition, in the sense that the 
regulator has no direct competition for his role of regulator (see for instance Alessi, L. 
de (1975) "An Economic Analysis of Government Ownership and Regulation" Public 
Choice, vol.l9, pp.I-42). Just as all other monopolies would maximise their 
monopoly position, so will the regulator. Therefore, some economists have argued 
that competition should be brought into regulation Le. all parties concerned (e.g. 
customers, the ftrm, the government, other interested and affected parties) would 
choose a regulator (from a selection) that would give them the greatest surplus. 
However, the formal procedure for this type of selection could be complicated if not 
unworkable. In the United States many companies have more than one regulator, 
being differentiated by geography, procedures and process which has led to 
competition between the regulators concerned. However, it has been argued that this 
multi regulator arrangement has been responsible for poor regulatory decisions (see 
for instance Wenders, IT., 1987). It could be argued that the law courts provide a 
form of competition because, in a way, lawyers and the courts compete in their 
understanding of the law and regulatory decisions and these hearings may result in 
further changes to the law and regulatory principles. However, giving legal precision 
to economic cases, as demonstrated on the railways in the last century, can lead to 
economic and commercial nonsenSe. 
Foster (1992) notes a different kind of competition arises where a regulatory 
Commission sits with a number of commissioners as its members, who then take 
decisions collectively. These commissioners will have differing views of what the 
public interest is i.e. some in line with customer groups and others favouring the 
regulated industry. The UK. regulatory model prefers single to commission type 
regulation. In the United States most commissions over the past 30 years have seen a 
scenario develop where the Chainnan's view tends to be final and decisive. 
Using a single regulator has-the advantage thatthey are-able to make morec-onsistenC--
decisions, which could be said to be in line with the philosophy that the more a 
situation requires the use of discretion, the more it requires a single person to weigh it 
up e.g. see Solo, R.A. (1980). However, in order to curb any excess there needs to be 
some appeals procedure i.e. so that justice and fairness can be clearly demonstrated 
(the appeal should be to another body specialising in economic regulation such as the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission). 
Cl 
Competition can also be induced by limiting the term of appointment of each 
regulator, any extension of the term being given by an elected official (although 
performance here will be judged by politicians not always on purely economic terms). 
Replacing one regulator with another will also risk a certain loss of consistency from 
the regulatory process. 
The Case for RegUlatory Reform in the UK 
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The case for reforming the UK system has been strengthened recently, partly because 
of the perceived excessive returns for utilities and in addition for other reasons, one of 
which is the lack of transparency that the present system has and the problems this 
causes for those companies (and other stakeholders) who are being regulated. 
Helm (1994) puts forward five arguments for reform in the UK system of regulation. 
These can be summarised as: 
'I. Regulatory Arbitrage (Substitution) ~ This deals with the effects that can occur 
where regulators decisions for two' different industries (e.g. Gas and Electric) which 
are interrelated are inconsistent. As Helm (1994) states "the potential and actual ' 
exercise of discretion over each of the main determinants of price caps (OPEX, 
CAPEX, asset valuation and cost of capital) and over the promotion of competition, ' 
creates uncertainty about regulatory decision making. This, in turn, has created a 
major activity among utilities, consultants and financial analysts in modelling and 
attempting to predict how each'individual DG will exercise his or her discretion. The 
uncertainty encourages speculation and consequently affects the pricing of utility 
shares in equity markets. The resultant volatility may raise the cost of capital. A 
process of regulatory capital market substitution takes place, as investors switch 
between utilities, betting on the conduct of the regulators". 
In addition, 'product market distortions' can occur. At present each regulator acts 
independently when deciding on issues of price level and structure .. Where 
inconsistencies occur, this may lead to three forms of distortion. These are described 
by Helm as; 
a. Inacc~te pricing leading to under or over investment. 
b. Differential pricing between n~tWorks leading to substitution between utilities. 
~ ~-- .. ,-----~". 
c. Location distortIons-as suppliers locauonal requirements are sensitive to '" 
transmission pricing (e.g. Gas fired generation in the north but demand in the south). 
That is, building generating plant near to where its output will be use'd can reduce 
transmission system usage and therefore transmission costs and prices. 
2. Capture - there is evidence that UK regulators have been captured by utility 
shareholders i.e. that the returns made by shareholders in UK utilities far outweigh 
those in other countries. particularly where rate of return regulation is in operation. 
There is also evidence to suggest that fuel price reductions have not been passed 
through to customers in Britain as much as in mainland Europe (Stem 1994). 
3. Administration Costs - As the tools and skills required to regulate one utility is 
nearly always identical to another (e.g. calculating cost of capital, asset valuations, 
OPEX and CAPEX for price setting can be done using a common set of tools) a 
degree of merger between regulatory offices could lead to cost savings. It should also 
be remembered that'the main costs of regulatory administration fall on the utilities as 
they have to create specialist units to track and predict the behaviour of their regulator. ' 
. - ',. '. 
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4. Investment, Sunk Costs and Regulatory Hold-up. Regulation has now replaced the 
role of public expenditure appraisal in controlling investment. For utilities the major 
problem in investing is that the investment is usually long tenn and sunk and this is 
out of step with periodic regulatory reviews of 3-5 years which means that returns on 
investment cannot always be guaranteed (at least in the planned timescale). This 
uncertainty for investors means that capital is rationed or the cost of capital is 
increased. In the private sector this problem has been overcome by vertical 
integration (e.g. industries with upstream sunk costs (oil refining) have integrated 
downstream to ensure final markets (petrol retail stations). However, regulation is an 
obstacle to this arrangement and therefore utilities have replaced vertical integration 
with long tenn contracts (e.g. 10-15 year contracts for Independent Power Projects 
(!PP's) with RECs). The key question is, therefore, whether the regulatory system can 
facilitate the emergence of long tenn contracts with customers. This is unlikely under 
the present system as long tenn contracts prevent entry. The result is likely to lead to 
significant distortions in inves~ent decision making. 
5. Political Instability. As utilities costs comprise 20% of the bottom 20% of 
households spending and comprise a significant proportion of GDP, they will always 
remain under public scrutiny. As investment in utility finns is long tenn and sunk in 
the majority of cases, a degree of political stability is important. However, as 
elections are periodic (every 4 to 5 years) and regulators are appointed by their 
political masters, there is a risk that a change of government could alter the regulatory 
rules (and the regulator) with all the associated consequences this could have on 
issues such as pricing, introduction of competition and energy efficiency. This 
political uncertainty can increase utilities costs of capital and affect their investment 
decisions. 
The recent spate of take-overs in the electricity sector also caused concern amongst 
regulators. The apparent attractiveness of the Regional Electricity Distributors to 
----foreign utilities-andUK. water companies has raised concerns about the effectiveness_ . 
of regulation to control and regulate multi utility concerns, especially where foreign 
ownership is involved. These take-overs have led to calls for separate listings for 
these companies, both to part them from their parent companies and in addition, their 
supply (potentially competitive) and distribution businesses (usually a natural 
monopoly). 
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International Electricity Price Determinants 
Chapter 2 
Introduction 
In this Chapter there is an econometric analysis of international electricity prices 
which will give an explanation of the variance in electricity prices between countries. 
The model built for this exercise utilises price data from eleven countries along with 
other quantitative information for these countries using a four year period which 
means that a panel data regression was used. The model attempts to analyse 
electricity prices in terms of a non traded good, using the work by Falvey and 
Gemmell (1991) regarding the explanation of service price differences in various 
countries as the starting point for much of the analysis. 
As this Chapter also relies on~e~onometric analysis, there is a discussion relating to 
Econometric modelling and, in particular, as a panel data regression is used, there is 
an explailation of 'Pooled Cross Section Time Series' modelling. 
Much of the analysis in this Chapter is dependant upon the use of Purchasing Power 
Parities (PPPs) to convert international cost, price and economic data into a single 
currency; therefore this Chapter starts offwith an explanation of PP Ps and why they 
are used. 
An Explanation of Purchasing Power Parities (PPP's) 
According to Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch (1984) the "definition oflong run 
equilibrium requires that the economy is both in internal balance (full employment) 
and external balance (zero net exports and current account balance). Import demand 
1 
----depends on doriiestic output and on the real exchange rate. Export demand depends 
on foreign output and on the real exchange rate. Hence, when both the domestic 
economy and the rest of the world are at internal balance or potential output there is 
only one real exchange rate compatible with external balance at the same time. At any 
higher real exchange rate, the domestic economy will be less competitive. Imports 
will be higher and exports lower and the country concerned will have a current 
account deficit. Conversely, at any lower real exchange rate, the domestic economy 
will have a current account surplus. Only one real exchange rate is compatible with 
internal and external balance at the same time". 
"Our theory of floating exchange rates in the long run can be summarised very simply. 
When exchange rates float freely, there is no official intervention in the foreign 
exchange market and no net monetary transfer between countries since the balance of 
payments is always zero. Just as in a closed economy, the domestic money supply is 
determined by the quantity of high powered money issued by the government and by 
the extent to which .the domestic banking system creates domestic bank deposits 
against this monetary base. In the long run the domestic money supply will determine 
the domestic price level just as in a closed economy .... in the long run the nominal 
1 
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exchange rate must adjust to achieve the unique real exchange rate required for 
external and internal balance in long run equilibrium". 
2 
According to Eurostat, the calculation of purchasing power parities became necessary 
once it was realised that international comparisons of gross domestic product (GDP) 
based on conversion into a common currency using exchange rates did not provide a 
reliable indication of the volume of goods and services intended for a particular final 
use. For many years it was assumed that exchange rates could be relied upon, at least 
during periods of relative stability between the currencies, as a good alternative to 
purchasing power parity rates, but this assumption was wrong and this realisation that 
comparison exercises using exchange rates could be flawed, meant that PPP's are now 
an important means of achieving a level playing field in international economic 
comparative studies. Therefore, they have been utilised for the statistical comparisons 
used in this thesis as we are dealing with international data. 
The exchange rate does not necessarily reflect the real purchasing power of a currency 
on the national territory as it is determined mainly on the one hand by the demand for 
and supply of foreign currency needed to pay for the goods and services traded 
between countries and, on the other hand, by factors such as capital flows, speculation 
and the political and economic situation in the country. Consequently, a comparison 
of data converted by means of exchange rates can be subject to considerable 
complexities and distortions i.e. varying from country to country and sector to sector. 
Eurostat notes that to calculate the parities, it is necessary to refer to the flow of 
products, the values of which are broken down into a price and a volume component. 
In national accounts, two types of products can be distinguished; 
a Final products. 
b. Intermediate products, those which are re-used in the production process to 
____ produce final pfoducts. __ 
Only the prices of fmal products are taken into account in calculating the parities and 
their sum gives the gross domestic product. The price level of this flow can be 
regarded as an indicator of the general level of prices in a given country. However, 
comparisons between countries can also be made for price levels of specific flows. 
Obviously, the specific parity rates differ according to the flow and are not identical to 
the overall rate because the existing price structures in countries are not always 
exactly the same. " 
The work programme of the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(Eurostat) in the field of purchasing power parities, is part of the International 
Comparison Project (ICP) being carried out by the United Nations at world level. 
Every five years (i.e. base or reference years) the estimates of parities and real values 
are made on the basis of wide ranging surveys at a very detailed level, while for the 
intervening years the estimation procedure is much less complex and at a more 
aggregated level. '. -
2 
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Utilisation ofPPP's 
The interest generated by comparisons of the purchasing power ofGDP in real terms 
(as explained by PPP's) has grown steadily, according to Eurostat, since they were 
introduced. The main users are the international institutions and organisations, 
particularly the various UN bodies, the OECD and the institutions of the European 
Communities, which can use these data for political and economic purposes. 
However, over the last 10 - 15 years the circle of users has widened considerably to 
such areas as the business world, universities, government departments and private 
individuals. 
3 
The use of the parity alongside the exchange rate for conversion purposes has come up 
against a number of problems since its creation because it is a relatively new statistical 
instrument. 
In general, it can be said that PPP's are being used in fields where it was previously 
the custom to make comparisons between countries, using data converted into, for 
instance ECU's, by means of exchange rates. The first application of parities is in 
national accounts and in particular, comparisons ofGDP. However, it should be 
borne in mind that there are some reservations to using PPP's in analysis work, as they 
do not always reveal the reality of the situation. For instance, energy price 
comparisons in PPP's do not reveal the impact on businesses of price differentials in 
energy (especially if that business has international competitors) Le. the business pays 
for energy in real currency terms which are immediate and not in PPP's terms, which 
are long term. 
Use of the parities, especially outside the field of national accounts, raises the problem 
of which rate should be used. Should it be the overall GDP rate or, depending on the 
type of value to be converted, specific rates which existed for the 260 or so basic 
~~~_headings oLGDP, or in certain cases, specific rates that are not obtained as part of the 
normal calculation of parities, but would have to be specially devised according to the 
requisite data sets individual requirements. It should also be noted that specific 
parities are costly, difficult and time consuming to calculate and the their use is not as 
popular as the overall GDP parity. 
The overall parity has a number of advantages such as being easy to interpret, it also 
eliminates the effect of differences in the general level of prices and, above all, avoids 
the need to produce large numbers of specific parity rates. Therefore, in the study 
presented in this submission, we will be using the overall parity rates as published for 
each individual country. 
Tradable and Non Tradable Goods 
When comparing the prices of commodities and services it is sometimes useful to 
distinguish between traded and non traded goods. Services, such as expenditure on 
personnel (Le. government employees), public transport and communication, public 
entertainment and energy (e.g. electricity) plus construction constitute non traded 
3 
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goods; all others are placed in the traded classification (see Kravis, I.B., Reston, A., 
and Summers, R. (1978) "International Comparisons of Real Product and Purchasing 
Power", John Ropkins University Press for the World Bank). According to Kravis, 
Reston and Summers the definition of'tradables' and 'non tradables' derives from the 
distinction that can be made between commodities and services .......... "services are 
defined as including categories in which expenditures are on goods that cannot be 
stored. These include categories in which personal services are being engaged (for 
example, domestic services, teachers and government employees), repairs of various 
kinds (footwear, auto), rents, public transport and communication, public 
entertainment, restaurants and hotels. All other categories of GDP are regarded as 
commodities. The distinction between the services/commodities and tradable and 
nontradable classification lies in the treatment of construction. Tradables consist of 
all commodities except construction; non tradables consist of all services plus 
construction". 
..: 
Therefore, as electricity constitUtes expenditure on goods that cannot be stored it can 
be regarded as a nontradable good. 
An often expressed generalIsation holds that the expenditures on services tend to rise 
as per capita incomes increase. Kravis, Heston and Summers in "The Share of 
Services in Economic Growth" (1982) noted that services are much cheaper in the 
relative price structure of a typical poor country than in a rich country. This was 
explained by them as follows: 
4 
"As a first approximation it may be assumed for purposes of explaining the model that 
the prices of traded goods, mainly commodities are the same in different countries. 
With similar prices for traded goods in all countries, wages in the industries producing 
traded goods will differ from country to country according to differences in 
productivity - a standard conclusion of Ricardian trade theory. In each country the 
----wage level established in the traded goods industries Will determine wages in the 
industries producing non traded goods, mainly services. Because internatlomiJ. . 
. productivity differences are smaller for such industries, the low wages established in 
poor countries in the low productivity traded goods industries will apply also to the 
service and other nontraded goods industries. The consequences will be low prices in 
low income countries for services and other non traded goods." 
This explanation is also to be found in Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964) and Harrod 
(1933). ~ 
International Electricity Price Differences - Use of Econometrics 
The Basis of the Experiment 
The model built for this part of the analysis utilises the work of Falveyand Gemmell 
(1991) regarding the differences in the price of non traded goods in various countries. 
As discussed earlier, electricity can be regarded as a non traded good. The model 
(The International Utilities Econometric Price Model - IUEPM) uses a framework 
4 
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inspired by Falvey and Gemmell to analyse the significance of a number of factors on 
the price of electricity in order to obtain an explanation of the international differences 
in the price of this commodity. 
The basis of the experiment was to see whether international electricity price 
differences were due to reasons relating to international effects on energy inputs (e.g. 
the price of oil) or whether the price paid by consumers was more reliant on 
indigenous regulation effects. An example of the differences in electricity prices 
between the countries in the model is given below using 'domestic' customer prices in 
1985 as an illustration. Prices have been converted using Purchasing Power Parities. 
Country 1985 
PPPkWh 
Belgium 17.12 
Denmark 9.79 
~. 
France 12.43 
Germany 13.36 
Ireland 13.71 
Italy 22.47 
Portugal 20.54 
Spain 16.44 
UK 12.07 
USA 12.81 
Japan 15.07 
The Data Sample for the IUEPM 
____ The data sample used was over four separate time periods (i.e. 1981, 1982, 1983 and 
1985).-- --- - - - - -- -
For each time period we used price data for 4 different types of customer and these 
were: 
i. Domestic Customers - Consumption 3300 kWh per annum 
ii. 100kW Maximum Q,emand - 20% Load Factor Customers 
Hi. 500kW Maximum Demand - 60% Load Factor Customers 
iv. 2500kW Maximum Demand - 20% Load Factor Customers 
The four year period (i.e. 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985) was chosen because there were 
no data gaps for this period. It was also chosen because there were no significant intra 
period regulation changes in the countries concerned (e.g. the subsequent change from 
public to private ownership in the UK electricity supply industry). The countries used 
for the sample, eleven in total, were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, 
5 
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Italy, Portugal, Spain, UK, USA and Japan. The completed model shall be referred to 
as the International Utilities Econometric Price Model (IUEPM). 
The regression process in the model was undertaken using the 'Shazam' econometric 
modelling software. 
As previous published work on the price of traded and non traded goods (e.g. Falvey 
and Gemmell's paper published in 1991 regarding 'Explaining Service Price 
Differences in International Comparisons') forms the basis of the methodology used to 
build the IUEPM, it is appropriate that this work is now discussed along with other 
relevant references. 
Some Recent Analysis on the Factor Productivity Explanation ofInternational 
Differences in Service Prices 
As mentioned above, some relevant work in relation to econometric modelling 
concerning international differences in prices can be found in the literature regarding 
international factor endowment and productivity differences (which deals with the 
effect these factors have on the price of traded and non traded goods). As electricity 
can be regarded as a non traded good, this literature is particularly relevant. 
As mentioned earlier a contribution to this field of analysis comes from Falvey and 
Gemmell (Falvey R.E. and Gemmell, N. (1991) "Explaining Service Price Differences 
in International Comparisons", American Economic Review, 81, 1295-309) 
The abov:e paper sets out to build upon previous models which were devised to try and 
explain the determinants of international differences in the prices of services relative 
to tradable commodities. Falvey and Gemmell's model identifies the effects of 
____ differences.in factor endowments, population, trade balance and trade impediments to 
explain the differences in service prices (Le. non traded goods) found in the countries 
investigated. 
The work of Kravis, Heston and Summers (KHS 1982) has shown that there are 
quantifiable differences between countries in terms of services relative to 
commodities. In addition, these differences have been shown to be positively 
correlated with differences in per capita real incomes. 
" 
Much of the work of KHS is influenced by Harrod (1933) who was of the opinion 
that the price of non traded services (e.g. transport and domestic services) relative to 
traded commodities could be expected to be higher in countries with higher per capita 
incomes. The Kravis, Heston, Summers and Harrod explanations are based on the 
effect that differences in factor productivities (or technologies) have on service prices 
across countries. The crux of this "Factor Productivity Hypothesis" (FPH) is that 
countries with a low factor productivity overall (low real income per capita) will, in 
relation to traded goods, be relatively more productive in services and therefore have 
lower service prices. Bhagwati (1984) provided the first multifactor model to explain 
price differences in terms of factor productivity differences. Bhagwati also 
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demonstrated that factor endowment differences can also be used to explain observed 
service price differences. Later research and papers such as Falvey and Gemmell 
(1991) have focused on the factor endowment explanation partly because of the 
absence of data on sectoral total factor productivitx differences across countries. 
Using duality models of trade and national income accounts, the Falvey Gemmell 
model (as set out in their 1991 paper) derives a reduced form equation for the 
difference between a country's service prices (non traded goods prices) and those of a 
base country. This difference is expressed as 6]1s and therefore the Falvey Gemmell 
model has the approximate form: 
where: 
Av = the difference in factor endowments relative to the base country. 
L\h = the difference in the balance of trade deficit to· the base country. 
6]1, = the difference in the price of non traded goods relative to the base country. 
Ay = difference in per capita income compared to the base country. 
The explanation for the role of these variables can be given briefly as follows. 
Av reflects the role of endowments in raising relative real income and therefore the 
demand for non traded goods. 
Ab explains the role of the real trade deficit in raising the demand for non traded' 
___ g~ods. ____ ·~ __ 
6]1, will also increase real demand for non traded goods in the country experiencing 
the relative rise in the price of its traded goods. 
Ay reflects the difference in real per capita income, long believed to be a cause of 
differences in non traded goods prices. 
" 
7 
Later work by Falvey and Gemmell (1993) further confmned the FPH hypothesis of 
Harrod (1933), KHS (1982), Kravis and Lipsey(1983) and Bhagwati (1984) i.e. that is 
average differences in sectoral factor productivity across countries appear to be 
positively correlated with differences in real incomes per capita and that the relative 
magnitudes of sectoral TFP differences in tradables versus services appear to be 
consistent with that required to produce a positive correlation between real income per 
capita and service prices. 
. ., ~ 
The question the FG model now asks is whether the estimated productivity terms used 
in the FG model have any significance in relation to how much they explain service 
7 
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price differences. The FG model uses data generated froni regression residuals to 
estimate the effects of sectoral TFP differences. This use of regression residuals by 
the FG model builds on the results from the 1993 Falvey and Gemmell paper, which 
in turn draws on the work relating to 'rational expectations' in the 1970's e.g. by 
Sargent (1976) and Barro (1977) and the econometric issues involved with the use of 
these residuals which is explored in Pagan (1984) and suggests, that any explanation 
of international differences in the price of services is enhanced, if both factor 
endowment differences and total factor productivity differences are recognised, even 
if TFP differences appear to affect prices less than factor endowment differences. 
However, for the purposes of our model (Le. the IUEPM) due to data restrictions, we 
have concentrated on factor endowment differences. 
The conclusion of the FG paper is that the observed positive correlation between 
service prices and real incomes per capita across countries can be partly explained in 
terms of differences in sectoral factor productivities across countries. Therefore, the 
Factor Productivity Hypothesis· (FPH) can be regarded as a complementary factorto 
the endowment explanation rather than an alternative. When combined with 
endowment factors the model provides a good explanation for international 
differences in service prices and the positive correlation between service prices and 
real incomes per capita. 
8 
Overall the FG model did concur with the FPH hypothesis i.e. that is average sectoral 
factor productivity differences did meet the appropriate FPH conditions in that the 
results of the model showed that sectoral productivity differences are positively 
correlated to real incomes per capita and service TFP differences do appear to be 
smaller than tradable differences. The model also detected some evidence to support 
the supposition that countries with higher productivity will exhibit higher service 
prices. However, for the purposes of the IUEPM, we are interested in the endowment 
factor explanation and their effect on price rather than the effects due to factor 
____ ~roductivity_ ~iffeEence~. 
Utilising the Work of Heston, Falvey and Gemmell et al to Construct the IUEPM 
We can assume, for the purposes of constructing a framework for the IUEPM, that 
comparable 'traded goods' will be roughly equal in price in different countries, when 
corrected by purchasing power parity exchange rates. However, we can expect 'non 
traded' goods to show a.,difference in price i.e. that 
can be used as a measure of the real exchange rates for two economies i and j. It can 
be said, therefore, that the Falvey Gemmell model is a widely known hypothesis for 
the explanation of non traded goods prices. Therefore, 
8 
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will vary positively with the country's GDP per capita. 
The object of the analysis in this section is to take the work of Falvey and Gemmell 
and extend it to international electricity prices by treating electricity prices as non. 
traded goods. However, in addition to the Falvey Gemmell effects, the IUEPM uses 
other factors that may explain differences in electricity prices and by implication 
raises the possibility that ownership and regulation factors may also be significant in 
relation to electricity prices. . 
Use of the 'Generalised Linear Regression Model' 
9 
Classic regression modelling uSes rather restrictive assumptions concerning the way 
regression disturbance behaves. This prevents a three dimensional econometric 
analysis of a data set. For our modelling purposes in the IUEPM, we are interested in 
data observations relating to eleven different countries, over four time periods 
utilising data for each of these years relating to each countries electricity prices e.g. 
net thermal generating capacity, balance of trade etc (these will be specified more 
fully later) and this requires a more three dimensional approach. 
Therefore, in this instance, for the IUEPM regression analysis we needed to use an 
alternative model. In 'Elements ofEconometrics' (Kmenta, J., Macmillan 1971) 
Kmenta describes such a model i.e. the Generalised Linear Regression Model 
(GLRM).which he states ...... 'an interesting application of this model ..... is (to) 
. observations on a number of cross-sectional units over time' ....... 'the classical normal 
linear regression model is characterised by a number of assumptions concerning the 
----stochastic disturbance in the regression equation including h<!mosked~ticity and 
nonautocorrelation'. Kmenta describes the disturbance term Si in 
this is supposed to satisfy the following requirements: 
ECG:) = cl for all i 
These assumptions in the matrix notation can be described by 
EC ee') = cl In 
where 
9 
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e= 
and In is an identity matrix of order (n x n). Therefore, if we do not make these two 
assumptions (homoskedasticity and autocorrelation), whilst retaining all the other 
assumptions of the classical normal linear regression model, we have the 'generalised 
linear regression model'. 
The full description of this m?del given by Kmenta is: 
"The joint distribution of El' E2, •••••• , En is multivariaie normal", 
E(Et)=O i=1,2, .... ,n. 
E(EtE) = G'ij i,j = 1,2, ....... ,n 
"Each of the explanatory variables is nonstochastic and such that for any sample size", 
"is a finite number different from zero for every k = 2,3, ........ ,K" . 
. . 
--~------
"It should also be remembered that the number of observations exceeds thenUlllber of 
explanatory variables (n> k) and that no linear relation exists between any of the 
explanatory variables". 
Kmenta notes that the model is 'generalised' because it includes other models as 
special cases. The classical normal linear regression model is one such special case 
in which n is a diagonal matrix with d in place of each of the diagonal elements. 
According to Kmenta another special case is the heteroskedastic model ..... "here n 
is again diagonal, but the diagonal elements are not necessarily all the same. For the 
model in which the disturbances follow a first order autoregressive scheme, the matrix 
n becomes" 
10 
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I P p2 pn-I 
p I P pn-2 
Q=cr . 
"Assuming that the variances and covariance's of the disturbance (Le. the elements of 
the n matrix are known) we can attempt to estimate the parameters of the generalised 
linear regression model. Since the OLS estimators of the regression coefficients are 
obtained by minimising" 
n L (Y, -PI -P2Xn - ... - PKXiK)2 
1=1 
''they are exactly the same as the least squares estimators of the classical normal linear 
regression model; that is" 
Note that 
E{fJ)=E(X'X)-l x'[xp+e]=p+ E(X'X)-I(X e)=p 
and 
--~~-___ ~ _~i> _ 
This demonstrates that the ordinary least squares estimators of p of the generalised 
linear regression model are unbiased and consistent. . 
Cl 
~ooled Cross Section Time Series Analysis 
Our International Electricity Prices model combines pooled cross section and time. 
series observations. The behaviour of the disturbances over the cross-sectional units 
is likely to differ from the behaviour of the disturbance of a given cross sectional unit 
over time i.e. the relationship between the disturbances of two countries at some 
specific time may differ from the relationship between the disturbances of a specific 
country in two specific time periods. 
11 
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Therefore, various kinds of prior specifications with respect to the disturbances will 
lead to various kinds of restrictions on n. Kmenta (1971) states that the regression 
equation for this type of equation can be shown as; 
Y;t = Xit,l + P Xit;l + ... '+PkXit,k + Eit (i = 1,2, .... ,N; t = 1,2, .... ,T) 
12 
The above shows that sample data are represented by observations on N cross-section 
units over T time periods. Altogether we have n =NxT observations. It is 
anticipated, that the regression disturbance and explanatory variables will satisfy the 
assumptions of the generalised line~ regression model. In the majority of cases we 
will have X;t,l = 1 for all i and t. 
(Where i = countries & t = time periods)' 
According to Kmenta (1971) it is usual to combine the assumptions that are usually 
made when we deal with cross sectional or time series observations (e.g. with cross 
sectional observations it is frequently assumed that the regression disturbances are 
mutually independent but heteroskedastic, however, with time series data it is usually 
assumed that disturbances are autoregressive, although not usually heteroskedastic). 
Therefore, it is usual when dealing with pooled cross section time series data to adopt 
a cross sectionally heteroskedastic and time wise autoregressive model. The 
characteristics of this model according to Kmenta are; 
E(~) = cl; heteroskedasticity 
cross sectional independence 
autoregression 
where '. ---~ 
" 
and 
Therefore, for the purposes of our model we had to assume that the auto correlation 
coefficient was the same for all countries in order to make the estimation method 
feasible. 
12 
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Structure of Model and Source Data Used 
As already discussed, the data sample used for construction of the International 
Utilities Econometric Price Model (IUEPM) was over four separate annual time 
periods. The four year period (Le. 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985) was chosen because 
there were no data gaps for this period (originally the model had included data on the 
following variables for an 11 year period, 1981-1992, but this period had suffered 
from data gaps for the eleven countries mentioned below). The four year period was 
also chosen because there were no significant intra period regulation changes in the 
countries concerned (e.g. the change from public to private ownership in the UK 
electricity supply industry). The countries used for the sample, eleven in total, were 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, UK, USA and 
Japan. 
The model was populated by data obtained from the sources listed below. 
Sources of Data Used in the International Utilities. Econometric Price Model 
1. Price Data 
Price data (in local currency price per kWh) was collected in the first instance from 
the International Electricity Prices annual published by the Electricity Association 
Services Limited (formerly known as the Electricity Council). The comparisons 
compiled by the Electricity Association are based upon the replies to a questionnaire 
sent to electricity supply authorities and national electricity organisations. For 
domestic customers, the prices include all taxes (recoverable and non recoverable). 
For non domestic customers, the prices include only non recoverable taxes. A 
consumption level of 3300 kilowatt hours per annum for domestic customers was used 
,_~~~for comparisonopurposes._ F0t" non do~estic comparisons, 3 types of customers price 
data was used Le. prices for consumers with demands-and load· faCtors as follows; .-
100kW maximum demand (MD) consumer with a 20% load factor, a 500kW MD 
consumer with a 60% load factor and 2500kW MD consumer with a 20% load factor. 
No load management, interruptibility or similar discounts have been included in the 
prices, because of the variety of such schemes, the problems of obtaining confidential 
information about them and the difficulties encountered when trying to make 
meaningful comparisons when using them (even with full knowledge of the details of 
these schemes). Above the 2500kW level of demand, special commercial 
relationships are more common and these make it very difficult to fmd a basis for 
comparison. In addition, some of these customers are in industries which may 
receive assistance in support of national economic or strategic aims. 
The prices are determined on a like for like basis. Where more than one tariff is 
available to new customers the lowest tariff is used. The analysis is based on United 
Kingdom consumption patterns which have been consistently applied throughout. 
13 
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Prices were then converted into Power Purchasing Parity tenns using PPP rates as 
given in Eurostatistics: Theme 1, Series B and extrapolated to other countries using 
PPP's from OECD Main Economic Indicators. 
2. Population of Country 
14 
These figures are based on mid year estimates as shown in the United Nations 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. This figure is a measure of the size of the country in 
terms of electricity using inhabitants and could be used along with the surface area of 
the country (Le. see 'Surface Area of Country' below) as a guide to population 
density. Population density is an important statistic for network industries as it gives 
an indication to the amount of investment per capita required to service the 
population. 
3. Surface Area of Country 
As given in the United Nations Statistical Yearbook. The surface area figure gives an 
indication to the approximate size of the country's distribution network. 
4. Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 
GDP per capita was derived from data shown in the OECD Main Economic 
Indicators. This figure has been converted into Purchasing Power Parity tenns and 
acts as a measure of the economic prosperity of the country concerned. 
1--__ .5. J~'elE~ct1ic:ityProduction (GWh) 
Figures for each country as published by the International Energy Agency publication 
'Energy Statistics ofOECD Countries (1994), which contains the necessary data for 
the relevant years Le. 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1985. 
6. Type of Plant used for Electricity Generation - Percentage of Net Electricity 
Production 
As given in the Electricity Association's International Electricity Prices annual 
pUblication for the years specified e.g. the percentage used of the following types of 
plant for generation purposes i.e. 
a. Conventional Thennal 
b. Hydro and Pumped Storage 
c. Nuclear 
d. Other (e.g. Solar '& Wind) 
14 
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7. Transmission and Distribution Losses as a Percentage of Sales 
Calculated from information contained in the Electricity Association's International 
Electricity Prices annual publication. 
8. Gross Hourly Earnings of Male Workers in Manufacturing Industry 
Calculated from information contained in the Electricity Association's International 
Electricity Prices annual publication. Information on these levels is given in local 
currencies and this is converted into a PPP value using the method outlined for price 
data for electricity prices given above. 
9. Trade Balance 
15 
Derived from the 'Balance of Payments ,;. Trade Balance' section of the International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook Vol. XLVI, 1993 which is given in US Dollars and then 
subsequently converted into a PPP level. 
10. Price of Oil 
Either Crude Oil Spot Price ofBrent or Arab Light or Oil Product Gasoline Price for 
North West Europe, as supplied by the International Energy Agency in their 
publication lEA Statistics (Energy Prices and Taxes) 4th Quarter 1993 (OECD Paris). 
Prices ar~ quoted in U.S Dollars bbIIFOB as these are not a country specific variable. 
1--~·-ChoiceofVariables 
The variables listed above have been chosen partly because they are· available for all 
countries in a similar format and partly because for the analysis we intend to 
undertake these variables should, hopefully, represent reliable explanatory variables of 
the price of a non traded good such as electricity. 
Finally, it was decided after much analysis that the IUEPM model would utilise the 
following combination Of variables as shown in 1,2,4,5,6, 9 and 10 above (3,7 and 8 
were omitted). 
The regression equation formulated for the IUEPM is; 
DPS = f(DV,EDNPS,PTDBPS,P~CONST~ 
where; 
(i). Where D is the difference relative to the base country. (DPS is the difference 
relative to the base country of the price of the non traded good i.e. electricity). 
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(ii). 'DV' is the percentage of Thermal Generating Capacity of Total Generating 
Capacity of the country multiplied by the Net Electricity Production of the Country. 
This variable proxies the factor endowment variable in Falvey Gemmell. 
C%TGCx CNEP 
. . 
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(iii). 'EDNPS' is the national income per head of the country concerned (ie. the non 
base country's e.g. France, Germany etc) multiplied by the difference in population to 
the base country i.e. the United States of America 
(CGNP/CPOP) x (BPOP-CPOP) expressed in Falvey Gemmell as (e*dNlPs) 
(iv). 'PTDBPS' price of the traded good (in this case oil) divided by the price of the 
non traded good (in this case the purchasing power parity per kilowatt hour price of 
electricity for each of the non base countries) multiplied by the difference in the 
balance of trade to the base country (i.e. USA). 
(OIL/CPPPKWH) x (BBOT-CBOT) expressed in Falvey Gemmell as {PtlPs)*db 
(v). 'PT' is the price of the traded good and in this model this is the price of oil {either 
Crude Oil Spot Price ofBrent or Arab Light or Oil Product Gasoline Price for North 
West Europe as supplied by the International Energy Agency in their pUblication lEA 
Statistics (Energy Prices and Taxes) 4th Quarter 1993 (OECD Paris) prices quoted in 
U.S Dollars bbllFOB. This variable represents the effect of an important, 
internationally determined factor price in setting the price of the non traded good. A 
statistically significant result for this variable will suggest that non traded electricity 
prices in different countries are driven by international factor prices. A non 
significant result (failure to reject the null) will suggest that internal factors, such as 
the nature of the regulatory regime, are more important for determining the price of 
non traded electricity. 
---{vi).-'CONSTANT' _ _ 
NB: Where 'C'is used at the beginning, as in 'CGNP', this relates to the GNP level of 
the country concerned Where 'B'is used, this relates to the base country i.e. the USA' 
and therefore BPOP means the base country's pop.ulation. 
The results of the model will be evaluated, in addition to normal econometric analysis 
'" tests, with reference to each countries regulatory regime for the period. These are set 
out in the table below. 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ownership Type 1981-85 
Private 
'. - Municipal and Private 
Public 
Municipal and Private 
Regulatory Method 1981-85 
Implicit Rate of Return 
Implicit Rate of Return 
Nationalised Industry guidelines 
Implicit Rate of Return 
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Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
UK 
USA 
Japan 
Public 
Public 
Public 
Public and Private 
Public 
Private 
Nationalised Industry guidelines 
Nationalised Industry guidelines 
Nationalised Industry guidelines 
Explicit Rate of Return 
Nationalised Industry guidelines 
Explicit Rate of Return 
Private Implicit Rate of Return 
Where; 
a. 'Implicit rate of Return' means that the underlying economic principles guiding 
policy makers will relate to this form of economic control although decision making 
will not be seen to be made entirely on these principles as other political 
considerations will also be taken into account. 
b. Nationalised Industry Guidelines' encompasses all considerations (Le. social, 
political, economic). 
c. 'Explicit Rate of Return' - the regulatory body sets its price control guidelines 
based on 'rate of return' economic principles which are laid out in an explicit 
contractual relationship with the companies. 
Results of the Analysis Using the Generalised Linear Regression Model 
As outlined earlier, the IUEPM looked at various data for eleven countries over four 
different time periods (Le. 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1985) for four different types of 
customer, these being; 
----i;-Domestic CUstomers - Consumption 3300 kWh per annum._ 
ii. 100kW Maximum. Demand - 20% Load Factor Customers 
iii. 500kW Maximum Demand - 60% Load Factor Customers 
iv. 2500kW Maximum. Demand - 20% Load Factor Customers 
We now consider the output from the IUEPM for each of these in turn. 
i. Domestic CustomerS - Consumption 3300 kWh per annum 
R Square = 57.35% 
F test = 11.766 (analysis of variance from mean) 
F crit = 2.65 (at 4 numerator and 35 denominator degrees of freedom) 
T - statistic 
at t 0.05 (10% significance) t crit = 1.690 
at t 0.025 (5% significance) t crit = 2.031 
17 
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Name Coefficient Error 35DF 
DV 0.12053E-05 0.6128E-06 1.967 
EDNPS 0.14452E-04 0.4057E-05 3.562 
PTDBPS -0.29875E-04 0.4904E-05 -6.092 
PT -0.4660 lE-O 1 0.5065E-Ol -0.9201 
CONSTANT 13.593 2.601 5.227 
• At 10% level only. 
ii. 100kW Maximum Demand - 20% Load Factor Customers 
R Square = 24.55% 
F test = 2.848 (analysis of variance from mean) 
F crit = 2.65 (at 4 numerator and 35 denominator degrees of freedom) 
T - statistic 
at t 0.05 (1 0% significance) t crit = 1.690 
at t 0.025 (5% significance) t crit = 2.031 
Name 
DV 
EDNPS 
PTDBPS 
PT 
CONSTANT 
----- ----- ---
Coefficient 
0.32617E-06 
0.10220E-04 
-0. 12489E-04 
-0.10200 
9.5164 
... 
Error 35DF 
0.5323E-06 0.6128 
0.3675E-05 2.781 . 
0.3295E-05 -3.790 
0.4627E-Ol -2.205 
2.129 4.470 
ill. 500kW Maximum Demand - 60% Load Factor Customers 
R Square = 60.52% 
F test = 11.879 (analysis of variance from mean) 
() 
F crit = 2.65 (at 4 numerator and 35 denominator degrees of freedom) 
T - statistic 
at t 0.05 (1 0% significance) t crit = 1.690 
at t 0.025 (5% significance) t crit = 2.031 
Positive/Negative 
Significance 
positive· 
positive 
negative 
not significarit 
Positive/Negative 
Significance 
not significant 
positive 
negative 
negative 
18 
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Name Coefficient Error 35DF 
DV 0.S0789E-06 0.3682E-06 1.379 
EDNPS 0.79949E-05 0.1708E-05 4.680 
PTDBPS -0.35163E 0.1612E-05 -2.181 
PT -0.889964E-Ol 0.3446E-Ol -2.582 
CONSTANT 7.9057 1.605 4.926 
iv. 2500kW Maximum Demand - 20% Load Factor Customers 
R Square = 40.08% 
F test = 5.853 (analysis ofvariance"from mean) 
F crit = 2.65 (at 4 numerator and 35 denominator degrees of freedom) 
T - statistic 
at t 0.05 (1 0% significance) t crit = 1.690 
at t 0.025 (5% significance) t crit = 2.031 
Name 
DV 
EDNPS 
PTDBPS 
PT 
CONSTANT 
Coefficient 
0.49709E-06 
0.1l457E-04 
-0.10152E-04 
0.39803E-Ol 
4.2908 
Error 
0.5643E-06 
0.320 lE-OS 
0.3 1 85E-05 
0.4544E-Ol 
2.097 
Conclusion on the Results of the IUEPM 
35DF 
0.8810 
3.579 
- 3.188 
0.8759 
2.046 
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PositiveJNegative 
Significance 
not significant 
positive 
negative 
negative 
Positive/Negative 
Significance 
not significant 
positive 
negative 
not significant 
In general, the model fits the data relatively well. The Goodness of Fit (F) test is 
passed in all cases and each regression contains statistically significant explanatory 
variables on the basis of the efficient estimators with the t statistics adjusted for panel 
heteroskedasticity and first order autoregression i.e. each current disturbance is equal 
to a portion of the preceding disturbance plus a random effect represented by Ut. 
In the period used, the model demonstrates that national regulation effects overcame 
international effects on electricity prices i.e. PT was either negative or not significant.. 
The model concludes that the bigger the negative figure for PTDBPS the higher the 
price of electricity because the PTDBPS will be greater as the trade deficit for a 
country gets larger.·· This is in line with Falvey and Gemmell (1991) which states "an 
increase in the real trade deficit raises real income per capita by the corresponding 
increase in real capita expenditure". 
19 
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Falvey and Gemmell (1991) conclude that "an increase in population, ceterisparibus, 
reduces real income per capita by the average reduction in expenditures necessary to 
provide these additional people with the nonnumeraire country's per capita real 
expenditure" . 
Our model shows that as a country's population gets larger the EDNPS figure in the 
model gets smaller (i.e. as a small population will cause a bigger difference when 
compared to the population of the USA thus causing an increase in EDNPS) and this 
therefore demonstrates that as a country's population gets bigger the price of our non 
traded good denoted as DPS (i.e. electricity) decreases as EDNPS has a positive 
correlation to DPS. 
The model also showed that the percentage of thermal generating capacity owned by 
the country concerned had no·s~gnificant effect on the price of electricity . 
. Other Factors Not Considered by the IUEPM 
Although the analysis represents one view of evaluating the determinants electricity 
prices there are also a number of other reasons for price differences which could be 
brought into the argument. Some of these factors are: 
1. Technology Constraints 
2. Indigenous Resources 
3. Energy Mix 
4. Price Elasticities of Demand 
1. Technology Constraints 
The use of certain types of plant could be restricted because of government energy 
- ---policy; resource shortages e.g. spare parts, trade embargoes and shortage of skilled-
staff. Poor fuel input (i.e. use of low quality fuels) could also hinder the efficiency of 
plant. 
2. Indigenous Resources 
Certain countries have an abundance of natural sources of energy. This indigenous 
advantage may not just be large quantities of cheap coal and oil, it could be an 
abundance of water aboye sea level e.g. Hydro generation is responsible for some of 
the worlds cheapest electricity and countries that possess this in abundance will 
usually display lower electricity prices than countries using more conventional forms 
of generation. 
3. Energy Mix 
This can be considered from two aspects - mix of generating stations to produce 
electricity and secondly the mix the country concerned uses to meets its overall fuel 
needs i.e. between electricity, gas and sold fuel. 
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Generating station usage will depend on past planning decisions, government 
restrictions, finance, available technology, grid types and fuel availability. An 
efficiency maximising mix may not always be achieved, which will then result in 
higher prices than normal. 
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Overall fuel mix will depend on the factors above plus any taxes that the government 
may impose on different fuels. Again, achieving an efficiency enhancing fuel mix 
will be difficult and the degree of success achieved will have an effect on all fuel 
prices to customers (as different fuel types do not operate independently from one 
another). 
4. Price Elasticities of Demand 
Demand for fuel use may vary from country to country. When comparing electricity 
prices between different countries, it may be that variances in prices could be due to 
alternative fuels, different tax structures and access arrangements between the 
countries. All the factors above i.e. Technology Constraints, Indigenous Resources 
and Energy Mix could all said to be factors affecting price elasticities of demand. In 
addition, customers in certain countries may be more price sensitive to electricity 
prices than in others (e.g. in cold countries electricity prices may be less price elastic 
and this could result in higher prices). 
Final Comments 
In the period used the model demonstrates that national regulation effects overcame 
international effects on electricity prices. There was heavy regulation in this period. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the price of the traded good (oil) had no significant 
effect on the price differences in electricity prices charged in different countries and 
this was d~moIistrated by t:b.e statis!tclll. output proc.iuced bytge model regarding this 
-----
factor (PT) in the analysis above. 
We see that the PT variable is either negative or not significant in explaining 
differences in electricity prices between countries. The underlying alternative 
hypothesis is that national regulatory factors are significant for determining electricity 
price differences. In some cases, these actually counteract the effect of oil prices. 
This is particularly the case for domestic customers with low maximum demand 
levels. In nearly all cases, the prevailing regulatory regime at the time was some form 
, of rate of retuln regulation or public ownership. These regulatory regimes appear to 
have insulated smaller domestic customers from the full effect of oil price changes. 
Large industrial customers also appeared to be insulated from these changes, although 
this 'insulation' may have come from market power, in terms of these customers 
ability to negotiate good prices (i.e. larger customers are usually enjoy a competitive 
electricity market), rather than from any kind of regulation. 
We have also noted'the other factors not considered by the IUEPM which could have 
affected the price differences observed. ' 
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We have seen that government involvement in utilities is significant and universal in 
the sense that no nations government is so completely confident of market forces that 
they allow them, unhindered, to ensure that the countries energy requirements are 
provided. Indeed, in most cases, government intervention goes much further than this. 
The usual type of government intervention comes from measures to control fuel 
diversity and security issues. In addition, environmental and conservation concerns 
are attracting increasing political attention and intervention. Social policy issues such 
as public safety, the disposal of hazardous materials and employee safety are some of 
the other areas which most governments feel compelled to get involved in. 
Another concern for governments are the activities of foreign administrations in 
relation to the treatment of their own energy industry (i.e. what policies are 
developing overseas) as well as the activities of foreign owned energy subsidiaries 
operating in the home market place and the potential influence they may have on the 
national utility infrastructure (i.e. in other words, what are home based foreign 
companies doing). An associated issue here is the extent of any subsidies being paid 
by national governments to their utility sector and whether this has as any impact on 
the input price to manufacturing industries which may be competing internationally 
i.e. the subsidy could be considered as an aid to the manufacturer to enable cheaper 
production, which could lead to manufacturers in other countries being unfairly 
disadvantaged. Another major concern which many countries have is the level of 
foreign ownership of their electricity industry. Even in the UK, where the 
government has proven fairly receptive to foreign investment, the proposed take-over 
in 1996 of National Power, the United Kingdoms biggest electricity generator, by an 
American utility was ruled out by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. 
In Chapter 1 the underlying economics of regulation are examined. It can be argued 
I----that economistS 'are still trying to find the ideal system of regulation; indeed some of 
the most popular new systems are those that have been tried before in the last century 
i.e. Sliding ScalelProfit Sharing. 
One of the most significant changes in regulation in the past decade has been through 
privatisation of the electricity industry in the UK and the subsequent introduction of 
competition or, where this was not possible, the use of price cap regulation (the 
drivers of this process being the UK business establishment who were concerned 
about the loss of international competitiveness in the 1970s, partly because of the 
inefficiency of utility providers). The apparent success of the 'price cap' system, in 
controlling prices, has influenced regulators in the USA to begin to replace their cost 
of service arrangements with price cap regulation as well as utilising profit sharing 
sliding scale arrangements. The notion of introducing competition into parts of the 
utilities sector, where an unnatural monopoly previously existed, has also taken hold 
in the USA and other countries because of the apparent success of the UK experiment 
with this part of th~ privatisation process. 
Critics of the UK. system of regulation claim that other countries have cherry picked 
the best parts of our system without the drawbacks induced by the political dogma 
Concluding Comments 
that insists that the doctrine has to be pure to its roots (Le. certain UK politicians 
devotion to the Austrian School of economics). It is ironic that the UK privatisation 
process has been the catalyst for privatisation world wide when there is so much 
pressure to reform the system at home. Some of the main criticisms of the regulatory 
process at present is that the system is too fragmented (Le. separate Gas and 
Electricity regulators), there is an indefensible reliance on individual discretion and a 
lack of due procedure and transparency in the regulatory process. 
Chapter 2 concludes that regulation can overcome international movements in 
commodity prices especially where domestic customers are concerned. This 
conclusion was reached by using an econometric model to analyse international 
electricity prices. The conclusion reached by the model may not be surprising if we 
consider the elector - political - agent model discussed in Chapter I Le. domestic 
customers are the electorate who confer power on politicians who use their agents 
(e.g. regulators) to carry out their policies. It would be interesting to see whether in 
the period after 1985 (the last year our econometric model in chapter 2 examines), if 
the more recent changes in regulatory arrangements (perhaps forced through by non 
domestic pressure groups concerned at the price paid for their electricity) have meant 
any shift in favour away from domestic customers, in other words, have business . 
customers had proportionately better price reductions under the new regulatory 
arrangements compared to domestic users? Another interesting issue that the 
introduction of new regulatory arrangements raises is whether the changes made can 
be considered to be Pareto dominating and how near prices achieved under these new 
regimes reflect 'first best' price outcomes compared to those obtained under previous 
arrangements. 
r, 
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